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ABSTRACT 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL AND CONTRACTUAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE 
APPLICATION OF CHAPTER 19 OF THE CHILDREN'S ACT 38 OF 2005 
S.V. Lewis 
Thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the degree Magister Legume, 
University of the Western Cape. 
In this research, I carefully and coherently examine Chapter 19 of the 
Children's Act 38 of 2005 as the first legislation to afford surrogate 
motherhood agreements legal recognition in South Africa. I argue that the 
application of Chapter 19 imposes a number of unwarranted limitations on 
several of the constitutional rights of the parties to a surrogacy agreement. In 
addition, I propose that Chapter 19 is not in accordance with the principal of 
the best interests of the child. 
I examine the history of surrogate motherhood in South Africa and establish 
that, prior to the enactment of Chapter 19, no legislation expressly afforded 
surrogate motherhood agreements legal recognition. Hence, prior to the 
enactment of Chapter 19, parties who entered surrogacy agreements could, 
first, not rely on the agreement to enforce contractual obligations, and 
secondly, the legal positions of the parties to the agreement were uncertain. 
Thirdly, a child born of a surrogacy agreement was seen as the child of the 
surrogate mother and not of the commissioning parents. 
Thereafter, I critically investigate the 1999 recommendations of the Ad Hoc 
Parliamentary Committee on Surrogate Motherhood, in light of the 
Constitution and in light of the general law of contract. In this, I conclude that 
several of the recommendations of the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee are 
constitutionally suspect and may give rise to future constitutional and 
contractual implications. In light of these recommendations, I then direct the 
reader's attention to the impugned recommendations of the Ad Hoc 
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Parliamentary Committee which were incorporated into Chapter 19. This 
leads to a detailed examination of these provisions (and exclusions) and a 
determination of whether the application of these provisions (and exclusions) 
may impose an unreasonable and unjustifiable limitation on the rights of all 
the parties to the surrogacy agreement. 
Whilst investigating surrogacy agreements in terms of the general law of 
contract, I establish that Chapter 19 of the Children's Act, although it affords 
expression to the right to make decisions regarding reproduction, limits the 
rights of persons who choose surrogacy as a form of assisted reproduction. 
Parties are not permitted to choose with whom they wish to contract and what 
obligations will arise as a result of the agreement. I conclude that breach of 
contract in the case of surrogacy agreements cannot be redressed by the 
primary remedies provided by the general law of contract. 
In addition to this, I argue that commercial surrogacy, if adequately regulated, 
can be used to protect the interests of all the parties to a surrogacy 
agreement, as well as to economically uplift the life of the surrogate. 
Lastly, I suggest recommendations for amendments to Chapter 19 which 
would create legislation which truly gives effect to the right to make decisions 
regarding reproduction, as well as providing greater contractual certainty for 
the parties to the surrogacy agreement. 
May 2011 
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CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION TO SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD IN SOUTH AFRICA 
1.1 Background to this research 
When the Children's Act 38 of 2005 (hereinafter referred to as 'the Act') was 
promulgated into law, it introduced groundbreaking legislation. Provisions 
provided for the 'lowering of the age of majority, the outlawing of virginity 
testing, the introduction of a child abusers registry and more importantly, the 
Children's Act, in the form of Chapter 19, was the first legislation to openly 
regulate surrogate motherhood and establish surrogacy as a legally 
recognised procedure of assisted reproduction'. 
Prior to the enactment of Chapter 19, surrogacy, as a form of assisted 
reproduction, had been available for many years in South Africa. The first 
publicised matter was that of Karen Ferreira-Jorge of Tzaneen in 1987. When 
a daughter found out that she was unable to bear children on her own, she 
was reluctant to enlist the services of another surrogate in fear that another 
surrogate may renege on her promise to give up the child at birth. 
Consequently, she approached her 48 year old mother to become her 
surrogate. Her mother accepted, and less than a year later, she gave birth to 
her daughters triplets. 
At the point in time when the Ferreira-Jorge triplets were born, no specific 
legislation dealt with surrogacy. Previous legislation such as the 1986 
Regulations Regarding the Artificial Insemination of Persons and Related 
Matters (in terms of the Human Tissue Act 65 of 1983) and the Children's 
Status Act 82 of 1987 did not make express provision for the practice of 
surrogacy as a form of legally assisted reproduction.1 However both of these 
1 The Human T issue Act 65 of 1983 w a s amended by Act No. 106 of 1984, fur ther a m e n d e d 
by Act No. 51 of 1989 and repealed by Act No. 61 of 2003. Under sect ion 5 of the Chi ldren 's 
Status Act 82 of 1987, the def ini t ion of artif icial inseminat ion did not include the status of a 
chi ld born of a sur rogacy agreement . However , this specif ic Act d id deal wi th the si tuat ion 
whe re the game tes dona ted w e r e that of the w o m a n car ry ing the baby i.e. the surrogate. Here 
the chi ld w a s seen as the legit imate chi ld of the surrogate (b i r th-g iv ing) mother and her 
spouse or partner if they both consen ted to the artif icial fert i l isation. Thus, in te rms of this Act, 
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Acts did include a definition for artificial fertilisation, which the SALC, in its 
Report on Surrogate Motherhood, submitted was capable of the inclusion of 
many of the procedures used to give effect to surrogate motherhood. 2 
After the circulation of the Questionnaire on Surrogate Motherhood in 1989, 
the SALC published a working paper on the topic of surrogacy (Working 
Paper 38: Surrogate Motherhood) and in 1993, a Report on Surrogate 
Motherhood. The published documents and draft legislation were tabled 
before the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee (hereinafter referred to as 'the 
AHPC').3 
In 1999, the Report of the AHPC on the Report of the SALC on Surrogate 
Motherhood was completed and referred to the Department of Justice. In the 
interim, the SALC had commenced its enquiry into the Child Care Act 74 of 
1983, and when the First Issue Paper of the Review of the Child Care Act was 
published in 1998, it openly acknowledged that surrogacy agreements had not 
in the past been sufficiently regulated.4 In 2001, the Issue Paper was followed 
by the Discussion Paper 103 on the Review of the Child Care Act, which 
recognised that the determination of legal parenthood, especially in the case 
of surrogate motherhood, had grown additionally challenging.5 
the result thereof wou ld be direct ly opposed to the purpose of the sur rogacy agreement , 
wh ich is to g ive birth to a chi ld for commiss ion ing parents w h o are unable to do so 
themse lves . The issue of sur rogacy not being direct ly regulated resul ted in the fact that the 
status of a chi ld born of such agreement had to be de termined in te rms of laws wh ich did not 
g ive effect to the des i red intent ion of the part ies: the desire of the commiss ion ing parents to 
be ves ted wi th the legal paren thood of the chi ld. This resul ted in leaving a lacuna in the law of 
parentage of ch i ldren born of surrogate motherhood agreements . S5(3) of the Chi ldren 's 
Status Act 82 of 1987 w a s repealed by the Chi ldren 's Act 38 of 2005. Carnel ley M and Soni S 
'A tale of two mummies . Providing a w o m b in South Afr ica: sur rogacy and the legal r ights of 
the parents wi th in the Chi ldren 's Act 38 of 2005. A brief compara t ive study wi th the Uni ted 
K ingdom' (2008) 22 Speculum Juris, 36; Jordaan RA and Davel CJ Law of Persons (2005), 
106; Boezaart T Law of Persons 5ed (2010), 97. 
2 Par l iamentary Moni tor ing Group Report of the South African Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (1997) avai lable at http://www.pmg.org.za (accessed on 1 June 2010), 4. 
3 The Ad Hoc Commi t tee w a s made up of representat ives of the Afr ican Nat ional Congress, 
Democrat ic Party, F reedom Front, Inkatha F reedom Party, Nat ional Party and the Pan 
Afr icanist Congress of Azania. The Commi t tee w a s chai red by Ms Priscil la Jana MP. Louw 
A S Acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights (unpubl ished LLD thesis, Universi ty of 
Pretoria, 2009), 331. 
4 Louw A S Acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights (unpubl ished LLD thesis, 
Universi ty of Pretoria, 2009) 332; Carne l ley M and Soni S (2008) 22 Speculum Juris, 37. 
5 Carnel ley M and Soni S (2008) 22 Speculum Juris, 37. 
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In 2003, the Children's Bill was tabled in parliament and was followed by the 
finalisation of the Children's Act in 2005. With this, Chapter 19 of the Act 
became the first South African legislation to expressly recognise surrogacy as 
a form of assisted reproduction. 
With reference to the history of surrogate motherhood in South Africa, the 
author intends to determine whether the drafters of Chapter 19 expended 
sufficient time on research whilst investigating surrogate motherhood 
agreements. Having regard to this, it will be determined whether Chapter 19 
provides adequate regulation affording all the parties to a surrogacy 
agreement sufficient legal protection. 
1.2 Explanation of surrogate motherhood as a form of assisted 
reproduction 
Surrogate motherhood is a form of assisted reproduction. Assisted 
reproduction refers to a number of medical techniques that aid fertilisation, 
most of which are used to treat infertility.6 In vitro fertilisation is a form of 
assisted reproduction which is used to fertilise surrogate mothers.7 
A surrogate motherhood agreement is an agreement between a surrogate 
mother and a commissioning parent where it is agreed that the surrogate 
mother will be artificially fertilised for the purpose of bearing a child for the 
commissioning parent, and in which, the surrogate mother undertakes to hand 
Slowik G 'What is assis ted reproduct ion ' (January 2011) avai lable at 
http://www.ehealthmd.com/library/infertility/INF assisted.htm (accessed on 28 Apri l 2011) ; 
Cent re for genet ics and society 'About assis ted reproduct ion ' (March 2010) avai lable at 
http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/section?php?id=89 (accessed on 28 Apri l 2011). 
In vitro fert i l isation refers to the jo in ing of the ovum and the sperm outs ide of the body of the 
gestat ional carr ier. The ovum is retr ieved f rom the non gestat ional mother wi th a minor 
surgical procedure, and then the o v u m is mixed wi th the spe rm and then inserted into the 
uterus of the gestat ional mother. Slowik G 'What is assis ted reproduct ion ' (January 2011) 
avai lable at http://www.ehealthmd.com/library/infertility/INF assisted.htm (accessed on 28 
Apri l 2011) ; Cent re for genet ics and society 'About assis ted reproduct ion ' (March 2010) 
avai lable at http://www.geneticsandsociety.org/section?php?id=89 (accessed on 28 Apri l 
2011) ; Ze l insk i -Wooten M Assisted fertilization and nuclear transfer in mammals (2001) 
Humana Press, USA, 3; Patrizio P, Tucker MJ and Gue lman V The color atlas for human 
assisted reproduction: Laboratory and clinical insights (2003), Lippincott, Wi l l iams & Wilk ins, 
24, 25. 
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over such child to the commissioning parent upon its birth, or within a 
reasonable time thereafter, with the intention that the child concerned 
becomes the legitimate child of the commissioning parent.8 
The term surrogate refers to the substitute or 'stand-in' mother who is 
implanted with the embryo and who takes on the role of mother until birth.9 
The commissioning parent or parents are the individual or the couple who 
intend(s) to raise the child after birth.10 
Despite the fact that surrogate motherhood has been provided legal 
recognition as a form of assisted reproduction, and with that, the reproductive 
rights of many have been afforded expression, this research aims to show 
that Chapter 19 of the Act does not permit parties to a surrogacy agreement 
to fully exercise their right to make decisions regarding reproduction. 
1.3 Reproductive rights and surrogate motherhood 
When an individual or a couple choose to make use of a surrogate mother to 
give them a child that they would not ordinarily be able to have, such 
individual or couple exercise their right to make a decision regarding 
reproduction. The right to make decisions regarding reproduction is codified in 
the form of section 12(2) of the Constitution. 
In affording the right to make decisions regarding reproduction, section 12(2) 
effectively acknowledges that the power to make decisions concerning 
reproduction is a crucial aspect of one's control over one's own body.11 
Section 12(2) gives women control over their own fertility and provides a 
9 Sect ion 1 of the Act. 
9 Louw A Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood in Davel CJ and Skel ton A Commentary on the 
Children's Act 38 of 2005 (2007), 19-3; K issoonnduth K 'Egg donat ion and surrogacy ' 
avai lable at http://www.infertility-support.org.za/surrogacy.htm (2007) (accessed on 16 
November 2009). 
10 O' Sul l ivan, M and Bailey, C 'Reproduct ive Rights, Revis ion Serv ice 2' avai lable at 
www.chr .up.ac .za/cent re-pub l ica t ions/const i tu law/pdf /16- reproduct ion%20r ights .pdf (2008) 
(accessed on 28 February 2010). 
1 'Sect ion 12(2) af fords recogni t ion to reproduct ive au tonomy: the right to reproduct ive self-
governance ' . Curr ie I and De Waa l J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2010), 308. 
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framework within which women will actually be able to enjoy the freedom to 
chose how and when to have children. The rationale behind the inclusion of 
section 12(2) of the Constitution is that the legislature recognised 'that some 
of the most devastating and socially entrenched forms of physical and 
psychological oppression and exploitation relate to reproduction and 
sexuality'.12 For example, often the circumstance in which a woman becomes 
pregnant is beyond her control.13 Consequently, section 12(2) expressly 
recognises reproductive choice.14 
Hence, as a result of the application of section 12(2) of the Constitution, 
parties to a surrogacy agreement have the right to choose surrogacy as a 
form of reproduction. Nonetheless, this research will show that Chapter 19 of 
the Act does not afford full recognition to the right to make decisions regarding 
reproduction. 
1.4 Contractual freedom and compensation for reproductive services 
Surrogacy agreements are valid and enforceable contracts once they are 
sanctioned by the High Court. The effect of such confirmation is that the 
parties to the agreement are obligated to perform in terms of their contractual 
obligations. Nonetheless, surrogacy agreements will be shown not to be, in 
the ordinary sense of contractual law, enforceable as a result of the distinction 
which the legislation has made regarding full and partial surrogacy 
agreements.15 
12 The effect of the inclusion of sect ion 12(2) is that it recognises the reality that many w o m e n 
do not enjoy secur i ty in and control over their bod ies - the except ional ly high rate of rape, 
sexual abuse, forced sexual intercourse, domest ic v io lence and femic ide in South Afr ica is 
ev idence of this. Bishop M and W o o l m a n S Constitutional Law of South Africa: Freedom and 
security of the person 2ed (2007), 40-81; O' Sul l ivan M Constitutional Law of South Africa: 
Reproductive Rights 2ed (2007), 37-17. 
13 O'Sul l ivan M Constitutional Law of South Africa: Reproductive Rights 2ed (2007), 37-17. 
14 O'Sul l ivan M Constitutional Law of South Africa: Reproductive Rights (2007), 37-18; Curr ie 
I and De Waa l J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2010), 274. 
15 In a full sur rogacy agreement , the surrogate mother is only the gestat ional mother. In the 
case of part ial surrogacy, the surrogate takes on the role of both the gestat ional and genet ic 
mother of the chi ld to be born of the sur rogacy agreement . This dist inct ion wil l receive greater 
examinat ion throughout the course of th is research. 
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Having regard to this, it will be shown that commercial surrogacy and the right 
to be compensated for reproductive services should be permitted by the Act. 
Despite the fact that the parties to a surrogacy agreement enter the 
agreement freely with the intention to be bound by its obligations, 
circumstances may change where the parties no longer want to fulfil their 
contractual obligations. Hence, financial compensation may sometimes 
become necessary in assuring that the positions of the parties to any contract 
are secured. 
With this in mind, this research will determine if commercial surrogacy is a 
viable option that can be adequately regulated. In addition to this, this 
research will determine if the prohibition of commercial surrogacy amounts to 
an unwarranted limitation on the freedom to contract, on the right to 
occupational freedom and on the right to make decisions regarding 
reproduction. 
1.5 Aim of this Research 
The primary aim of this research is to clarify, examine and assess Chapter 19 
of the Children's Act relating to surrogate motherhood agreements in South 
Africa. This research will show that Chapter 19, in its current form, raises 
several constitutional and contractual implications for the parties to a 
surrogate motherhood agreement. 
This research will contribute towards the realisation that Chapter 19, in its 
current form, does not sufficiently realise the right to make decisions 
regarding reproduction, the right to equality, the right to culture, and the right 
to economic activity, and is not in accordance with the principal of the best 
interests of the child. In addition to this, this research will contribute to the 
realisation that differentiating on the basis of genetic relation is not in the 
interests of all the parties concerned and does not provide contractual clarity 
and protection to all the parties to the agreement. 
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In addition to the above, this research will contribute towards illustrating, with 
reference to the laws of surrogacy in Israel, that adequately regulated 
commercial surrogacy does not inevitably give rise to exploitation of the 
parties to the surrogacy agreement and can be used for the economic 
upliftment surrogate mothers as well as to create surrogacy agreements that 
favour all positions of the parties to the agreement. 
With this in mind, this research will provide recommendations regarding 
amendments to Chapter 19, which if taken into consideration, will have the 
effect that surrogate motherhood agreements can be sufficiently regulated so 
as to provide adequate legal certainty for all the parties concerned. 
1.6 Significance of this research 
This research will draw attention to specific provisions of the Act which 
impose unwarranted limitations on the rights of parties to a surrogacy 
agreement. 
While previous papers on Chapter 19 have examined Chapter 19 as a whole, 
this research will identify several provisions which, the author submits, are 
candidates for future constitutional challenges. In addition to this, this 
research will devote an entire chapter to the contractual implications of the 
application of Chapter 19 of the Act. Hence, this research will be the first to 
examine each suspect provision in great detail and illustrate the impact such 
provision has on the both the constitutional rights of the parties as well as the 
impact that Chapter 19 has on the freedom to contract and the principle of 
pacta sunt servanda. 
1.7 Research Question 
Chapter 19 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005 provides for surrogate 
motherhood as a legally recognised method of assisted reproduction. The 
research question posed is whether the application of Chapter 19 of the Act 
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imposes unreasonable and unjustifiable limitations on the rights of the parties 
to the surrogacy agreement? 
1.8 Literature review 
The method which was employed to undertake this research was primarily 
through an extensive literature review. However, where necessary, some 
practical work was carried out in the form of discussions with legal 
practitioners, legal academics as well of people who had been/were parties to 
a surrogacy agreement. 
There is only one piece of legislation which expressly deals with surrogate 
motherhood in South Africa, and as a result, Chapter 19 of the Act formed the 
primary source of information relating to the legalisation of surrogate 
motherhood in South Africa. Chapter 19 of the Act is annexed to this research 
and marked 'A1' for ease of reference. 
Another source which was vital to this research was the 2007 Commentary 
and 2009 Doctoral thesis of Professor Anne Louw of the University of 
Pretoria. Both the 2007 Commentary and the 2009 Doctoral thesis provided 
great assistance in understanding the purpose, intentions and content of 
Chapter 19.16 
Lastly, journals, articles, textbooks, theses and dissertations also formed a 
large part of this research, and where it became necessary, international 
conventions, foreign legislation and foreign case law was also referred to. 
1.9 Chapter outline 
1.9.1 Chapter one: Introduction to surrogate motherhood in South Africa 
16 Louw A Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood in Davel CJ and Skel ton A Commentary on the 
Children's Act 380 of 2005 (2007); Louw A S Acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights 
(unpubl ished LLD thesis, Universi ty of Pretoria, 2009) . 
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The introduction sets out the background to this research, the important 
concepts as well as the aims and significance of this research. In addition to 
this, chapter one identifies the problem statement and provides for an 
overview of forthcoming chapters. 
1.9.2 Chapter two: Legislative history of surrogacy in South Africa 
The purpose of chapter two of this research is to provide a foundation upon 
which the constitutional and contractual issues of Chapter 19 of the Act can 
be examined. Chapter two will commence with the terminology of a surrogacy 
agreement and thereafter, previous surrogate motherhood regulatory policies 
will be examined. 
The bulk of chapter two will take the form of a comprehensive examination of 
the 1999 recommendations of the AHPC. The examination will be three fold, 
first the purpose for the inclusion (or exclusion) of the recommendation for be 
examined and secondly, it will be stipulated whether the recommendation was 
wholly or partially incorporated into Chapter 19 of the Act, or whether the 
recommendation was excluded as a whole by the legislature. Thirdly, the 
recommendations will be briefly analysed in light of the rights as enshrined in 
the Constitution, and an initial submission will be presented regarding whether 
such recommendation may amount to an infringement of the constitutional 
rights and contractual liberties of the parties to a surrogacy agreement. 
1.9.3 Chapter three: The constitutionality of Chapter 19 
This focus of chapter three is the constitutional implications which may arise 
out of the application of Chapter 19 on the rights of the potential parties to the 
surrogacy agreement. 
This chapter will commence with an introduction to the Constitution with 
particular attention being afforded to the rights to equality, human dignity and 
the right to make decisions regarding reproduction. These rights will be shown 
to be the three primary rights which are implicated through the operation of 
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the provisions of Chapter 19 of the Act, and ultimately, this chapter aims to 
determine if Chapter 19 gives effect to these above-mentioned rights, or if the 
respective provisions of Chapter 19 place a constitutionally unacceptable 
limitation on the exercise of these rights. 
Having regard to the above, the chapter will then re-examine the provisions of 
the Act which were identified as being constitutionally impugned in chapter 
two, in light of the constitutional implications that their application may have 
on the rights of the potential commissioning parents, the rights of the potential 
surrogate mother, and lastly, on the principle of the best interests of the child. 
In addition to this, the chapter will also examine the implications of the non-
recognition of cultural surrogacy on the rights of parties to cultural surrogacy 
agreements, and the implications of omitting to include a maximum age bar 
for potential surrogate mothers. 
In conclusion, this chapter will show that, despite the fact that Chapter 19 has 
afforded legal recognition to surrogacy as a form of assisted reproduction, 
many of the provisions of Chapter 19 impose unjustifiable restrictions on the 
rights of all the parties to a surrogacy agreement which do not serve 
constitutionally acceptable purposes. 
1.9.4 Chapter four: The contractual issues of Chapter 19 
This chapter will provide a comprehensive investigation into the contractual 
implications of the application of Chapter 19 of the Act. The chapter will 
commence with brief discussion of the principles of the freedom of contract 
and pacta sunt servanda, and subsequent to this, the seven requirements of a 
valid contract will be examined. 
Having regard to the fact that a surrogacy contract is deemed to be valid and 
enforceable from the moment the agreement has been confirmed by the High 
Court, the three forms of breach of contract will then be discussed. Within this 
discussion, hypothetical situations of breach of surrogacy agreements will be 
presented. 
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Thereafter, the chapter will then discuss the primary remedies available to 
innocent contractants in the case of breach, and the remedies will be applied 
to breach of surrogacy agreements. With this is mind, it will be shown that the 
primary remedies which are available for contractants in the general law of 
contract will be neither plausible in the case of breach of a surrogacy 
agreement, nor will provide sufficient redress for the innocent party to a 
surrogacy agreement. 
Subsequently, this chapter turns to the issue of enforceability. Focusing on 
section 297, 298 and 299 of the Act, a determination will be made as to what 
contractual implications arise out of the application of the Act, and whether 
Chapter 19 affords recognition to the principles of the freedom of contract and 
the principle of pacta sunt servanda. 
Lastly, chapter two investigates the practice of commercial surrogacy. First, a 
determination is made as to whether section 22 of the Constitution (the right 
to occupational freedom) can be interpreted to mean that women are entitled 
to be compensated for their reproductive services, and secondly, after having 
submitted the affirmative, the chapter will reflect on the practice of commercial 
surrogacy in Israel and illustrate that commercial surrogacy is legally viable 
when adequately regulated. 
1.9.5 Chapter five: Conclusions and recommendations 
The final chapter discusses the conclusions drawn from the research and 
provides recommendations regarding the amendment of Chapter 19 of the 
Act. Finally, the author will respond to the research question. 
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CHAPTER TWO: 
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF SURROGACY IN SOUTH AFRICA 
'Now Sarai Abram's wife bare him no children; and she had an handmaid, an Egyptian, 
whose name was Hagar. And Sarai said unto Abram, Behold now, the Lord has restrained me 
from bearing: I pray thee, go in unto my maid; it may be that I may obtain children from her. 
And Hagar bare Abram a son: and Abram called his son's name, which Hagar bare, Ishmael'. 
Genesis 16:1-2 and 15 
2.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to lay a foundation regarding surrogate 
motherhood practice and legislation in South Africa. A brief discussion 
regarding the relevant terminology will be presented, and thereafter the 
historical background of surrogacy in South Africa will be examined in light of 
the Reports of the South African Law Commission (hereinafter referred to as 
the SALC) and the Ad Hoc Parliamentary Committee (hereinafter referred to 
as the AHPC).17 Subsequently, the author will look at Chapter 19 of the Act 
and the respective provisions which form the basis of the constitutional 
investigations which will occur in all of the following chapters. 
2.1.1 Terminology 
Section 1(1) of the Act defines a surrogate motherhood agreement as 'an 
agreement between a surrogate mother and a commissioning parent whereby 
it is agreed that the surrogate mother will be artificially fertilised18 for the 
17 Despi te the fact that the author makes reference to the South Afr ican Law Commiss ion and 
the SALC, the name of the S A L C has changed as a result of the promulgat ion of sect ion 4 
and sect ion 5 of The Judicial Mat ters A m e n d m e n t Act 55 of 2002. The S A L C w a s or iginal ly 
establ ished in te rms of the South Afr ican Law Commiss ion Act 19 of 1973. SALRC Bulletin 
Vol 8: 1 (January 2003) avai lable at http://www.justice.aov.za/salrc.bltns2003 volnl jan.pdf 
(accessed on 1 June 2010), 1. 
8Artif icial fert i l isat ion is def ined in sect ion 1 of the Chi ldren 's Act 38 of 2005 as ' [T]he 
introduct ion, by means other than natural means, of a male gamete into the internal 
reproduct ive organs of a female person for the purpose of human reproduct ion, including the 
br inging together of a male and female gamete outs ide the human 's body wi th a v iew to 
placing the product of a union of such gametes in the w o m b of a female person; or the placing 
of the product of a union of male and female game tes wh ich have been brought together 
outs ide the human body, in the w o m b of a female person' . In the case of artif icial fert i l isation, 
di f ferent iat ion is made be tween AID and AIH chi ldren. In the latter case, AIH chi ldren are 
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purpose of bearing a child for the commissioning parent, and according to the 
agreement, the surrogate mother undertakes to hand over such child to the 
commissioning parent upon its birth, or within a reasonable time thereafter, 
with the intention that the child concerned becomes the legitimate child of the 
commissioning parent.'19 
The commissioning parent or parents are the individual or the couple who 
intend(s) to raise the child after birth. The term 'surrogate' refers to the 
substitute or 'stand-in' mother who is implanted with the embryo and who 
takes on the role of mother until birth.20 
Two forms of surrogacy practice are recognised in South Africa, namely 
partial and full. Full surrogacy is where the surrogate has no biological 
relationship with the commissioning parent whereas, in the instance of partial 
surrogacy, some form of biological relationship exists.21 
2.1.2 Legislative background of surrogate motherhood agreements in South 
Africa 
Surrogacy has been available for many years in South Africa, the first 
recognised case being that of Karen Ferreira-Jorge of Tzaneen in 1987 where 
a 48 year old mother carried her daughter's triplets to term. The daughter was 
unable to bear children of her own and had been discouraged from enlisting 
the services of an unknown surrogate in fear that the surrogate may renege 
on her promise to give up the baby at birth. Her own mother, after offering her 
conce ived wi th the game tes of the husband or partner wi th that of a female spouse or partner. 
In the case of A ID chi ldren, the gametes of a third party donor are used in the process of 
artificial fert i l isation. Jo rdaan RA and Davel CJ Law of Persons (2005), 105. 
19 Louw A Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood in Davel CJ and Skel ton A Commentary on the 
Children's Act 38 of 2005 (2007), 7. 
20 A surrogate mother is def ined in sect ion 1(1) of the Act as 'an adult w o m a n w h o enters into 
a surrogate motherhood agreement wi th the commiss ion ing parent ' . It is submi t ted that the 
surrogate mother is 'the w o m a n w h o agrees to ges ta te and bear the chi ld rather than the 
w o m a n w h o intends to rear the child'. Louw A S Acquisition of parental responsibilities and 
rights (unpubl ished LLD thesis, Universi ty of Pretoria, 2009) , 335; Par l iamentary Moni tor ing 
Group Report of the South African Law Commission on Surrogate Motherhood (1997) 
avai lable at http://www.pmg.org.za (accessed on 1 June 2010), 5 - 6. 
21 Carnel ley M and Soni S (2008) 22 Speculum Juris, 37. 
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assistance and after the process of having her own ova stimulated, gave birth 
to triplets. 
In South Africa surrogacy, as a form of assisted reproduction, is legally 
recognised and regulated by Chapter 19 of the Act. In short, Chapter 19 
provides that: 
i surrogacy agreements which are sanctioned by the High Court are 
valid and enforceable between parties;22 
ii the commissioning parent(s) are recognised as the legal parent(s) 
from date of birth;23 
iii the child born of the agreement is for legal purposes the child of the 
commissioning parents; and24 
iv surrogacy in exchange for commercial gain is prohibited.25 
2.1.3 Previous regulatory policies 
Prior to the Act, no specific legislation dealt with surrogacy. The 1986 
Regulations Regarding the Artificial Insemination of Persons and Related 
Matters (in terms of the Human Tissue Act 65 of 198326) and the Children's 
Status Act 82 of 1987 did not explicitly provide for surrogacy agreements; 
however neither expressly prohibited the practice either and both Acts did 
have an implicit impact on the practice.27 The Children's Status Act defined 
22 Sect ion 292(1)(e) prov ides that no sur rogacy agreement is val id unless conf i rmed by the 
High Court (subject to the part ies meet ing the other requ i rements speci f ied in sect ion 295). 
23 In other countr ies such as the UK there is a defaul t legal assumpt ion that the w o m e n giv ing 
birth to that chi ld is the chi ld 's legal mother. 
24 Sect ion 297(1)(a) of the Act prov ides that 'any chi ld born of a surrogate mother in 
accordance wi th the agreement is for all purposes the chi ld of the commiss ion ing parent or 
parents f rom the moment of birth of the chi ld concerned ' . Louw A S Acquisition of parental 
responsibilities and rights (unpubl ished LLD thesis, Universi ty of Pretoria, 2009) , 356. 
25 Sect ion 301 of the Act prohibi ts payment in respect of sur rogacy agreements . Sect ion 305 
st ipulates the possib le o f fences and respect ive pun ishments . The surrogate may only enter 
the agreement for pure ly altruist ic reasons and the only compensa t ion she is ent i t led to 
receive f rom the commiss ion ing parents is compensa t ion in respect of reasonable expenses. 
Carnel ley M and Soni S (2008) 22 Speculum Juris, 41; Louw A S Acquisition of parental 
responsibilities and rights (unpubl ished LLD thesis, 2009), 350, 355, 361, 368. 
26 The Human T issue Act 65 of 1983 w a s a m e n d e d by Act No. 106 of 1984, fur ther amended 
b_y Act No. 51 of 1989 and repealed by Act No. 61 of 2003. 
2 Under sect ion 5 of the Chi ldren 's Status Act 82 of 1987, the def ini t ion of artif icial 
inseminat ion did not include the status of a chi ld born of a sur rogacy agreement . However , 
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artificial insemination "as the introduction by other than natural means of male 
gamete or gametes into the reproductive organs of a woman or by placing the 
product of a union of a male and female gamete or gametes which have been 
brought together outside the human body in the womb of that women".28 As 
the SALC noted in its 1997 Report on Surrogate Motherhood, legally, this was 
an all encompassing definition which was capable of the inclusion of many of 
the procedures used to give effect to surrogacy agreements.29 
In 1987, the absence of specific legislation governing surrogacy as well as the 
highly publicised nature of the Ferreira-Jorge case led the SALC to begin 
investigating the matter. Following the circulation of a Questionnaire on 
Surrogate Motherhood in 1989, the SALC published a working paper on the 
topic of surrogacy (Working Paper 38: Surrogate Motherhood) and in 1993, a 
Report on Surrogate Motherhood. The published documents and draft 
legislation were tabled before the AHPC.30 
2.2 The issues and recommendations of the SALC and AHPC 
The AHPC's term of reference was 'to enquire into and report upon the 
SALC's Report on Surrogate Motherhood'. The AHPC expanded on its terms 
and conducted additional research of its own. This was a result of the 'thought 
th is specif ic Act did deal w i th the si tuat ion whe re the game tes donated were that of the 
w o m a n carry ing the baby i.e. the surrogate. Here the chi ld w a s seen as the legi t imate chi ld of 
the surrogate (birth-giving) mother and her spouse or partner if they both consented to the 
artificial fert i l isation. Thus, in te rms of th is Act, the result thereof wou ld be direct ly opposed to 
the purpose of the sur rogacy agreement , wh ich is to g ive birth to a chi ld for commiss ion ing 
parents w h o are unable to do so themse lves . The issue of sur rogacy not be ing direct ly 
regulated resulted in the fact that the status of a chi ld born of such agreement had to be 
determined in te rms of laws wh ich did not g ive effect to the desi red intention of the part ies: 
the desi re of the commiss ion ing parents to be ves ted wi th the legal parenthood of the child. 
This resul ted in a lacuna in the law of parentage of chi ldren born of surrogate motherhood 
agreements . Carne l ley M and Soni S (2008) 22 Speculum Juris, 36; Jo rdaan RA and Davel 
CJ Law of Persons (2005), 106; Boezaar t T Law of Persons 5ed (2010), 97. 
28 S5(3) of the Chi ldren 's Status Act 82 of 1987 w a s repealed by the Chi ldren 's Act 38 of 
2005. 
29 Par l iamentary Moni tor ing Group Report of the South African Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (1997) avai lable at http://www.pmg.org.za (accessed on 1 June 2010), 4. 
30 The Ad Hoc Commi t tee w a s made up of representat ives of the Afr ican Nat ional Congress , 
Democrat ic Party, F reedom Front, Inkatha F reedom Party, Nat ional Party and the Pan 
Afr icanist Congress of Azania . The Commi t tee w a s cha i red by Ms Priscil la Jana MP. Louw 
A S Acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights (unpubl ished LLD thesis, Universi ty of 
Pretoria, 2009), 331. 
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that [at the time], the SALC was inappropriately constituted in terms of gender 
and race; that some of the recommendations made were not in line with the 
Constitution and the consultation process followed [had been] inadequate'.31 
The AHPC hosted informative comprehensive workshops with experts on 
surrogacy; conducted public hearings and called for written submissions on 
the draft Bill contained in Schedule A to the SALC's Report through 
advertisements in newspapers and invitations to all relevant stakeholders.32 
Study tours were undertaken in the North West Province, Northern Province, 
Eastern Cape Province and KwaZulu Natal Province. The four mentioned 
provinces of South Africa were specifically targeted, the rationale being that 
they were predominantly black regions where most cultures traditionally 
permitted surrogacy as a form of assisted reproduction. Visits to the United 
States and the United Kingdom were also made to investigate how the matter 
of surrogacy was being dealt with in international jurisdictions. The report of 
the AHPC was finalised in 1999. A second round of draft legislation was 
developed by the SALC, in correlation with the AHPC's recommendations, 
and was referred thereafter to the Minister of Justice for finalisation.33 
A summary of the Committee's recommendations can be briefly stated as 
follows; 
31 Louw A S Acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights (unpubl ished LLD thesis , 
Universi ty of Pretoria, 2009) 331 fn 25; Report of the A d Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood (11 February 1999) avai lable at 
http//www. pmg. org, za/docs/1999/990211. saclreport. h tml (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 2. 
The A d Hoc Par l iamentary Commi t tee on Surrogate Motherhood w a s the first par l iamentary 
commi t tee to be estab l ished outs ide that of the SALC. Previous SALC Reports were solely 
S A L C Reports, and no external boards or inst i tut ions had ever been requested to assist in an 
S A L C Report. The rat ionale behind the inclusion of the A H P C w a s that the S A L C of the ear ly 
1990's still cons is ted of members w h o s e thoughts and suggest ions w e r e based on the pre-
1994 reg ime whe re concepts such as equal i ty, human digni ty and f reedom w e r e so- to-say 
non-existent . Tak ing th is into regard, and th is wil l be ev idenced th rough this research, the 
S A L C Report w a s presented prior to the enactment of both the Inter im and the Final 
Const i tut ion, and thus the major i ty of the suggest ions put fo rward by the S A L C were 
supposed to not be in accordance wi th the Bill of Rights as it exists today. Report of the Ad 
Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) 
avai lable at http//www.pmg.org.za/docs/1999/990211.saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apri l 
2011), 1. 
33 The A H P C ' s respect ive reports w e r e the inter im report and the 1999 Report of the Ad Hoc 
Par l iamentary Commi t tee on the Report of the South Afr ican Law Commiss ion on Surrogacy. 
Louw A S Acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights (unpubl ished LLD thesis, 
Universi ty of Pretoria, 2009) , 332; Carne l ley M and Soni S (2008) 22 Speculum Juris, 36. 
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'Surrogacy should not be banned or cr iminal ised in South Afr ica ... [it should] rather be 
recognised and regulated by legislation. Surrogate motherhood should be permi t ted for 
marr ied coup les only, [and] the wi fe has to be incapable of g iv ing birth for medica l 
reasons ... her condi t ion [must be] permanent and irreversible. The game tes of both 
commiss ion ing parents have to be used . w h e r e this is not possib le; the game tes of at 
least one [commiss ion ing parent] and a donor [are] to be used. The donor should not be 
the surrogate or her husband. 
The wr i t ten surrogate agreement has to be conf i rmed by the [High] Court who , in order 
to proper ly cons ider the appl icat ion for conf i rmat ion, [must be presented with] conc lus ive 
ev idence. . .w i th regard to the physical and psycholog ica l suitabi l i ty of the surrogate 
mother to act as such, the psychologica l suitabi l i ty of the commiss ion ing parents to 
accept paren thood of the chi ld, the fami ly c i rcumstances of the part ies in quest ion, and 
the interests of any descendant or adopted chi ld of the commiss ion ing parents. 
The surrogate wi l l only be compensa ted for actual expenses in connect ion w i th [the] 
conf i rmat ion and execut ion of the agreement . The effect of a val id surrogate motherhood 
agreement wou ld be that any chi ld born of such artif icial fert i l isation ... wou ld for all 
purposes be the chi ld of the commiss ion ing p a r e n t s . [and] the surrogate wou ld have no 
right of parenthood, custody 3 4 or access 3 5 to the chi ld. ' 
Although the AHPC did not accept the SALC's Report in its original structure, 
both the SALC and the AHPC did accept that the majority of persons were in 
34 In te rms of the Act , 'custody' is now referred to as 'care' and is def ined in sect ion 1, in 
relation to a child, as: '(a) wi th in avai lable means, prov id ing the chi ld wi th (i) a sui table p lace 
to live; (ii) l iving condi t ions that are conduct ive to the chi ld 's health, wel l -be ing and 
deve lopment ; and (iii) the necessary f inancial support ; (b) sa feguard ing and promot ing the 
wel l -be ing of the chi ld; (c) protect ing the chi ld f rom mal t reatment , abuse, neglect, 
degradat ion, d iscr iminat ion, exploi tat ion and any other physical , emot ional or moral harm or 
hazards; (d) respect ing, protect ing, p romot ing and secur ing the ful f i lment of, and guard ing 
against any infr ingement of the chi ld 's r ights set out in the Bill of Rights and the pr inciples set 
out in Chapter 2 of the Chi ldren's Act ; (e) guiding, direct ing and secur ing the chi ld 's educat ion 
and upbr inging, including rel igious and cultural educat ion and upbr inging, in a manner 
appropr ia te to the chi ld 's age, matur i ty and stage of deve lopment ; gu id ing and advis ing and 
assist ing the chi ld in dec is ions to be taken by the chi ld in a manner appropr ia te to the chi ld 's 
age, matur i ty and stage of deve lopment ; (g) gu id ing the behaviour of the chi ld in a humane 
manner ; (h) mainta in ing a sound relat ionship wi th the chi ld; (i) accommoda t ing any special 
needs that the chi ld may have; and (j) general ly , ensur ing that the best interests of the chi ld is 
the paramount concern in all matters af fect ing the chi ld. ' 
35 In te rms of the Act, 'access ' is now referred to as 'contact ' and is def ined in sect ion 1 of the 
Act , in relat ion to a chi ld, as : '(a) maintain ing a personal relat ionship w i th the chi ld; and (b) if 
the chi ld l ives wi th someone else- (i) commun ica t ion on a regular basis wi th the chi ld in 
person, including- (aa) visi t ing the chi ld; or (bb) being v is i ted by the chi ld; or (ii) 
commun ica t ion on a regular basis wi th the chi ld in any other manner , including - (aa) th rough 
the post; or (bb) by te lephone or any other fo rm of electronic communica t ion . ' 
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favour of surrogacy as a legitimate alternative for irreversibly infertile persons 
who did not want to adopt (because they instead wanted the opportunity to 
have children of their own: children genetically related to themselves). In 
addition, both bodies also identified many common issues in the practice of 
surrogacy as a form of assisted reproduction. Ultimately it was agreed that 
surrogacy should not be banned in South Africa, but instead be recognised 
and regulated through legislation.36 
For purposes of this research, the author does not intend to comprehensively 
examine all of the issues identified by the respective bodies. The first half of 
the analysis which follows considers those AHPC recommendations which are 
of actual relevance to this study (because of the constitutional and/or 
contractual implications which their application may have); the second half of 
this examination will take the form of a brief analysis of other 
recommendations. The recommendations which will receive thorough analysis 
are in relation to: 
i the different types of surrogacy practised in South Africa, 
ii the qualifications required of parties to a surrogacy agreement, 
iii the rights and obligations of the parties to the agreement, and 
iv the prohibition of commercial surrogacy. 
In addition to this, brief mention will be afforded to the best interests of the 
child (specifically in respect of knowledge of genetic origin and publication of 
36 It w a s agreed by the A H P C that the opin ion of the S A L C that the genera l pr inciples 
prov ided by the law of contract may be insuff icient to regulate the rights and obl igat ions of 
part ies to the agreement w a s correct, and that, despi te the agreement be ing crucial to the 
actual surrogate motherhood, the agreement should not be used as the most important factor 
in the determinat ion of such r ights and dut ies. Instead both the S A L C and the A H P C dec ided 
that legislat ion should be suff ic ient ly adequate so that the rights, obl igat ions and legal 
consequences of the agreement itself are clear to all part ies and to ul t imately ensure that the 
best interests of all, most important ly the interests of the child, are protected. Report of the Ad 
Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) 
avai lable at http//www.pmg.org.za/docs/1999/990211.saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apri l 
2011), 1, 4. For further d iscuss ion regarding the contractual aspects of surrogate motherhood 
agreements see chapter 4. 
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identities) and state funded fertility clinics (in respect of the right to 
reproductive health).37 
Before the author commences with an examination into the above mentioned 
AHPC recommendations, it is necessary to recapitulate the purpose of this 
chapter. The purpose of this chapter is to establish a foundation for the 
constitutional and contractual investigation into the provisions of Chapter 19 
which will take place in chapter three and four respectively. What is important 
to note, is that when the SALC carried out its Report in 1993, South Africa 
was yet to promulgate the Interim Constitution. Consequently, the SALC 
submissions were presented without taking into consideration the values of 
equality, human dignity and freedom which today, form the basis of our 
constitutional supremacy. Thus, when the AHPC was appointed to examine 
and reconsider the SALC submissions, this was the first time that surrogacy 
was considered in light of the Constitution (despite the Constitution being just 
over 2 years old). As a result, many of the AHPC recommendations focused 
on the constitutional implications that the SALC submissions might have on 
the rights of the parties to a surrogacy agreement. 
In respect of the above, and because this research considers Chapter 19 in 
respect of its constitutional implications, the author will focus on the AHPC's 
recommendations in view of the fact that these recommendations were 
presented with the Constitution at hand. Nonetheless, and this will be 
evidenced in the forthcoming paragraphs, despite the fact that the AHPC took 
into consideration the fundamental rights as contained in Chapter two of the 
Constitution, some of the recommendations of the ADPC were not 
incorporated into Chapter 19 of the Act, and many that were, cannot be said 
to be in accordance with the principles of the Constitution. 
2.2.1 Types of surrogacy 
2.2.1.1 Cultural surrogacy 
37 These three issues wi l l be dealt w i th comprehens ive ly in Chapter 3 and 4 respect ively. 
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The first aspect of the recommendations which will be examined is the 
distinction made by the SALC and the AHPC in respect of informal and formal 
surrogacy. The SALC and the AHPC recognised that both these types of 
surrogacy practices are practiced in South Africa, and both the SALC and the 
AHPC submitted that informal surrogacy should not be permitted. 
The AHPC found that informal surrogacy (hereinafter referred to as 'cultural 
surrogacy') was found to be practiced in most traditional South African 
communities and referred to the insemination of the surrogate mother with the 
gametes of the commissioning parent. It was found that cultural surrogacy is 
privately performed by the parties, according to accepted customary 
practices, without the intervention of medical doctors or clinics.38 In cultural 
surrogacy, the surrogate is both the genetic and gestational mother. 39 
Despite the fact that the practice of cultural surrogacy was identified as being 
in existence, the AHPC was nonetheless of the opinion that cultural 
surrogacy, as a result of it being privately performed, should not be included 
in future surrogacy legislation on the ground that cultural surrogacy does not 
protect the interests of all the parties concerned.40 
As a result of the recommendation submitted by the AHPC that cultural 
surrogacy not be legislated or legally recognised, cultural surrogacy has not 
been recognised as a form of artificial fertilisation in the Act. In fact, cultural 
surrogacy has not been acknowledged through either prohibition or 
endorsement: there is not a single word or phrase incorporated into the Act 
38 Report of the A d Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) avai lable at 
http//www. pmg. org. za/docs/1999/990211. saclreport. h tml (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 4. 
The Concise Medical Dictionary (1999), 283, 285 def ines the 'genetic mother ' as the 
mother f rom w h o m the chi ld acqui res his or her genet ic mater ial wh i ch is carr ied at a 
part icular p lace on a ch romosome. A c h r o m o s o m e is one of the threadl ike st ructures in a cell 
nuc leus that carr ies the genet ic informat ion. The nuc leus of each human cell conta ins 46 
ch romosomes ; 23 maternal and 23 paternal. 'Gestat ional mother ' is def ined as the w o m a n 
wi th in wh i ch the fert i l ised cell (ovum and sperm comb ined that deve lop into embryo) deve lops 
into a baby ready to be del ivered. 
40 Louw A S Acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights (unpubl ished LLD thesis, 
Universi ty of Pretoria, 2009) , 335; Carnel ley M and Soni S (2008) 22 Speculum Juris, 37; 
Par l iamentary Moni tor ing Group Report of the South African Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (1997) avai lable at http://www.pmg.org.za (accessed on 1 June 2010), 6. 
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which can be interpreted to mean that cultural surrogacy is or is not permitted 
as a form of legally assisted reproduction. 
Despite the fact that one could presuppose that the members of the AHPC 
were acquainted with the Constitution, the AHPC, in accordance with the 
SALC suggestion, recommended that cultural surrogacy not be legislated on 
the grounds that, because it is privately performed without medical 
intervention, it does not provide the requisite legal protection for all the parties 
concerned.41 
Having regard to the above, the authors initial submission is that the failure by 
the AHPC to recommend the inclusion of cultural surrogacy in future 
surrogacy legislation could amount to discrimination on the grounds of culture, 
could have the potential to impair the dignity of many who choose informal 
surrogacy as a method of assisted reproduction when unable to bear a child 
themselves, and lastly, that the failure to recommend the inclusion of cultural 
surrogacy in Chapter 19 may also place a limitation on one's right to make 
decisions regarding reproduction. 
The result of the recommendation of the AHPC that cultural surrogacy not be 
provided for in the Act has the effect (and this argument will be further 
substantiated with reference to the rights of the Constitution in chapter three) 
that the parties to cultural surrogacy agreements are not afforded the same 
legal recognition as those individuals who opt for formal surrogacy 
agreements. Persons who choose formal surrogacy agreements, which are 
legally recognised by the Act, are able to have such agreement sanctioned by 
41 In a Sep tember 1997 address to Par l iament, the Cha i rperson of the S A L C Report on 
Surrogate Motherhood, Priscil la Jana, w h e n asked whe the r the proposed Bill on Sur rogacy 
wou ld apply to cus tomary law answered in the negat ive. Such response w a s made regardless 
of the fact that she had stated in the S A L C Report that "sur rogacy is pract ised wi th in all b lack 
g roups on an informal basis. Many cul tures d e m a n d that a chi ld be born of a marr iage and 
people desi re genet ica l ly l inked chi ldren. In many cus toms the e lders get together to ar range 
for someone to g ive birth for an inferti le w o m a n . It a lso happens that a man is found to assist 
whe re a husband is inferti le". Par l iamentary Moni tor ing Group Report of the South African 
Law Commission on Surrogate Motherhood (1997) avai lable at http://www.pmg.org.za 
(accessed on 1 June 2010); S loth-Nie lsen J and Van Heerden B 'Putt ing Humpty Dumpty 
back together again: Towards restructur ing fami l ies ' and chi ldren 's l ives in South Afr ica' 
(1998) 115 SALJ, 165. 
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the Court. Such confirmation makes the surrogacy agreement valid and 
binding, and the rights and obligations of the parties are protected and 
acknowledged: the surrogate is the gestational mother, the commissioning 
parents are those persons who will be the legal parents of the child born of 
the agreement from birth, and the child born of the agreement will be legally 
recognised as the child of the commissioning parents. 
The impact of non-recognition of cultural surrogacy is that the parties to the 
agreement are not afforded the same protection and thus it cannot be said 
that the non-recognition of cultural surrogacy as a legal form of assisted 
reproduction protects the interests of the parties concerned. In point of fact, 
the effect is the corollary: the parties to the agreement are not afforded legal 
recognition, their positions in law are uncertain and the legal status of a 
cultural surrogacy agreement and the child born of the agreement is unclear. 
To conclude, the AHPC agreed with the SALC recommendation that the Act 
'should not make provision for cultural surrogacy'. The result is that cultural 
surrogacy has not been incorporated into Chapter 19 of the Act.42 
2.2.1.2 Formal Surrogacy 
The second type of surrogacy practiced in South Africa, as recognised by the 
SALC and the AHPC, is 'formal surrogacy'. The SALC and the AHPC further 
subdivided formal surrogacy full and partial surrogacy. Full surrogacy refers to 
the in vitro fertilisation of the surrogate mother.43 In full surrogacy the 
surrogate's gametes are not used in the fertilisation procedure, whereas in 
partial surrogacy, the surrogate mother is artificially inseminated with the 
42 Further a rgument wil l be prov ided in chapter 3 of th is research. 
43 Full sur rogacy p regnancy is ach ieved th rough the implantat ion into the surrogate 's uterus of 
an embryo wh ich has been 'created' outs ide the body of the surrogate. The surrogate is not 
genet ica l ly related to the child. Louw AS Acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights 
(unpubl ished LLD thesis, Universi ty of Pretoria, 2009), 335; Carnel ley M and Soni S (2008) 22 
Speculum Juris, 37; Par l iamentary Moni tor ing Group Report of the South African Law 
Commission on Surrogate Motherhood (1997) avai lable at h t tp : / /www.pmg.org.za( accessed 
on 1 June 2010), 6; Lupton ML Family Law Service Issue 48: Medico-Legal Aspects (2007), 
71; Report of the Ad Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) avai lable at 
http//www.pmg.org.za/docs/1999/990211.saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 4. 
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gametes of the commissioning male, thus the surrogate is both the genetic 
and gestational mother. 
In respect of partial surrogacy, several arguments were submitted by the 
members of the AHPC in favour of and against the practice of partial 
surrogacy. However the overriding concern of the AHPC was the 
enforceability of the surrogacy agreement and the future parentage of the 
child, and thus the AHPC recommended that partial surrogacy was only to be 
used in the case where it was not possible to use the female gamete of the 
commissioning parent for purposes of artificial insemination. Ultimately, the 
AHPC wanted to reduce the likelihood of future conflicts arising between the 
commissioning parents and the surrogate mother on the basis of the child 
born of the agreement being genetically related to the surrogate mother.44 
In addition to this, surrogacy agreements where both gametes used in the 
creation of the embryo were donor gametes was not favoured. Once more, 
this submission was made on the basis of genetic relations; it was submitted 
that if the child was in no manner genetically related to the commissioning 
parent(s) or the surrogate mother, this would firstly give rise to a situation 
similar to adoption and secondly, this would not be in the best interests of the 
child concerned.45 
In conclusion, the AHPC, after reading the SALC's Report, recommended that 
both full and partial surrogacy should be regulated. The reasons for infertility 
must be irreversible and permanent, and at the least, the gametes of one 
commissioning parent must be used in the surrogacy procedure.46 
44 The idea that genes rather than gestat ion are responsib le for the bond be tween mother and 
chi ld has been cr i t ic ised wor ldwide. Carnel ley M and Soni S (2008) 22 Speculum Juris, 13. 
45 The impact of genet ic relat ions on the best interests of the chi ld wi l l be comprehens ive ly 
examined in chapter three of th is research. 
46 Full sur rogacy w a s recommended as the preferred method, whe reas part ial sur rogacy w a s 
only to be avai lable whe re full sur rogacy is not possib le due to medica l or biological reasons. 
In favour of partial surrogacy, a rguments submit ted by the A H P C included that full sur rogacy 
wil l not a lways be the pract ical a l ternat ive for inferti le couples. Invest igat ions showed that full 
sur rogacy tended to be more expens ive and could be a complex surgical p rocedure often wi th 
a relat ively low success rate. Full sur rogacy w a s also shown to have the potent ia l to be more 
exploi t ive of poorer w o m a n however more attract ive to weal th ier coup les w h o desi re a chi ld 
w h o is of their own genet ical ly. Partial sur rogacy w a s shown to be in many cases the only 
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The AHPC were of the initial opinion that full surrogacy would be the best 
option for parties who wish to find greater legal certainty in surrogacy 
agreements. This recommendation was presented in consideration of the fact 
that full surrogates have no genetic tie to the child and it will be more 
constitutionally acceptable to compel a full surrogate to relinquish a child who 
is not genetically their own to the commissioning parents upon birth. Hence, 
the overriding concern of the AHPC related to the issue of genetic relations 
and the importance that genetics would play in respect of the enforceability of 
the agreement and in assuring that the agreement was in the best interests of 
the child.47 
With regard to the above, the AHPC, in its final recommendations, 
recommended that full surrogacy would be the favoured option, with partial 
surrogacy being available only in the case where due to medical and 
biological reasons, full surrogacy was not possible. 
Ultimately, Chapter 19 of the Act has incorporated the above recommendation 
to the extent that the Act recognises both partial and full surrogacy as a form 
of surrogacy which is legally recognised, and where the child born of such 
agreement is considered as the child of the commissioning parents. However, 
the Act does not include a proviso stating that partial surrogacy should only be 
permitted where the female gamete of the commissioning parent cannot be 
used. The reason for this 'exclusion' is unknown.48 However, and this will be 
further substantiated in the forthcoming chapters, such exclusion on the 
legislature's part may have the corollary effect which the AHPC was seeking 
pract ical and f inancial ly feasib le opt ion; the p regnancy being easi ly ach ieved wi thout the need 
for medical intervent ion. Report of the Ad Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission 
on Surrogate Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) avai lable at 
http//www. pmg. org. za/docs/1999/990211. saclreport. h tml (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 5. 
47 Enforceabi l i ty of the sur rogacy agreement will be d iscussed in chapter four and the impact 
of genet ic relat ions on the best interests of the chi ld wil l be examined in chapter 3. 
4 8 The S A L C submi t ted in its Report on Surrogate Motherhood that 'restr ict ing the use of 
part ial sur rogacy to si tuat ions "where it wou ld not be possib le, for biological and medical 
reasons, to use the female gamete of the commiss ion ing parent for the purpose of artif icial 
inseminat ion" wou ld be problemat ic in cases whe re the commiss ion ing parents could s imply 
not af ford the p rocedures required for [full] surrogacy. ' Louw A Chapter 19: Surrogate 
Motherhood in Davel CJ and Skel ton A Commentary on the Children's Act 38 of 2005 (2007), 
19-13. 
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to avoid: it may increase the likelihood of disputes arising from surrogacy 
agreements because when the surrogate is also the genetic mother of the 
child, it cannot be submitted that it will be reasonable to compel her to hand 
over the child upon birth if she chooses not to. 
2.2.2 Qualifications of parties 
2.2.2.1 Surrogate mother: Psychological and physical suitability 
The AHPC were of the opinion that a body or institution should be established 
to advise the Courts on the practice of surrogacy, and such body or institution 
(or a separate body or institution) would be tasked with the regulation of the 
screening of the potential parties to the agreement. 
The AHPC submitted that the suitability of the parties to the agreement would 
be determined through screening, and the suitability report of the person who 
carried out the screening should be submitted at Court to assist the Judge in 
making his/her decision regarding the confirmation of the parties to the 
potential agreement.49 
In its final recommendations, the AHPC recommended that all the parties to 
the agreement should be subjected to a strict screening process before the 
agreement would be confirmed by the Court. In support of the inclusion of 
such recommendation, the AHPC resorted to evidence from other jurisdictions 
such as the UK and the US, where it was shown that 'the majority of the 
problems emanating from surrogacy agreements were brought about by the 
insufficient screening of parties'.50 
49 The A H P C recommended that the assessment to be done on the respect ive part ies should 
be carr ied out w i th the fo l lowing factors in mind, first the reasons for the surrogacy, secondly , 
the state of mind of the part ies to the agreements , thirdly, the suitabi l i ty of the part ies and 
lastly, the r isks involved in the agreement . Report of the Ad Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA 
Law Commission on Surrogate Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) avai lable at 
http//www. pmg. org. za/docs/1999/990211. saclreport. h tml (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 13. 
Report of the A d Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) avai lable at 
http//www. pmg. org. za/docs/1999/990211. saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 18. 
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Regardless of the above, when the Act was promulgated in 2005, Chapter 19 
did not expressly provide for the screening and counselling of parties. The 
author is uncertain as to why a provision of this kind was excluded from the 
Act. Both the SALC and the AHPC recommended that the parties must be 
submitted to screening. 
Nonetheless, despite this 'omission' by the legislature, in practice, the Court 
will only confirm a surrogacy agreement if the parties to the application 
provide sufficient proof of their suitability for the agreement.51 In practice, such 
suitability is determined by a screening process conducted by private medical 
practitioners, usually at the expense of the potential commissioning parents. It 
is unknown as to why the legislature did not incorporate this recommendation, 
however it can be submitted that if in practice the Court did not insist that the 
parties provide sufficient evidence as to their suitability, such exclusion by the 
legislature may have created a situation where any would-be surrogate or 
would-be potential commissioning parent could have approached the Court to 
have their agreement confirmed, without having their suitability 
predetermined. Consequently, this may have resulted in a situation where 
potential parties to the agreement may not be psychologically and physically 
fit to enter into a surrogacy agreement, and this could give rise to the 
likelihood of future disputes between parties. 
To bring to a close, despite the fact that the Court in practice requests that the 
parties to a potential surrogacy agreement produce sufficient evidence as to 
their suitability to enter into surrogacy agreements, and that such suitability is 
determined through psychological and physical screening, the legislature itself 
did not take heed of the AHPC's recommendation. Resultantly, Chapter 19 
does not make provision for such screening, and it was submitted in 2007 that 
'one [could] only hope that the regulations to the Act will address this lacuna', 
because, effectively, 'the successful execution of the surrogate agreement is 
to a large extent dependant on the surrogate mother being physically and 
51 Govender S 'Rise of the babymakers : Ren t -a -womb gains favour in SA' The Sunday Times 
25 October 2009, 10. 
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psychologically suited to act as a surrogate mother.'52 The Regulations which 
were promulgated in April 2010 do not provide for screening of potential 
parties to a surrogacy agreement. In fact, the 2010 Regulations make no 
reference to Chapter 19 of the Act or surrogacy agreements at all. 
2.2.2.2 Surrogate Mother: Age 
The AHPC initially submitted that, in respect of potential surrogate mothers, a 
prescribed age limitation should be implemented. However, when the final 
recommendations were submitted to the SALC and the Minister of Justice, an 
age limitation in respect of surrogate mothers was not included. Though no 
reason was provided for the exclusion of such age limitation by the AHPC, the 
author submits that an age limitation was almost certainly excluded on the 
basis that age had been listed as a specified ground of unfair discrimination in 
the Constitution. With no recommendation by the AHPC, Chapter 19 of the 
Act did not include a provision regarding an age limitation in respect of 
potential surrogate mothers. Whilst the author submits that she agrees that 
any discrimination on the basis of age is presumably unfair, it will be shown in 
the subsequent chapter that there may be a constitutionally acceptable 
purpose for limiting the rights of potential surrogates by including an age 
limitation. 
2.2.2.3 Surrogate mother: Marriage 
The AHPC recommended that marriage was not to be a suitability 
requirement of potential surrogates; the competency of the surrogate would 
be determined regardless of whether she was married or not. 
The above recommendation, although not expressly stated, has been 
incorporated into Chapter 19 of the Act. In terms of the Act, any competent 
woman may act as a surrogate and there is no provision which can be 
interpreted to read that only married surrogates may enter into surrogacy 
52 Louw A Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood in Davel CJ and Skel ton A Commentary on the 
Children's Act 38 of 2005 (2007), 19-16. 
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agreements.53 In fact, section 293(2) provides that 'where the surrogate is 
married or involved in a permanent life relationship, the court may not confirm 
the agreement unless [the surrogates] husband or partner has given his or her 
written consent to the agreement and has become a party to the 
agreement'.54 Hence, the part which reads 'where the surrogate' can be 
interpreted to mean that the surrogate is not obligated to be married or in a 
relationship. Taking this into consideration, it would seem that neither the 
AHPC nor the legislature wanted to create a situation where marriage could 
be a factor which would prevent a woman from becoming a surrogate. 55 
Despite the fact that the SALC had suggested that marriage be included as a 
ground of suitability of a potential surrogate, the AHPC's recommendation and 
the resultant legislation shows that, unlike the SALC (whose Report was 
concluded prior to the enactment of the Interim Constitution), both the AHPC 
and the legislature took cognisance of the fact that marriage is a listed ground 
of discrimination in terms of the Constitution, and that any limitation on the 
rights of woman to become surrogate mothers on the basis of this listed 
ground may amount to unfair discrimination. 
2.2.2.4 Sexual orientation 
As was the case with marital status, the AHPC recommended that sexual 
orientation would not have an effect on the competence of a surrogate. The 
SALC had however suggested that sexual orientation should be a ground to 
determine the suitability of potential surrogate mothers. 
When the Act was promulgated in 2005, it took cognisance of such 
recommendation and did not stipulate that only women who were 
heterosexual qualified as being competent to enter into a surrogacy 
agreement. The author once again refers to section 293 of the Act, which 
53 Sect ion 295(c)( i) of the Act. 
54 Sect ion 293(2) of the Act. 
55 Prior to the 1984, 1989 and 2003 a m e n d m e n t s of the Human T issue Act 65 of 1983, 
artificial inseminat ion could only be carr ied out on a marr ied w o m a n wi th the wr i t ten consent 
of her husband. 
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refers to the surrogate's husband or her partner in a permanent life 
relationship.56 Though the AHPC's recommendations were submitted prior to 
the enactment of the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006, the recommendations of the 
AHPC pre-emptively accord with the recognition which has been afforded to 
same-sex civil marriages in terms of the Civil Union Act. 
As a result, Chapter 19 of the Act also gives effect to the recognition afforded 
to same-sex partnerships and marriages because sexual orientation has not 
been included as a suitability requirement of potential surrogate. 
Hence the author submits that the AHPC and the legislature took into 
consideration that sexual orientation is a listed ground of discrimination in 
terms of the Constitution, and that both the AHPC and the legislature 
acknowledged that any restriction on the rights of a woman, to become a 
surrogate, on the basis of her sexual orientation could amount to unfair 
discrimination. 
The author concurs with the AHPC's recommendation that both marriage and 
sexual orientation should not be determining factors in the assessment of the 
suitability of a surrogate. Both marriage and sexual orientation are listed 
grounds of discrimination in terms of section 9 of the Constitution and it is thus 
submitted that neither marriage nor age could be argued to be a justifiable 
limitation on the rights of a surrogate to exercise her right to make her own 
decisions regarding reproduction. The CC has held that children born of 
artificial fertilisation to married parents and parents of same-sex permanent 
life partnerships are afforded the same legal status.57 
2.2.2.5 Surrogate mother: One living child of her own 
5(5 Sect ion 293(2) of the Act. 
57 Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development (Lesbian and Gay Equality 
Project as Amicus Curiae) 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) and J v Director General, Department of 
Home Affairs 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC). Boezaar t T The Law of Persons 5ed (2010), 29, 52; 
Boezaar t T Child Law in South Africa (2010), 87, 88,100, 133,134,138. 
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The AHPC recommended that the surrogate must have a living child of her 
own to be suitable to enter into a surrogacy agreement. It was argued that 
when a surrogate has a living child of her own, she would be emotionally 
better equipped to understand the consequences of entering into the 
agreement after having experiencing pregnancy before, thus enhancing the 
chances of success of the agreement being adhered to i.e. reducing the risk 
of the surrogate wanting to keep the child after birth.58 
When the Act was promulgated in April 2005, the above recommendation of 
the AHPC was incorporated in terms of section 295(c)(viii). According to the 
AHPC, a surrogate who has a living child of her own would be less likely to 
withhold a child born of a surrogacy agreement from the commissioning 
parents at birth. Though this recommendation, and ultimately this provision, 
will receive greater examination in the subsequent chapter, the author submits 
that the application of such provision on the rights of potential surrogate 
mothers may not amount to a reasonable limitation on their rights to make 
decisions regarding reproduction, and in addition to this, it could also amount 
to an unwarranted restriction on their right to dignity and equality 
(differentiation on the ground of prior pregnancy). 
Without conclusive proof showing that a surrogate who has a living child of 
her own will be less likely to change her mind about giving the child born of 
the agreement to the commissioning parents upon birth, the author cannot 
accept that the inclusion of this provision is constitutionally justified. The 
author submits that there may be some woman who, although they may not 
have a child of their own, would also want to offer their services as a 
surrogate to persons desiring a child of their own. The AHPC recommended 
58 The S A L C presented two further reasons in support of th is recommendat ion : firstly, if the 
surrogate has her own chi ld, she wil l be less l ikely to refuse to rel inquish the chi ld born of the 
agreement because the chi ld born of the agreement wil l not be 'her' on ly chi ld. Secondly , it 
w a s submi t ted that having a chi ld of her own 'will cater for the event that th rough this 
p regnancy , she might be unable to have other chi ldren' . Report of the Ad Hoc Commi t tee on 
Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) avai lable at 
http//www.pmg.org.za/docs/1999/990211.saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apri l 2011), 6; 
Report of the Ad Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commiss ion on Surrogate Motherhood 
(11 Feb 1999) avai lable at http//www.pmg. org.za/docs/1999/990211. saclreport.html 
(accessed on 20 Apri l 2011), 15. 
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submitted that there could be almost no justification for the legal 
entrenchment of criteria which would prevent someone from becoming a 
surrogate mother. To conclude, the author does not agree with this AHPC 
recommendation, unless it can be proven that a surrogate who has a living 
child of her own will definitely be less likely to fail to relinquish the child born of 
the agreement to the commissioning parents upon birth. The suitability of a 
surrogate should not be dependent on whether she has or does not have a 
living child. Essentially, suitability should be determined through a screening 
process. 
Further to the inclusion of the above mentioned recommendation into Chapter 
19, Chapter 19 does not only provide that a surrogate must have a child of her 
own, but section 295(c)(vi) provides that a surrogate must have had at least 
one viable delivery and a documented history of pregnancy. It must be noted 
that this provision is not a result of the AHPC recommendations because the 
requirement that a surrogate have at least one viable delivery and a 
documented history of pregnancy was not recommended by the AHPC. This 
provision is in fact a result of the original SALC Report. 
This exclusion by the AHPC was not expressly motivated, however the author 
agrees with Professor Louw's suggestion that the inclusion by the legislature 
of section 295(c)(vi) is 'rather puzzling'.59 First, it is ambiguous what exactly a 
'viable delivery' would amount to: neither the SALC Report nor the Act defines 
a 'viable delivery'. The author presupposes that in this respect, a 'viable 
delivery' could mean that the child born of the mother lived, survived and 
subsists.60 Secondly, if the surrogate has a living child of her own, the logical 
explanation would be that she had to have had a viable delivery to give birth 
to such child, and thus it would be fairly obvious to accept that she would 
have a documented history of such pregnancy. Effectively, the inclusion of 
both section 295(c)(vi) and section 295(c)(viii) is essentially superfluous for 
the reason that section 295(c)(vi) and section 295(c)(viii) are tortologous of 
59 Louw A Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood in Davel CJ and Skel ton A Commentary on the 
Children's Act 38 of 2005 (2007), 19-17. 
60 Chambers Twentieth Century Dictionary (1982). 
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one another. It makes no sense to include the requirement that the potential 
surrogate must prove she has had 'at least one viable delivery and a 
documented history of pregnancy' when she has to prove that she has a living 
child of her own. Nonetheless, the implications of the application of section 
295(c)(vi) will not receive further examination in further chapters. 
2.2.2.6 Surrogate mother: Financially secure 
The AHPC agreed with the SALC's suggestion that the surrogate should be 
financially secure so as to eliminate the possibility that she may use the 
agreement for income purposes, and this suggestion was resultantly 
incorporated into the AHPC's final recommendations.61 
In respect of financial security, the author cannot agree with the AHPC's 
recommendation that the surrogate must be proven to be financially secure 
before she may enter into the agreement. The author will submit in the 
subsequent chapters that 'it is unfair...for the law to deny women the freedom 
to decide how best to utilise their procreative ability and to fulfil their role in 
life'.62 In this respect, if a woman is able to be financially rewarded for her 
services as a surrogate, and in this, further herself financially, unless there 
exists a constitutionally acceptable purpose for limiting this freedom, 
compensation for services as a surrogate should be permissible. 
Despite the fact that the author will not discuss the requirement of financial 
security any further (because the author will argue in favour of commercial 
surrogacy), there could exist an issue in this recommendation. When the 
AHPC recommended that a surrogate must be financially secure to be 
suitable for surrogacy, the AHPC did not recommend any methods in which 
the financial security of a surrogate could be determined in practice, as well 
as not stipulating what would amount to being 'financially secure'. All that was 
61 Report of the A d Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) avai lable at 
http//www. pmg. org. za/docs/1999/990211. saclreport. h tml (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 16. 
Louw A Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood in Davel CJ and Skel ton A Commentary on the 
Children's Act 38 of 2005 (2007), 19-17. 
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provided by the AHPC was that the screening process would provide an 
overall mechanism with which to determine suitability. 
Having regard to the above, would it be required that a thorough examination 
into the potential surrogate mother's financial circumstances be carried out, 
and who would carry out such investigation? As to the degree of 'financial 
security' required, would it be possible for the Court, in its task of confirmation, 
to place a lower limit restriction on what a potential surrogate is required to 
financially possess before she may act as a surrogate?63 
To conclude, the recommendation by the AHPC that the surrogate must be 
financially secure to enter into a surrogacy agreement was not as a whole 
incorporated into the Act. Section 295(c)(iv) of the Act merely provides that 
the surrogate mother must not use the surrogacy as a source of income, and 
hence does not expressly stipulate that the surrogate must be financially 
secure. Further examination of this provision will be carried out in chapter 4 
under the discussion on commercial surrogacy agreements. 
2.2.2.7 Surrogate mother: Partner's consent 
The AHPC included in its final recommendations that that a surrogate should 
have her husband or partner's written consent to enter into a surrogacy 
agreement, the partner himself/herself should become a party to the 
63 The Legal Aid Board of South Afr ica makes use of a ' f inancial means test ' whe reby only 
those persons wi th the ' f inancial means ' of R3 000-00 or less qual i fy as indigent persons 
permi t ted to make use of Legal Aid at torneys. Another f inancial means test wh i ch is made use 
of Sou th Afr ica is that test wh i ch is used in the determinat ion for chi ld support grants. 
Amongs t the requ i rements for qual i f icat ion is the f inancial means test, in te rms of wh ich , 
s ingle persons w h o earn no more than R28 800-00 per year or R2 400-00 per month and 
marr ied persons w h o earn a comb ined income of R57 600-00 per year or R4 800-00 per 
month, qual i fy for a chi ld support grant if they are the chi ld 's pr imary caregiver . The 
qual i f icat ion is subject to other l imitat ions such as age, c i t izenship etc. Capega teway 
Government Director ies 'Grant for Car ing for a Young Chi ld (Child Support Grant) ' avai lable 
at http://www.capeaatewav.aov.za/ena/directories/services/11586/47468 (accessed on 14 
August 2010). 
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agreement, and if the partner unreasonably withholds consent, the court may 
nevertheless confirm the agreement.64 
The author agrees with the above mentioned AHPC recommendation. When 
a woman chooses to become a surrogate and she is in a relationship, her 
surrogacy (artificial fertilisation, pregnancy and child birth) may have an effect 
on her husband or partner. Any woman who is pregnant experiences changes 
that the husband or partner may be unwilling to experience. Even though this 
may sound self-centred, it may be the truth. There also exists the issue that if 
your wife or your partner is undergoing artificial fertilisation, this may affect 
your intimacy as a couple, and could maybe result in emotional problems 
within your relationship. In addition to that, there may exist the possibility that 
the husband or partner also wants to have a child but because his wife or 
his/her partner is party to a surrogacy agreement, the surrogates husband/ 
partner may have to postpone his/her desires until the surrogacy agreement 
has come to an end. 
Nonetheless, with no additional recommendations made by the AHPC, it is 
unknown as to whether the surrogate's spouse or partner would be compelled 
to abide by the agreement if he/she chooses not to and what the effect of 
such consent would have on his or her legal obligations. It has been 
suggested that because the surrogate is expected to relinquish all parental 
rights and responsibilities towards the child at birth, the same obligations 
would exist regarding the spouse or partner of the surrogate.65 In this regard, 
the author submits that each case would have to be decided on its own 
merits. What may amount to an unreasonable withholding of consent by one 
partner, may amount to being reasonable in another situation, and if the Court 
is capable of confirming the agreement without the husband or partners 
consent, this could amount to an unreasonable limitation on his or her 
freedom as well. Hence, screening and counselling would assist in 
64 Report of the A d Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) avai lable at 
http//www. pmg. org. za/docs/1999/990211. saclreport. h tml (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 16. 
Louw A Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood in Davel CJ and Skel ton A Commentary on the 
Children's Act 38 of 2005 (2007), 19-9. 
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determining not only the surrogate's suitability to the agreement, but her 
husband or partner's suitability as well. 
This recommendation, although stated differently, has been included in the 
Act in terms of section 293. The recommendation stipulated that the surrogate 
'should' obtain the consent of her partner, whereas the Act provides that a 
Court may not confirm the surrogacy agreement unless consent of the 
husband or partner has been obtained.66 The difference between the AHPC 
recommendations and the Act lies in the fact that the recommendations 
provided that the court may confirm the agreement if consent is unreasonably 
withheld, whereas the Act provides that 'where the husband or partner of a 
surrogate mother who is not the genetic parent of the child unreasonably 
withholds his or her consent, the court may confirm the agreement'. 
Therefore, the author submits that in the case of the AHPC recommendations, 
all surrogacy agreements, whether partial or full, where the husband or 
partner unreasonably withheld his/her consent, the Court could sanction the 
agreement, but in terms of the Act, it seems as though that in the case of 
partial surrogacy, the agreement cannot be confirmed even if the husband or 
partner unreasonably withholds his/her consent. This is probably because if 
the partial surrogate chooses to terminate the agreement in terms of section 
298 of the Act, section 299 provides that the surrogate and her 
husband/partner are vested with full parental rights and responsibilities 
towards the child born of the agreement. Therefore this goes to the issue of 
the enforceability of a contract which is discussed more fully in chapter four of 
this research. 
To conclude, the AHPC recommendation, although not exactly, was 
incorporated into the Act in the form of section 293. 
2.2.2.8 Commissioning parent: Last resort for conception 
66 This provis ion should be a m e n d e d to include the w o r d spouse after husband and partner to 
br ing this provis ion into accordance wi th the Const i tut ion and the Civi l Union Act 17 of 2006. 
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In respect of the commissioning parents, the AHPC recommended that 
surrogacy must be exercised as a last resort for persons unable to have 
children via natural methods. The AHPC concurred with the SALC that 
surrogacy should only be permitted if it can be medically or biologically proved 
that the infertility and inability to give birth is permanent and irreversible. The 
AHPC motivated the inclusion of this recommendation on the basis of all the 
risks inherent in a surrogacy agreement.67 
The above mentioned AHPC recommendation was included in the Act in the 
form of section 295(a), which provides that the Court will not confirm the 
surrogacy agreement unless the commissioning parent(s) are not able to give 
birth to a child and that this condition is permanent and irreversible. As a 
result, the Act can be interpreted to mean that even persons who are not 
infertile are able to enter into valid surrogacy agreements, however, such 
persons must not be able to give birth to a child. 
Despite the fact that section 295(a) will receive greater examination in the 
subsequent chapter, the author is of the opinion that the limiting effect which 
this AHPC recommendation and the resultant section 295(a) has on the 
exercise of, amongst others, the rights to make decisions regarding 
reproduction is warranted. In support of this argument the author submits that 
when fertile persons are capable of having children through other means, 
such as natural conception, such persons should make use of this option. 
Chapter 19 was enacted to provide those persons who are unable to have 
children on their own, due to biological and medical reasons, to enter into a 
surrogacy agreement whereby the child born of the agreement will be legally 
recognised as their own. Hence, the author submits that she is agreement 
with the inclusion of this recommendation and that that application of this 
recommendation and the resultant provision could be said to amount to a 
constitutionally acceptable limitation on the rights of potential commissioning 
parents. Section 295(a), and the constitutional implications which its 
67 Report of the A d Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) avai lable at 
http//www. pmg. org. za/docs/1999/990211. saclreport. h tml (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 17. 
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application has on the rights of would-be commissioning parents, will be 
further investigated in paragraph 3.5 of chapter three. 
2.2.2.9 Commissioning parent: Fit and proper person 
The following requirement recommended by the AHPC in connection with the 
suitability of potential commissioning parents was that the commissioning 
parents must be fit and proper persons to accept the responsibility of the 
parenthood of the child born of the agreement. As was the case regarding a 
surrogate, a screening process was recommended as the manner in which to 
determine if the commissioning parents were fit and proper persons and if the 
commissioning parents were able to understand the rights, obligations and 
legal consequences which flow from the surrogacy agreement and the 
applicable legislation as well.68 
The author agrees with the inclusion of the above mentioned AHPC 
recommendation. Since surrogacy is not an ordinary contract dealing with 
ordinary rights and obligations, it is imperative that parties take as many 
precautions possible to obtain certainty and clarity regarding their contractual 
duties. Screening, as proven in other jurisdictions, assists in reducing the risks 
of disputes which may arise out of a surrogacy agreement.69 
Nonetheless, the Act did not incorporate the term 'fit and proper' as 
recommended by the AHPC. Instead, section 295(b) requires that the 
commissioning parents must be competent to enter into the surrogacy 
agreement and suitable to accept the parenthood of the child recieved.70 Yet, 
the author submits that unless the commissioning parents are screened for 
competency and suitability, it is debatable as to how such suitability and 
competency will be determined. Even though the courts in practice do 
68 Report of the A d Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) avai lable at 
h t tp / /www.pmg.org .za /docs /1999/990211 .saclreport .html (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 17. 
Report of the A d Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) avai lable at 
http//www. pmg. org. za/docs/1999/990211. saclreport. h tml (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 6, 17. 
70 Sect ion 295(b)( i) and (ii) of the Act. 
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determine whether the parties to the agreement comprehend what is required 
of them and if they are indeed suitable to become parties to an agreement 
which has been shown to compose of so many inherent risks; the result of the 
failure to include a provision stating that parties to the agreement must 
undergo screening for suitability and competency could result in bringing 
about future disputes between the parties. 
Nonetheless, the author agrees with the AHPC recommendation that the 
commissioning parents should undergo screening to determine their suitability 
to accept parenthood, but cannot understand why the legislature would omit 
to expressly include within the Act such an important component of both the 
SALC Report and the AHPC recommendations. The author anticipates that 
this omission may be amended if future regulations are drafted in respect of 
surrogacy agreements. 
2.2.2.10 Commissioning parent: Age 
The SALC had submitted in its Report that an age bar in respect of 
commissioning parents should be incorporated into future surrogacy 
legislation. Nonetheless, the AHPC did not include such a restriction in their 
final recommendations. In fact, the AHPC members, despite their initial 
agreement that a prescribed age limitation should be implemented, did not 
even allude to such a requirement in respect of suitability of potential 
commissioning parents. 
The omission by the AHPC to include such a provision in their 
recommendations could be as a result of the fact that the AHPC took into 
cognisance that any differentiation on the basis of age is presumably 
discriminatory and constitutionally suspect. Nonetheless, unlike the 
submission provided above that there should be an age limitation for would-be 
surrogates, the author cannot at this point in this research submit that she is 
in agreement or disagreement with the omission of an age bar for potential 
commissioning parents. In this respect, there exists a distinct difference 
regarding potential surrogate mothers and potential commissioning parents. A 
38 
 
 
 
 
surrogate mother is subject to the psychological and physical risks associated 
with artificial fertilisation, pregnancy and child birth, whereas the 
commissioning parents do not endure similar burdens. The age of the 
commissioning parents, although they may be submitted to emotional stress 
as a result of the enforceability risks of the agreement (i.e. whether the 
surrogate will be able to get pregnant and whether she will adhere to her 
obligations to hand over the child upon birth), cannot be said to affect their 
ability to provide the child born of the agreement with a loving and stable 
home. 71 
At this juncture in the research the author submits that the omission by the 
AHPC to include a provision regarding and age limitation in respect of 
potential commissioning parents is satisfactory. Unlike the argument 
submitted above that would-be surrogates should be subjected to an age bar, 
the author cannot justify an age limitation for commissioning parents. To 
conclude, when the Act was promulgated, the legislature itself also did not 
include provision in respect of an age limitation for potential commissioning 
parents. 
2.2.2.11 Commissioning parent: Marriage 
The AHPC recommended that surrogacy agreements should not only be 
available to married persons. When the Act was promulgated in 2005, the Act 
incorporated this recommendation in that the Act does not provide that only 
married persons are eligible for surrogacy. As was the case with the 
71 It has been said that an age l imitat ion in respect of commiss ion ing parents should be 
imp lemented so that the legislature does not open itself up to geriatr ic parent ing, wh ich has 
been said to not be in the best interests of the chi ld born of the agreement . For example , in 
December 2010, Sir Elton John (63 years of age) and his husband David Furnish b e c a m e 
parents to Zachary Jackson Levin w h o w a s born as a result of sur rogacy agreement . Even 
though the author does not w ish to d iscuss age l imitat ions in respect of commiss ion ing 
parents any further, because it wil l exceed the scope of th is research, the author submi ts that 
age l imitat ions in respect of potent ia l commiss ion ing parents may not pass const i tut ional 
muster because it wil l be problemat ic to show that that older persons are less capab le of 
being sui table for paren thood as their younger counterpar ts . Nathan S and Greenhi l l S You 
can tell everybody this is our son: Elton John and David Furnish welcome son Zachary with 
the help of a surrogate mother (December 2010) avai lable at 
http://wwwdailymail.co.uk/tvshowbizniz/article-1342092/Elton-John-David-Furnish-welcome-
son-Zachary-help-surrogate-mother.html (accesses on 11 January 2011). 
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recommendation that surrogates need not be married to enter into surrogacy 
agreements, section 294 of the Act provides that if married, the 
commissioning parent must obtain the written consent of his/her spouse. 
Having regard to the above, the author submits that the Act has taken into 
account the AHPC's recommendation that marriage should not be a 
requirement for suitability of potential commissioning parents, and in this, both 
the AHPC and the legislature have considered that in terms of section 9 of the 
Constitution, any differentiation on the basis of marriage is presumably unfair. 
The author submits that she agrees with the AHPC recommendation that 
marriage should not be a prerequisite for the suitability of potential 
commissioning parents to a surrogacy agreement. In terms of section 12(2) of 
the Constitution everyone has the right to make decisions regarding 
reproduction, and it cannot be submitted that failure to be married would 
amount to a reasonable limitation on this right. 
2.2.2.12 Commissioning parent: Sexual orientation 
The AHPC recommended that sexual orientation should not be a determining 
factor in the assessment of the suitability of commissioning parents. As was 
the case with marriage, such recommendation, although not explicitly stated 
in the requirements of potential commissioning parents in section 295, was 
incorporated into the Act when it was promulgated in 2005. Section 293, 
although it does not directly relate to the eligibility requirements of a 
commissioning parent, provides that the commissioning parent if married or 
involved in a permanent relationship must obtain his/her partners written 
consent to enter into the agreement. 
The author agrees with the AHPC's recommendation that sexual orientation 
should not be a prerequisite for would-be commissioning parents. Such 
recommendation, and the subsequent provisions of the Act, is in accordance 
with the right to equality (sexual orientation is a section 9 listed ground of 
discrimination) as well as the right to make decisions regarding reproduction. 
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Though the recommendations were presented in 1999, it is clear that the 
AHPC, unlike the SALC, took cognisance of the rights embodied in the 
Constitution.72 In this, the AHPC took into account the fact that any limitations 
on the rights of potential commissioning to enter into surrogacy agreements, 
would have to be proven justifiable, and if not, such limitations could establish 
the basis for future constitutional disputes. 
2.2.2.13 Commissioning parent: Healthy and stable family environment 
The AHPC recommended that potential commissioning parents must be able 
to provide a 'healthy and stable family environment' for the child to be born of 
the agreement and that this should be established through screening. 
While the AHPC did not expressly define what constitutes a 'healthy family 
environment', the AHPC did emphasise that future legislation 'should in all 
respects protect the best interests of children, especially with regard to 
providing a child born within surrogacy agreements with stable homes'.73 The 
author submits that not only is the requirement similar to that which is 
requisite in respect of adoption i.e. 'securing stability in a child's life through 
permanent placement', but a 'healthy and stable family environment', although 
it would not encompass the same meaning, would fall under the general 
requirement that the commissioning parents must be competent and suitable 
to accept parenthood.74 And competency and suitability is, as recommended 
by the AHPC, supposed to be determined through screening. 
7 2 The Nat ional Party sugges ted that only heterosexual persons should be permi t ted to enter 
into sur rogacy agreements . This suggest ion w a s founded on the idea that it wou ld be in the 
best interests of the chi ld to g row up in a heterosexua l home, and that it wou ld be incorrect to 
p lace chi ldren in an env i ronment that by its very own sexual nature prevented the concept ion 
of ch i ldren in the first place. Of course, this argument wil l no longer pass const i tut ional 
muster . Not only has the enactment of the Civi l Unions Act 17 of 2006 had the effect that 
same-sex coup les are now able to marry, but there have been many Const i tu t ional Court 
cases wh ich have recognised that same-sex persons have the same rights as heterosexual 
persons. See for examp le Du Toit v Minister of Welfare and Population Development (Lesbian 
and Gay Equality Project as Amicus Curiae) 2003 (2) SA 198 (CC) and J v Director General, 
Department of Home Affairs 2003 (5) SA 621 (CC). 
73 Report of the A d Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) avai lable at 
http//www.pmg.org.za/docs/1999/990211.saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 17. 
74 Boezaart T Child law in South Africa (2010), 134, 150, 151. 
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However, if it was not practice that the Courts request sufficient information 
regarding suitability and that attorneys ensure that the parties to the 
agreement undergo screening, the regretful omission by the legislature to 
include a provision stipulating that the parties shall undergo screening may 
have resulted in a situation where the commissioning parents may in fact not 
be able to provide a healthy and stable family environment. 
Once again, the author is appreciative that legal practitioners and the judiciary 
have taken it upon themselves (without any legislation which directs them to 
do so) to ensure that the parties to the agreement are suitable candidates for 
surrogacy agreements. To conclude, the author agrees with the AHPC 
recommendation that, in the interests of the child born of the agreement, the 
commissioning parents should be required to show that they are capable of 
providing a healthy and stable family environment for the child born of the 
agreement. This requirement and the requirement of screening should have 
been more expressly stated in the Act. 
2.2.2.14 Commissioning parent: Genetic relation 
In its final recommendations, the AHPC recommended that that it would be in 
the best interests of the all the parties concerned if the commissioning 
parent(s) were to be genetically related to the child.75 
This recommendation was incorporated in its entirety into the Act in terms of 
section 294 which is headed 'Genetic origin of the child' and provides as 
follows: 
'No surrogate motherhood agreement is val id unless the concept ion of the chi ld 
con templa ted in the agreement is to be ef fected by the use of the game tes of both 
commiss ion ing parents or, if that is not possib le due to biological , medical or other val id 
75 'Genet ic relation' is def ined as the inheri ted link be tween a parent and chi ld in te rms of 
wh ich the chi ld possesses maternal or paternal c h r o m o s o m e s or both maternal and paternal 
ch romosomes . Mart in EA The Concise Medical Dictionary (2007) 285; Report of the Ad Hoc 
Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) 
avai lable at http//www.pmg.org.za/docs/1999/990211.saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apri l 
2011), 17. 
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reasons, the gamete of at least one of the commiss ion ing parents or, whe re the 
commiss ion ing parent is a single person, the gamete of that person' . 
The AHPC was of the opinion that donor gametes should not be permitted 
where it would be possible to use the gametes of both the commissioning 
parents, and in cases where the single commissioning parent is, or both the 
commissioning parents are, unable to provide a gamete for purposes of 
artificial conception, other parenting options such as adoption is available to 
these above mentioned categories of persons. 
The inclusion of this recommendation has been justified that it would be in the 
best interests of the child if he/she is genetically related to at least one of 
his/her commissioning parents. In addition to this, it has been submitted that 
this recommendation was included to 'restrict undesirable practices such as 
shopping around with a view to creating children with particular 
characteristics".76 
Despite the fact that the issue of genetic relations will revieve further 
consideration in chapter three and four respectively, the impact of the 
application of this recommendation may have both constitutional and 
contractual implications on the rights of all the parties to the surrogacy 
agreement. Constitutionally, the application of section 294 has the effect that 
infertile persons are unable to enter into surrogacy agreements because they 
cannot provide a gamete for purposes of conception. Having regard to the 
contractual implications of the application of section 294, it could be argued 
that when there exists a genetic relation between the commissioning parent 
and the child born of the agreement, it could be easier to compel the 
surrogate to hand over the child to the commissioning parent upon birth and 
that it may be better for a child to be raised by a parent with who he/she 
shares a genetic link. 
76 Louw A Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood in Davel CJ and Skel ton A Commentary on the 
Children's Act 38 of 2005 (2007), 19-12, 19-13. 
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To conclude, it is suffice to say that the application of this recommendation 
and the resultant provision (section 294) gives rise to a number of 
constitutional which will examined in great detail in paragraph 3.5, 3.5.2, 
3.5.21 and 3.8.2. 
2.2.2.15 Commissioning parent: Partners consent 
The AHPC recommended that that the commissioning parent should acquire 
his/her husband's, wife's or partners written consent to enter into the 
agreement, and that the husband, wife or partner should be a party to the 
contract. The AHPC also recommended that where the husband, wife or 
partner unreasonably withholds his or her consent, the court will have the 
power to decide whether to dispose of such consent. 
The author agrees with this recommendation, and although the arguments 
which were submitted in paragraph 2.2.2.7 above in favour of this 
recommendation regarding the husband, partner or spouse of the surrogate 
are relevant, the situation is not wholly similar. In most cases, a married 
commissioning parent who chooses to enter into a surrogacy agreement will 
be married to a partner who too wishes to have a child and thus, one could 
presuppose that he/she will consent. However, there may be a case where 
the commissioning parent is not married but has a partner and only the 
commissioning parent desires a child of his/her own. In this respect, such 
person cannot be compelled to become party to an agreement which they 
choose not to be apart of. 
With this in mind, it is uncertain what legal status is attached to a 'partner' of a 
commissioning parent. The Act is silent if the consent required of such 
'partner' is the consent of only 'permanent life partners', or an ordinary partner 
which may have only been involved in a relationship with the surrogate for a 
few months. This result of this recommendation is that uncertainty may arise 
as to the status of the 'partner' of the commissioning parent. 
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Taking the above into consideration, it is worthy of note that, despite the fact 
that the Act, in the form of section 293(1), incorporates the AHPC's 
recommendation that the husband, wife or partner of the commissioning 
parent must consent to the agreement and become a party thereto, unlike in 
the case of the surrogate mother, the legislature did not include the AHPC 
recommendation that when a husband, wife or partner of a commissioning 
parent unreasonably withholds his/her consent, the Court can dispose of this 
requirement. Thus, it can be submitted that the commissioning parent's 
husband, wife or partner cannot be compelled to enter or abide by the 
agreement. Consequently, if the commissioning parent's husband, wife or 
partner refuses to consent to the agreement, the court will not confirm the 
agreement. It is debatable as to why the legislature did not include an 
'unreasonably withheld' provision in respect of the commissioning parents, 
however, further discussion regarding this will is beyond the ambit of this 
research. 
2.2.3 Rights and obligations of parties 
Depending on the specifics of a surrogacy agreement, it is possible that a 
child born of such agreement may have up to six possible parents.77 Thus the 
AHPC felt it was of utmost necessity that the rights and obligations of such 
parties be clearly defined so as not to found future disagreement. 
When the AHPC commenced its investigation into surrogate motherhood, one 
of the primary issues brought to the attention of the AHPC members was the 
issue of genetic relations and what impact genetic relations would have on the 
rights of the respective parties. 
Having regard to the above, and the previous discussion under paragraph 
2.2.2.2, the AHPC were aware of the very 'emotive' dilemma regarding the 
77 The six potent ial parents could be the genet ic parent/s, the surrogate mother, the 
surrogate 's husband or partner and the commiss ion ing parent(s). Report of the Ad Hoc 
Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate Motherhood (11 February 1999) 
avai lable at http//www.pmg.org.za/docs/1999/990211.saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apri l 
2011), 8. 
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compulsion of a surrogate mother to give up her genetically related child. With 
this in mind, the AHPC recommended that the rights and obligations which 
flow from a surrogacy agreement must be determined on the basis of whether 
a genetic relation exists between the surrogate mother and the child i.e. the 
rights and obligations of the parties were recommended to be dependant on 
whether the agreement was a full surrogacy agreement or a partial surrogacy 
agreement.78 
2.2.3.1 Rights and obligations of the parties in a full surrogacy 
agreement 
In respect of full surrogacy agreements, the AHPC recommended that any 
child born of a full surrogacy agreement would be regarded as the legitimate 
child of the commissioning parents immediately from birth. Hence, the AHPC 
recommended that the surrogate would be obliged to hand over the child to 
the commissioning parents immediately upon birth. 
In respect of the rights of the child born of the agreement, he or she would 
from the moment of birth be regarded as the child of the commissioning 
parents and thus would have no claim of maintenance or succession from the 
surrogate, her husband, partner or spouse or the surrogates' relatives. 
To conclude, the AHPC recommended that subject to the right to terminate 
one's pregnancy in terms of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act 92 
78 Three submiss ions were made by members of the A H P C in respect of the dist inct ion 
regarding full and part ial sur rogacy agreements . The first w a s that where a genet ic relat ion 
exists be tween the surrogate and the chi ld, the l ikel ihood of her surrender ing the chi ld upon 
birth w a s less than if she w a s not genet ica l ly related. The second submiss ion referred to a 
study by the Amer i can Col lege of Obstet r ic ians and Gynaecolog is ts , whe re it w a s found that 
a t tachment to the chi ld born of the agreement wou ld occur whe ther or not the surrogate w a s 
genet ica l ly related to such child. The final opin ion w a s that bonding be tween the mother and 
chi ld did not a lways happen: bond ing supposed ly takes place after birth. Report of the Ad Hoc 
Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) 
avai lable at http//www.pmg.org.za/docs/1999/990211.saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apri l 
2011), 8, 9, 20. 
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of 1996, the agreement would be wholly valid and enforceable and would not 
be capable of termination post artificial fertilisation.79 
Having regard to the above, the recommendations of the AHPC in respect of 
full surrogacy does, in effect, gives expression to the overriding purpose of 
surrogacy agreements: the child born of the agreement is regarded as the 
child of the commissioning parents immediately from the moment of birth and 
no party can terminate the agreement post artificial fertilisation. 
The recommendations presented above were directly incorporated into 
section 297(1) of the Act. The author submits that she is in agreement with 
the above mentioned recommendations and the resultant section, because as 
stated above, these recommendations and section 297(1) of the Act fulfil the 
objective behind legalising surrogacy agreements. The AHPC 
recommendations provide for persons who are naturally unable to have 
children of their own to enter into an agreement with a woman who agrees to 
bear a child for them. Such child will from the moment of birth be for all 
purposes considered to be their own and neither party can terminate the 
agreement post fertilisation. 
2.2.3.2 Rights and obligations of the parties to a partial surrogacy 
agreement 
To recapitulate, partial surrogacy is when the surrogate mother is both the 
genetic and gestational mother of the child to be born of the agreement. In 
this, the AHPC identified two problems, first whether a partial surrogate could 
be compelled to relinquish the child and all parental rights and responsibilities 
to such child upon birth to the commissioning parents, and secondly, if 
enforcing the agreement upon a partial surrogate (i.e. compelling her to hand 
over the child) would amount to an infringement of her constitutional rights to 
dignity and the right to make decisions regarding reproduction. 
79 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) avai lable at 
http//www. pmg. org. za/docs/1999/990211. saclreport. h tml (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 19, 20. 
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Taking the above into consideration, the AHPC recommended that, unlike in 
the case of full surrogacy, the child born of the agreement would not be 
considered the legitimate child born of the commissioning parents. The AHPC 
recommended that the child born of the agreement would be regarded the 
child of the surrogate upon birth, and a guardian ad litem would be appointed 
to protect the interests of the child born of the agreement. Despite the fact that 
the surrogate would be considered the legal mother of the child born of the 
agreement, the commissioning parents would be able to apply for a change of 
parentage in respect of such child after six weeks after the birth of the child. If 
the partial surrogate unconditionally consented to the 'change in parentage', 
the child born of the agreement would be given a new birth certificate with the 
commissioning parents listed as the child's parents. 80 
However, the AHPC recommended that if the surrogate does not provide her 
unconditional consent to the change in parentage, the status quo would 
prevail, and she would for all purposes remain the mother of the child born of 
the agreement. 
As was the case with full surrogacy, if the partial surrogate consents to the 
change in parentage, the AHPC recommended that the child born of the 
agreement would have no claim of maintenance or succession against the 
surrogate, her husband, partner, spouse or relatives. 
Lastly, having regard to the termination of the agreement, although not 
expressly stated by the AHPC, it is submitted by the author that because the 
partial surrogate has the right to keep the child born of the agreement as her 
80 Th is p roposed procedure is similar to that wh ich is in operat ion in the UK today. Sur rogacy 
Ag reemen ts (a l though not legal ly enforceable) are governed by the 1985 Sur rogacy 
Ar rangements Act and the 1990 and 2008 Human Fert i l isat ion and Embryo logy Act. All three 
Acts are still in operat ion and regulate sur rogacy ag reements in the UK. Sect ion 54 of the 
2008 Human Fert i l isat ion and Embryo logy Act prov ides for Parental Orders. In te rms of this, 
commiss ion ing parents apply to the Court after the chi ld has born for a parental order. The 
effect thereof is that the r ights and the responsibi l i t ies of the surrogate towards the chi ld wil l 
be te rminated and the commiss ion ing parents wil l become the legit imate parents of the chi ld 
born of the agreement . Report of the Ad Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on 
Surrogate Motherhood (11 February 1999) avai lable at 
http//www. pmg. org.za/docs/1999/990211. saclreport. h tml (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 20, 21. 
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own and not to consent to the change in parentage in respect of the 
commissioning parents, partial surrogacy agreements are capable of 
termination post fertilisation. 
The author submits that even though she is in agreement that it would be 
difficult to compel a woman to give up her own genetic child, and that forcing 
her to do so may amount to an unconstitutional act, recommending that partial 
surrogacy agreements, by comparison to full surrogacy agreements, 
constitute different rights and obligations for the parties does not give effect to 
the purpose of surrogacy agreements. Effectively, in the case of partial 
surrogacy, the surrogate mother will always possess the opportunity to 
terminate the agreement post fertilisation and to refuse to relinquish the child 
born of the agreement to the commissioning parents. Hence the 
commissioning parents, who entered the agreement with the desire to have a 
child which naturally they are on their own unable to do, will not be certain that 
this will be the result of the partial surrogacy agreement. To conclude, the 
effect of the AHPC recommendations is that partial surrogacy agreements will 
never be wholly enforceable against parties.81 
Though this argument will receive further examination in the subsequent 
chapters, the author submits that partial surrogacy does not protect the rights 
and the interests of all the parties concerned. Keeping in mind that in terms of 
the AHPC recommendations, the surrogate may choose not to hand the child 
born of the agreement to the commissioning parents, the position of the 
parties to a partial surrogacy agreement will, in the author's opinion, never be 
certain. 
The overall thrust of the above-mentioned recommendations of the AHPC has 
been incorporated into the Act in the form of section 298. Whilst the author 
submits that it is important to differentiate between surrogates on the basis of 
81 This is despi te the fact that the A H P C recommended that all sur rogacy agreements , 
whe ther full or part ial, should be regarded as val id and enforceable once conf i rmed by the 
Court. Report of the Ad Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (11 February 1999) avai lable at 
http//www. pmg. org. za/docs/1999/990211. saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 19. 
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the genetic relation which they share with the child of the agreements, and in 
doing so, the AHPC took cognisance of the possible implications that forcing a 
genetic mother to give up a child may have on her rights to dignity and her 
rights to make decisions regarding reproduction, the author submits that in 
principle, she does not agree with the practice of partial surrogacy. 
Whilst the substance of section 298 will receive further investigation 
throughout this research, what is important to note is that, in respect of the 
recommendations of the AHPC, section 298 does not wholly replicate the 
AHPC recommendations. Section 298 (read with section 297(1)(a)), unlike the 
AHPC recommendations, provides that the child born of the agreement is for 
all purposes the child of the commissioning parents. Instead of stipulating that 
the commissioning parents can request consent from the surrogate mother to 
apply for a change of parentage after sixty days since the birth of the child, 
the Act provides that the partial surrogate can terminate the agreement 
through written notice to the court before the expiry of the sixty day period 
after birth. Hence, the acquisition of the parental rights and responsibilities 
towards the child born of the agreement by the commissioning parents is 
delayed by this sixty day 'cooling-off' period.82 
Taking the above into consideration, the author submits that unlike the AHPC 
recommendations which created certainty as to who the parent of the child 
born of the agreement was during the sixty day period, the Act, in the form of 
section 298 leaves a lacuna in the law. Effectively, although the 
commissioning parents are considered the parents, the surrogate can choose 
to keep the child. During the sixty days between the birth of the child and the 
envisaged 'handover', the question which arises out of the application of 
section 298 is who bears the responsibility for the child for this period? For 
example would it be the surrogate or the commissioning parents who must 
consent to the emergency medical attention of the child? Would it be the 
surrogate or the commissioning parents who register the birth of the child: in 
terms of section 9(1) of the Births and Deaths Registration Act, the Director-
82 Louw A Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood in Davel CJ and Skel ton A Commentary on the 
Children's Act 38 of 2005 (2007), 19-24. 
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General of Home Affairs must be notified of the birth of every child within 30 
days after such birth? Lastly, if the child born of the agreement needed an 
emergency passport, would it be the surrogate or the commissioning parents 
who would make such application? 
Having regard to the above and the contents of the AHPC recommendations 
and section 298 of the Act, it is clear that partial surrogacy and full surrogacy 
agreements impose different rights and obligations on the parties to the 
respective agreements. In the case of full surrogacy, the child is the child of 
the commissioning parents from the moment of birth and the surrogate mother 
may not terminate the agreement post fertilisation. In the case of a partial 
surrogacy agreement, the commissioning parents only acquire parentage 
after the expiry of the sixty day period, and this is only of the surrogate mother 
chooses not to exercise her right to terminate the agreement. As the child 
born of a full surrogacy agreement is the child of the commissioning parents 
from the moment of birth, there exists no uncertainty as to the commissioning 
parent's rights and obligations towards the child. Whereas in the case of the 
partial surrogacy agreement (as it was illustrated above), it is debatable who 
bears the responsibility for the child born of the agreement during the first 
sixty days of his/her life. 
To conclude, the author submits that she does not in principle agree with the 
recommendation by the ADPC that partial surrogacy agreements be permitted 
due to the fact that they do not provide protection to the positions of the 
parties to the surrogacy agreement. This argument will be further 
substantiated in paragraph 4.5 of chapter four. 
2.2.4 Commercial surrogacy 
The AHPC recommended that surrogate motherhood for financial gain should 
not be permitted and that surrogacy should be seen as a method in which to 
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assist persons who are permanently and irreversibly unable to have children 
on their own and not as a means in which to accomplish financial upliftment.83 
As a result, the AHPC recommended that future legislation which regulated 
surrogacy should provide that no person shall in connection with a surrogate 
motherhood agreement give or promise to give any reward or compensation 
in cash or in kind. This recommendation was extended beyond that of the 
surrogate mother and the commissioning parents and included agencies and 
brokers. The only persons who were recommended to be exempt from such 
recommendation were legal practitioners and medical practitioners if they 
carried out bona fide services in the confirmation and performance of the 
agreement. Nonetheless, the AHPC members did provide that the surrogate 
would be entitled to reasonable compensation for those actual expenses 
incurred as a result of the confirmation and execution of the agreement.84 
The author submits that she is not in agreement with the above-mentioned 
recommendation of the AHPC. Despite the fact that the issue of commercial 
surrogacy will be examined in chapter four of this research, the author 
submits that unless the practice of commercial surrogacy can be said to be 
harmful to others, or have the potential to impair the dignity of the surrogate, 
commercial surrogacy is a viable option.85 
Section 22 of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to choose 
and practice their choice of trade, occupation and freedom, and provided that 
the compensation for surrogacy services is adequately regulated by 
government, it can be argued that women not only have right to choose 
surrogacy as a dorm of trade, occupation or profession, but they also have the 
83 Report of the A d Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (11 February 1999) avai lable at 
http//www. pmg. org. za/docs/1999/990211. saclreport. h tml (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 7, 17. 
The surrogate wou ld be ent i t led to be compensa ted for her loss of earn ings ar is ing out of 
per fo rmance in te rms of the agreement and the commiss ion ing parents wou ld have to take 
out an insurance pol icy to cover the surrogate in the event of dea th or disabi l i ty arising out of 
her per fo rmance in te rms of the agreement . Report of the Ad Hoc Commi t tee on Report of 
SA Law Commission on Surrogate Motherhood (11 February 1999) avai lable at 
http//www.pmg.org.za/docs/1999/990211.saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 1, 17. 
See paragraph 4.6 of chapter 4 for fur ther examinat ion. 
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right to make decisions regarding reproduction. Therefore the author submits 
that women should be permitted to be compensated for their reproductive 
services. 
Even though some AHPC members did initially submit that commercial 
surrogacy could be viable, and that 'if the state wished[d] to avoid 
discrimination and to treat its citizens equally, [the state] should adopt a 
hands-off approach' and permit citizens to exercise their freedoms, the final 
AHPC recommendations, and Chapter 19 of the Act, prohibit payment to the 
surrogate for her services as a surrogate. 
2.2.5 Best interests of the child 
It was the intention of both the SALC and the AHPC to ensure that any 
legislation which provided for the recognition and regulation of surrogacy 
agreements would give effect to the 'best interests of the child' and the 
majority of the submissions made 'highlighted the fact that everything should 
be done within the surrogacy agreement with the best interest of the child in 
mind.'86 
Having regard to this, the AHPC recommended the following: 
i) that the legal status of the child to be born of the agreement must 
be evident from the legislation and that such legislation should 
provide that the child born of the agreement has the right to be 
informed of his/her genetic origin,87 
86 The pr inciple (and the right as conta ined in sect ion 28 of the Const i tut ion) of the best 
interests of the chi ld wil l be examined in chapter th ree under the heading 'The const i tut ional 
impl icat ions of the appl icat ion of Chapter 19 on the best interests of the child'. Report of the 
A d Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate Motherhood (11 February 
1999) avai lable at http//www.pmg.org.za/docs/1999/990211.saclreport.html (accessed on 20 
Apri l 2011), 10. 
87 S o m e members of the A H P C argued that it wou ld not be in the chi ld 's best interests if he or 
she is to be aware of the identity of his or her surrogate mother. Report of the Ad Hoc 
Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate Motherhood (11 February 1999) 
avai lable at http//www.pmg.org.za/docs/1999/990211.saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apri l 
2011), 10. 
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ii) that the child born of the agreement should be genetically related to 
the commissioning parent,88 
iii) that full surrogacy, and the protection which it affords all parties to 
the agreement, would be in accordance with the best interests of 
the child,89 
iv) that the commissioning parents must be able to provide a healthy 
and stable home for the child born of the agreement, and90 
v) that the interests of any descendant or adopted children of the 
surrogate and/or the commissioning parents must be taken into 
account.91 
All of these recommendations, bar number iii were incorporated into Chapter 
19. For the reason that numbers ii, iii and iv have already been discussed in 
this chapter, the author will not examine these recommendations further, and 
because numbers i and v will be examined in great detail in chapter three, 
these recommendations will only be briefly discussed. 
The author agrees with the recommendation of the AHPC that the child born 
of the surrogacy agreement should have the right to be informed of his or her 
genetic origin. As it will be evidenced in chapter three, the right of access to 
information to one's genetic origin can be said to be vital to the enhancement 
and preservation of one's human dignity and self-worth. 
The above recommendation has been afforded some consideration by the 
legislature, albeit that the AHPC recommendation has not been precisely 
88 Report of the A d Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (11 February 1999) avai lable at 
http//www.pmg.org.za/docs/1999/990211.saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 17. 
89 Report of the A d Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (11 February 1999) avai lable at 
http//www. pmg. org. za/docs/1999/990211. saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 16. 
90 Report of the Ad Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (11 February 1999) avai lable at 
http//www.pmg.org.za/docs/1999/990211.saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 17. 
91 Report of the A d Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (11 February 1999) avai lable at 
http//www.pmg.org.za/docs/1999/990211.saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 18. 
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replicated. Section 41 of the Act, which provides for access to biographical 
and medical information concerning genetic parents, reads as follows: 
'(1) A chi ld born as a result of artif icial fert i l isat ion or sur rogacy or the guard ian of such 
chi ld is ent i t led to have access to -
(a) any medical informat ion concern ing that chi ld 's genet ic parents; and 
(b) any other informat ion concern ing that chi ld 's genet ic parents but not before the 
age of 18 years 
(2) Informat ion d isc losed in te rms of subsect ion (1) may not reveal the identi ty of the 
person w h o s e gamete w a s or game tes were used for such artif icial fert i l isation of the 
identi ty of the surrogate mother. 
(3) The Director-General : Heal th or any other person speci f ied by regulat ion may require 
a person to receive counsel l ing before any informat ion is d isc losed in te rms of 
subsect ion (1)'. 
Although section 41 restricts the information accessible to only that of medical 
and biographical information and the child is only entitled to access such 
information at the age of 18 years, the child born of a surrogacy agreement 
has been afforded the right to have access to his/her genetic origin and this is 
in accordance with the best interests of the child principle. 
To conclude the author submits that she agrees that it will be in the best 
interests of the child born of a surrogacy agreement to have access to 
information regarding his/her genetic origin.92 
In addition to the AHPC recommendation that children born of surrogacy 
agreements should have access to information regarding their genetic origin, 
the AHPC also recommended that due consideration needed to be afforded to 
the interests of any descendants or adopted children of the surrogate and/or 
the commissioning parents. I.e. due consideration should be given to the 
children of the parties to the surrogacy agreement who are already in 
existence. 
92 The right of access to know ledge in respect of one 's genet ic origin wil l be further examined 
in paragraph 3.8.2 of chapter 3. 
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This recommendation, albeit in different wording, has been incorporated into 
the Act in terms of section 295(e). Section 295(e) provides that a court may 
not confirm a surrogacy agreement unless it has regard to the 'family 
situations of all the parties concerned'. With this, the author submits that 
'having regard to the family situations of all the parties concerned' can be said 
to mean that the court must consider the views of the family members of the 
surrogate mother and/or the commissioning parents. 
In addition to section 295(e), section 10 of the Act provides for child 
participation in all matters concerning the child. In terms of section 10, 'every 
child that is of such an age, maturity and stage of development as to be able 
to participate in any matter concerning that child has the right to participate in 
an appropriate way and views expressed by that child must be given due 
consideration'. 
To conclude, the author agrees that the views of the child of the surrogate 
and/or the commissioning parents must be afforded consideration, however, 
and this will be further substantiated in chapter three, whether the views and 
interests of the other children (who are already in existence) of the surrogate 
and/or the commissioning parents will have the effect that they may trump the 
rights of the surrogate mother and/or the commissioning parent to enter into a 
surrogacy agreement, is debatable. Though the best interests of the child are 
paramount, this right is not absolute and can be proportionately limited. Lastly, 
without provision made for the screening of the parties to the agreement, it is 
unclear how the 'family situations' of these parties will be given due regard. 
2.2.6 State funded fertility clinics 
Due to the high costs involved in surrogacy procedures, initially, most of the 
AHPC members were in agreement with the SALC suggestion that State-
funded fertility clinics needed to be established to provide access to those 
who could not afford surrogacy-enabling medical procedures. Section 27(1)(a) 
of the Constitution provides that everyone has the right to access to 
reproductive health care services. In light of this constitutional provision, the 
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AHPC felt that the State should provide the opportunity to access medical 
procedures assisting in surrogacy to those who are unable to afford the 
medical procedures involved in fulfilling surrogacy agreements.93 However, 
when it came to drafting the final recommendations, the AHPC 
recommendations did not make provision for State funded fertility clinics. 
The author is partial agreement with the exclusion of the above 
recommendation. Although it is acknowledged that everyone has a right to 
access to reproductive health services, it is proposed that the right to access 
to reproductive health care cannot, at this point in time, be interpreted to 
include the right of access to surrogate motherhood enabling technologies. 
With the aid of socio-economic rights case law, this recommendation will be 
comprehensively examined in chapter three. 
In addition to this, the author notes that whilst both the SALC and the AHPC 
were very much in favour of the establishment of state-funded fertility clinics 
to assist in the medical procedures associated in surrogacy, neither the SALC 
nor the AHPC made any suggestions regarding possible monetary assistance 
in respect of legal costs. 
Section 292(e) of the Act provides that 'no surrogate motherhood agreement 
is valid unless the agreement is confirmed by the High Court'. Whilst it can be 
presupposed that because the High Court is the upper guardian of all children 
that the Judges of the High Court could be said to be the most qualified to 
determine that the surrogacy agreement conforms to the requirements of the 
Act and ultimately, that the agreement to be confirmed is in the best interests 
of the child, the fact of the matter is that High Court litigation is costly. 
South Africa is a third-world country where the majority of the persons are 
unemployed. If the SALC, AHPC and the legislature envisaged that all 
surrogacy agreements be sanctioned by the High Court before they could 
93 Report of the A d Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (11 February 1999) avai lable at 
http//www.pmg.org.za/docs/1999/990211.saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 15. 
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become valid, the SALC, AHPC and the legislature were impractical. By 
providing that surrogacy agreements must be confirmed by the High Court, 
the legislature clearly has not taken cognisance of the South African 
economic sphere and within this, the Act advocates high legal costs in respect 
of the confirmation of surrogacy agreements. 
To conclude, the legislature should have delegated surrogacy agreement 
jurisdiction to Children's Courts and High Courts. 
2.2.7 The proposed Surrogacy Act 
The AHPC completed its final report (Report of the Ad Hoc Parliamentary 
Committee on the Report of the SALC on Surrogacy) in 1999. The report was 
referred to the Department of Justice and recommended the adoption of the 
Surrogacy Act. In the interim, the SALC had commenced its enquiry into the 
Child Care Act.94 The First Issue Paper of the Review of the Child Care Act 
was published in 1998. The Paper acknowledged that surrogacy agreements 
had not been sufficiently regulated in the Children's Status Act and comment 
was called for on whether a comprehensive children's statute should be 
drafted so as to include such agreements.95 The Issue Paper was followed by 
the Discussion Paper 103 on the Review of the Child Care Act in 2001, the 
perception being that the determination of legal parenthood especially in the 
case of surrogate motherhood had grown additionally challenging.96 
In the 2002 Report and Draft Children's Bill on the Review of the Child Care 
Act it was ultimately recommended by the SALC that those provisions which 
were to be found in the AHPC's proposed Surrogacy Act were to be included 
in the new Children's Act: thus no discrete legislation would be promulgated 
which dealt solely with surrogacy agreements.97 
94 Louw A S Acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights (unpubl ished LLD thesis, 
Universi ty of Pretoria, 2009) , 332. 
95 Carnel ley M and Soni S (2008) 22 Speculum Juris, 37. 
96 Carnel ley M and Soni S (2008) 22 Specu lum Juris, 37. 
97 Jordaan RA and Davel CJ Law of Persons (2005), 106; Carnel ley M and Soni S (2008) 22 
Speculum Juris, 97; Louw A S Acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights (unpubl ished 
LLD thesis, Universi ty of Pretoria, 2009) , 332. 
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In 2003, the Minister of Social Development tabled a draft Children's Bill 
aimed at enhancing the rights of vulnerable and poor children, addressing the 
increase in child abuse and neglect and providing better care for all children, 
and in June 2005, the Children's Act 38 of 2005 was promulgated.98 The 
Children's Act made provision for surrogacy agreements and was the first 
South African legislation to openly regulate surrogate motherhood and 
establish surrogacy as a legally recognised procedure of assisted 
reproduction.'99 
Having regard to the above, the author disagrees that the regulation of 
surrogate motherhood agreements has been incorporated into the Children's 
Act. Though surrogacy does deal with the conception of a child and his/her 
interests need to be protected, surrogate motherhood agreements, as it will 
be evidenced in chapter three and four respectively, do not solely involve 
children or families. Surrogate motherhood agreements involve a hybrid of 
legal issues that cannot be regulated through the application of one aspect of 
South African law. Surrogacy agreements involve contract law, family law and 
may even involve customary law. Hence the author submits that to regulate 
surrogate motherhood agreements adequately, the proposed Surrogacy Act 
which was recommended by the AHPC in 1999 should have been 
promulgated. Thus the author submits that the inclusion of surrogate 
motherhood into the Children's Act was erroneous. 
2.3 Conclusion 
The purpose of this chapter has been to lay a foundation for the examination 
of some specific provisions of Chapter 19 which, in the author's opinion, may 
give rise to future constitutional and/or contractual disputed. Consequently, 
only this recommendations (and their resultant provisions) which the author 
98 Carr K 'Surrogate Motherhood ' (2007) avai lable at 
http://mcsadewcom.bloaspot.com/2007/03/surroaate-motherhood.html (accessed on14 
February 2010); Boezaart T Law of Persons (2010), 97. 
99 Carne l ley M and Soni S (2008) 22 Speculum Juris, 36; Louw A S Acquisition of parental 
responsibilities and rights (unpubl ished LLD thesis, Universi ty of Pretoria, 2009) , 330. 
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submitted may give rise to constitutional and contractual implications were 
examined. 
The first part of this chapter dealt with the legislative history of surrogacy prior 
to 2003. It was noted that due to the highly publicised case of the Ferreira-
Jorge triplets of Tzaneen in 1987 and the realisation that surrogacy was being 
practiced in South Africa, the SALC recognised a need for legislation that 
would clarify the positions of all parties to a surrogacy agreement, and most 
importantly, elucidate the legal status of children born of these agreements. 
As a result of the general opinion that the SALC were, as an investigative 
committee, inappropriately constituted, the AHPC was appointed to 
investigate surrogacy in light of the newly enacted Constitution and recent 
legislative developments. 
With this in mind, the author examined several of the AHPC 
recommendations. The recommendations which were examined were those 
that the author identified as having the possibility of being either 
constitutionally and/or contractually suspect. Having regard to these 
recommendations, the author investigated the rationale behind the inclusion 
of each individual recommendation and whether such recommendation had 
been wholly or partially incorporated into Chapter 19, or whether such 
recommendation was in fact omitted from the Act. 
Thereafter the author briefly examined the AHPC's proposed Surrogacy Act. 
The author submitted that the incorporation by the legislature of surrogacy 
agreements into the Children's Act was inappropriate due to the fact that 
surrogacy is not solely a children's rights issue: surrogacy agreements 
compose of conflicting human interests which cannot alone be regulated 
through family/children law. 
The purpose of this chapter was to examine the legislative history of surrogate 
motherhood in South Africa. It was intended to identify possible constitutional 
and contractual implications which may arise out of the application of Chapter 
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19 of the Act. Hence, this chapter aimed to establish the necessary foundation 
for this research. 
With reference to the provisions of the Act, which were briefly examined in this 
research, as well as to those aspects proposed by the AHPC, which were 
either included of excluded in the Act, the next chapter intends to show that 
despite the fact that surrogacy as a form of assisted reproduction has been 
afforded legal recognition, the application of some of the provisions, and the 
impact of some of the exclusions, of Chapter 19 of the Act has the likelihood 
of infringing the constitutional rights of would-be commissioning parents, 
would-be surrogates and the child born as a result of the agreement. 
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CHAPTER THREE: 
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF CHAPTER 19 OF THE CHILDREN'S ACT 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter aims to comprehensively investigate the possible constitutional 
issues which were identified in Chapter Two. Each issue will be dealt with 
individually, taking into account the constitutionally guaranteed right that may 
be infringed by the relevant provisions of the Act. The purpose of this chapter 
is to illustrate the encumbering effect that the relevant provisions of Chapter 
19 have on specific rights as contained in the Constitution. 
Ultimately, the intention is to illustrate that certain provisions are in fact not 
based on a law of general application and are not reasonable and justifiable in 
an open and democratic society based on dignity, equality and freedom and 
that these specific provisions are neither rational nor fair. As a result, it will be 
established that such provisions are in fact inconsistent with the Constitution, 
are invalid and it is thus the duty of the state to amend Chapter 19 to 
construct legislation which respects promotes and fulfils a constitutionally 
acceptable purpose. The core rights of equality, freedom and dignity will be 
discussed as well as the effect Chapter 19 has on aspects of reproductive 
autonomy and cultural freedom. 
3.2 Introduction to the Constitution 
Arguably the most important chapter of the Constitution is Chapter 2: The Bill 
of Rights. Based on the Freedom Charter, the rights contained in Chapter 2 
form the cornerstone of our democracy. The state and all South Africans, 
whether as natural or juristic persons, are required to respect and protect 
these rights. All rights contained in Chapter 2 are however subject to the 
application of section 36, the limitations clause. 
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The Constitution has two primary functions, namely to grant power and to limit 
power.100 Empowerment provisions provide the constitutional authority to 
different branches and organs of state to perform certain tasks; however at 
the same time, by providing certain branches or organs with constitutional 
authority, provisions may also limit the powers of other organs or branches to 
act. 
The Bill of Rights is vertically and horizontally applicable.101 Vertical 
application refers to application between private persons and the state, 
whereas horizontal application is between one private individual and another 
(a natural person102 and/or a juristic person).103 
Certain legislation places a duty on the state to implement procedures and 
methods in which private citizens are provided with the opportunity to realise 
their rights.104 Vertically, individuals may invoke the Bill of Rights and 
approach the Constitutional Court (hereinafter referred to as the 'CC') either 
directly or indirectly when they are of the opinion that their right has been 
infringed by an organ of state. Horizontally, individuals, when of the opinion 
that their rights have been infringed, may also approach the CC. 105 
100 Provis ions wh ich grant power are te rmed 'empowermen t or power provis ions' . Provis ions 
wh ich limit power are 'r ights or l imitat ion c lauses' . Mota la Z and Ramaphosa C Constitutional 
Law: Analysis and Cases (2002), 221. 
101 In te rms of sect ion 8 of the Const i tut ion, ' the Bill of Rights appl ies to all law, and binds the 
legislature, the execut ive, the judic iary and all o rgans of state'. 
1 0 2 Cronje DSP and Heaton J The South African Law of Persons 3ed (2007), 2; Jo rdaan RA 
and Davel CJ Law of Persons (2005), 5. Legal personal i ty is bes towed upon legal subjects. A 
legal subject is any ent i ty wh i ch can have rights, dut ies and capaci t ies. An examp le of a legal 
subject is a natural person w h o is any human being i rrespect ive of age, menta l capaci ty and 
intel lectual abil ity. 
103 A jurist ic person is the other example of a legal subject bes towed wi th legal personal i ty. 
Certa in assoc iat ions of natural persons are legal subjects of their own and have their own 
separate legal ex is tence f rom that of the natural persons w h o created it. An example of a 
juristic person is a c o m p a n y incorporated in te rms of the relevant legislat ion. Cronje DSP and 
Heaton J The South African Law of Persons 3ed (2007), 5; Jo rdaan RA and Davel CJ Law of 
Persons (2005), 4. 
104 An example of such legislat ion is found in sect ion 26 of the Const i tut ion wh ich prov ides 
that everyone has the right to have access to adequate housing. The State must take 
reasonable measures , wi th in its avai lable resources to ach ieve the progress ive real isat ion of 
this right. 
105 Horizontal appl icat ion may result f rom a contractual d ispute, defamat ion, or for instance 
discr iminat ion. See for example Hoffmann v South African Airways 2001 (1) SA (CC). 
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The forthcoming paragraphs will examine the rights of the Constitution which 
are pertinent to this research: the right to equality, the right to human dignity 
and the right to make decisions regarding reproduction. All of these rights are 
relevant because of the restrictive impact that the application of Chapter 19 
may impose on their implementation. 
3.2.1 Section 9 of the Constitution: The equality clause 
"Equal i ty is of ten seen as the most diff icult right to achieve; a right wh ich often promises 
more that it can del iver, however it g ives meaning to specif ic substant ive r ights and it 
can be used as a tool to deve lop a powerfu l and progress ive jur isprudence".1 0 6 
One of the rights that will be examined in this chapter will be the right to 
equality, and the impact that specific provisions of Chapter 19 have on this 
right. 
Although no precise definition of the word equality or the exact composition 
thereof exists, equality has however been said to encapsulate 'the social 
democratic vision embracing both equality of opportunity and outcomes'.107 
Section 9 of the Constitution (hereinafter referred to as the equality clause) 
commences with the words 'everyone is equal before the law and has the 
right to equal protection and benefit of the law'. In this, the equality clause 
purports to include the full and equal enjoyment of all rights and freedoms. 
The equality clause stipulates that neither the state nor an individual may 
directly or indirectly unfairly discriminate against anyone on one or more 
grounds, including race, gender, sex, pregnancy, marital status, ethnic or 
social origin, colour, sexual orientation, age, disability, religion, conscience, 
106 W o o l m a n S, Roux T and Bishop S Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed: Vol. II (2008), 
35-4. 
107 A lber tyn A and Goldblat t B Constitutional Law of South Africa: Equality Vol. III (2008), 35-
2. 
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belief, culture, language and birth.108 A positive duty exists on the state to 
enact legislation preventing and prohibiting unfair discrimination.109 
Amongst others, discrimination on the grounds of age, disability and culture 
are significant to this research, in that it will be contended that by and large 
the application of Chapter 19 has the effect that these rights are superfluously 
limited without the justification of a constitutionally acceptable purpose. 
3.2.1.1 The meaning of equality in South Africa: Fair discrimination 
A unique aspect of the South African Constitution is that it can be said that 
'fair' discrimination is permitted.110 The equality clause is primarily aimed at 
redressing the inequalities of the pre-1994 era in which our social and legal 
system rested predominantly on discrimination. The infamous terms of 
'separate development' and 'apartheid' were characterised by the unequal 
treatment and overall discrimination against the majority of South Africans in 
all divisions of their lives, such as in property, education and marriage.111 
The legislation of pre-1994 regimes has left a legacy of inequality and unequal 
growth. Those South Africans who suffered under the pre-1994 rule were 
economically, educationally and socially disadvantaged and they could not 
compete on an equal level with previously advantaged South Africans. As a 
result, equality for all could not be realised overnight. Legislation had to be 
implemented and lengthy procedures were embarked upon so as to achieve 
equality for all. As a result, South Africa does not approach equality from a 
hierarchical approach but rather a relational approach: no group is valued 
108 Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa 2002 (9) BCLR 986 (CC) ; Du Toit 
and Another v Minister for Welfare and Population Development and Others 2002 (10) BCLR 
1006 (CC) ; Bhe and Others v Magistrate, Khayelitsha and Others 2004 (1) BCLR 27 (C) ; S v 
J 1998 (4) BCLR 424 (SCA); Bannatyne v Bannatyne and Another 2003 (2) BCLR 111 (CC). 
109 An example of legislat ion wh ich the state has enacted in the ful f i lment of its duty to prevent 
and prohibit unfair d iscr iminat ion is the Promot ion of Equal i ty and Prevent ion of Unfair 
Discr iminat ion Act 4 of 2000. Chapter 2(a) of this Act states that, amongst others, the 'object 
of this Act [is] to enact legislat ion required by sect ion 9 of the Const i tut ion. ' 
110 Curr ie I and De W a a l J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2010), 45. 
111 The Group Areas Act 41 of 1950 ( repealed in 1991), The Nat ives Land Act 27 of 1913 
(repealed in 1991), The Bantu Educat ion Act 47 of 1953 (repealed in 1979), The Immoral i ty 
Act 23 of 1957 ( repealed in 1985) and Prohibi t ion of Mixed Marr iages Act 55 of 1949 
(repealed in 1985). 
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above another; instead it is the substantive arrangements that produce or 
prevent a group's social prosperity or political self-determination which is 
calculated.112 
Rather than relying on the idea that any different treatment is presumably 
suspect, irrational and thus unfair, South Africa recognises that inequality 
does not only emerge from irrational legal distinctions but is often more deeply 
rooted in the social and economic differences between groups and 
individuals.113 
'A substant ive approach to equal i ty ... promote[s ] the va lue of human digni ty and 
prevent[s] arbi trary t reatment : it is not about how w e compare but w h y w e compare ' . 1 1 4 
In light of this, the Constitution and the CC it its interpretation thereof, 
consider different treatment not from a subjective viewpoint, but through the 
eyes of an objective person. Thus the inclusion of reasonableness as an 
objective standard in the determination of whether the differentiation between 
individuals (or categories of individuals) seeks to fulfil a constitutionally 
acceptable purpose. 
3.2.1.2 Reasonableness 
112 W o o l m a n S, Roux T and Bishop S Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed: Vol. II (2008), 
35-4; Alber tyn A and Goldblat t B Constitutional Law of South Africa: Equality Vol. III (2008), 
35-2. 
113 Sect ion 9(2) of the Const i tut ion prov ides as fo l lows; ". [T]o p romote the ach ievement of 
equal i ty, legislat ive and other measures des igned to protect or advance persons, or 
categor ies of persons, d isadvantaged by unfair d iscr iminat ion, may be taken". W o o l m a n S, 
Roux T and Bishop S Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed: Vol. II (2008), 35-6 and 35-7; 
Curr ie I and De W a a l J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2010), 245. See Eskom v Hiemstra 
NO and Others 1999 (11) BCLR 1320 (LC) ; President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 
1 £397 (4) SA 17 (CC). 
114 The Employment Equity Act 55 of 1998 purpor ts to redress the inequal i t ies in both the 
publ ic and private sector labour markets. The Broad-Based Black Economic Empowermen t 
Act 53 of 2005 a ims to p romote the economic empowermen t of all b lack people, w o m e n , 
workers , youth, d isabled persons and persons wi th in rural communi t ies . Curr ie I & De W a a l J 
The New Constitutional and Administrative Law (2008), 349. See Botha & Another v Mthiyane 
& Another 2002 (4) BCLR 389 (W) for further d iscuss ion on substant ive and formal equal i ty 
and Stoman v Minister of Safety and Secur i ty 2002 (3) SA 468 (T); Motala v University of 
Natal 1995 (3) BCLR 374 (D); Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (6) SA 121 (CC); 
Public Servants Association of South Africa v Minister of Justice 1997 (5) BCLR 577 (T) 
regarding af f i rmat ive act ion. 
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In the determination of unfair discrimination, reasonableness is the key. The 
case in point is that of Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) para 53, 
where the CC tabulated the stages of an enquiry into a violation of the 
equality clause as follows: 
"(a) Does the cha l lenged law or conduct di f ferent iate be tween people or ca tegor ies of 
peop le? If so, does the di f ferent iat ion bear a rat ional connect ion to the legit imate 
government purpose? If it does not, then there is a v io lat ion of sect ion 9(1). Even if it 
does bear a rat ional connect ion, it might never the less amount to d iscr iminat ion. 
(b) Does the di f ferent iat ion amount to unfair d iscr iminat ion? th is requires a two-s tage 
analysis: 
(i) Firstly, does the di f ferent iat ion amount to d iscr iminat ion? if it is on a speci f ied g round 
then d iscr iminat ion wil l have to be establ ished. If it is not on a speci f ied ground, then 
whe ther or not there is d iscr iminat ion wil l depend upon whether , object ively, the g round 
is based on attr ibutes and character is t ics that have the potent ial to impair the 
fundamenta l human digni ty of persons as human be ings or to affect t h e m adverse ly in a 
comparab ly ser ious manner . 
(ii) If the di f ferent iat ion amounts to d iscr iminat ion, does it amount to unfair 
d iscr iminat ion? if it has been found to have been on a speci f ied ground, then unfa i rness 
wil l be p resumed. If on an unspeci f ied ground, unfa i rness wil l have to be establ ished by 
the compla inant . The test of unfa i rness focuses pr imari ly on the impact of the 
discr iminat ion on the compla inant and others in his or her si tuat ion. 
If at the end of th is s tage of enquiry, the di f ferent iat ion is found not to be unfair, there wil l 
be no v io lat ion of sect ion 9(3) and 9(4). 
(c) If the d iscr iminat ion is found to be unfair then a determinat ion wil l have to be made as 
to whe ther the provis ion can be just i f ied under the l imitat ion c lause. 
[The l imitation analys is involves a "weighing of the purpose and effect of the provis ion in 
quest ion and a determinat ion as to the proport ional i ty thereof in relat ion to the extent of 
its inf r ingement of equal i ty"] . '1 1 5 
In summary, differentiation will only be unfair and discriminatory if no 
reasonable relation exists between the differentiation and the purpose of the 
115 Curr ie I and De Waa l J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2010), 235,236; W o o l m a n S, 
Roux T and Bishop S Constitutional Law of South Africa 2ed: Vol. II (2008), 35-18. 
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act or provision. Ultimately it must be established that the law cannot achieve 
its purpose, or that the relation between the differentiation and the legitimate 
governmental purpose that the provision is designed to further or achieve, is 
arbitrary.116 It must be noted that in the cases of Prinsloo v Van der Linde and 
National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice and Zondi v 
President of the RSA and Others the CC held that it was unnecessary to 
perform the reasonableness stage of the test on the basis that the 
differentiation was clearly unjustifiable and illogical.117 
Whether the discrimination is in fact unfair rests on the determination of 
whether such discrimination is based on a section 9(3) listed ground or an 
analogous ground. 'An analogous ground is one that is based on attributes or 
characteristics which have the potential to impair the fundamental dignity of 
persons as human beings or to affect them in a seriously comparable 
manner'.118 
The rights and freedoms contained in the Bill of Rights are not absolute and 
circumstances do exist where unreasonable differentiation and unfair 
116 Curr ie I and De W a a l J Constitutional and Administrative Law (2008), 351; Curr ie I and De 
Waa l J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2010), 236; Master of the High Court v Deedat and 
Others 1999 (11) BCLR 1285 (N); Moseneke and Others v Master of the High Court 2001 (2) 
BCLR 103 (CC); City Council of Pretoria v Walker 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC); Mwellie v 
Ministry of Works, Transport and Communications and Another 1995 (9) BCLR 1118 (C); 
Jooste v Score Supermarket Trading (PTY) Ltd 1998 (9) BCLR 1106 (E); East London 
Transitional Local Council v Taxpayers' Action Organisation and Others 1998 (10) BCLR 
1221 (E). 
117 Prinsloo v Van der Linde 1997 (3) SA 1012 (CC) para 2 2 ; National Coalition for Gay & 
Lesbian Equality v Minister of Justice 1998 (6) BCLR 726 (W); Zondi v President of the RSA 
and Others 1999 (11) BCLR 1313 (N). 
118 A case in point wou ld be that of Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC). 
The case dealt wi th the const i tut ional i ty of Sect ion 25(9) of the Al iens Contro l Act 96 of 1991 
wh ich required appl icants for immigrat ion permi ts to be outs ide of South Afr ica w h e n their 
permits we re granted (however this Act exempted spouses, same sex life partners, 
dependant chi ldren and dest i tute, aged or inf irm fami ly members of South Afr ican permanent 
residents and cit izens). The CC held that despi te the right to fami ly life not being express ly 
prov ided for in the const i tut ion, the right to enter into and sustain a permanent int imate 
marr iage relat ionship fo rmed part of the fundamenta l right to human dignity. A n y legislat ion 
wh ich prohibi ted the right to form a marr iage infr inged the right to digni ty and any legislat ion 
wh ich wou ld have the effect of impair ing the abi l i ty of spouses to honour their obl igat ions 
under marr iage wou ld also limit ones right to human dignity. Living together is a central 
aspect of marr iage. Thus the appl icant w a s d iscr iminated against the basis of his nat ional i ty 
and mari tal status and the protect ion of his fami ly w a s seen to be ana logous to mari tal status. 
Curr ie I and De Waa l J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2010), 244. Larbi-Odam v MEC for 
Education (North West Province) 1998 (1) SA 745 (CC) ; Hoffmann v South African Airways 
2001 (1) SA 1 (CC). 
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discrimination can be justifiable if in accordance with section 36 (hereinafter 
referred to as the limitations clause). 
In terms of the limitations clause, any right may be limited if such limitation is 
in the form of a law of general application.119 The limitation must nevertheless 
be reasonable and justifiable in light of the open and democratic country in 
which we live: a country whose laws and regulations are based on human 
dignity, equality and freedom. Consequently, the provision in question must 
be shown to serve a constitutionally acceptable purpose and sufficient 
proportionality must exist between the infringement and the benefit such 
infringement is intended to achieve.120 When determining if the limitation is 
reasonable and justifiable, factors such as the composition of the right, the 
significance of the purpose of the limitation, the composition and degree of the 
limitation, the relation between the limitation and the purpose; and whether 
less restrictive means exist to fulfil such purpose are taken into account. The 
motivation for limiting a right must be exceptionally formidable: the limitation 
must serve a purpose which the majority of persons would find compellingly 
imperative. To be precise: proportionality must exist between the restriction 
and the advantage. 121 
In S v Bhulwana 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC), paragraph 18, the CC held that the 
application of the limitations clause required the following: 
'[I]n sum, the Court p laces the purpose, effects and impor tance of the infr inging 
legislat ion on one side of the scales and the nature and effect of the infr ingement caused 
by the legislat ion on the other. The more substant ia l the inroad into fundamenta l r ights, 
the more persuas ive the g rounds of just i f icat ion must be'. 122 
119 A law of genera l appl icat ion is any original or de legated legislat ion wh i ch appl ies 
impersonal ly (equal un-arbi t rary appl icat ion) and wh ich is suff ic ient ly c lear and prec ise so that 
those af fected can readi ly ascerta in their subsequent r ights and obl igat ions. Curr ie I and De 
Waa l J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2010), 168. See for examp le August v Electoral 
Commission 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC); President of the Republic of South Africa v Hugo 1997 (4) 
SA 1 (CC); S v Mbatha 1996 (2) SA 464 (CC). 
120 Curr ie I and De W a a l J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2010), 176. 
121 Curr ie I and De W a a l J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2010) 164; Larbi-Odam and 
Others v Member of the Executive Council for Education, North-West Province and Another 
1997 (12) BCLR 1655 (CC); Van Rensburg v South African Post Office Ltd 1998 (10) BCLR 
1307. 
122 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC). 
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3.2.2 Human dignity 
The right to equality does not stand in isolation. Very often, when specific 
conduct or legislation is challenged on the grounds that it is a violation of the 
right to equality, the right to dignity is also implicated. 
'The term digni ty itself means 'worth iness ' or 'excel lence' . It is any qual i ty of a person 
entit l ing t h e m to be regarded, respected and protected. '1 2 3 
Section 10 of the Constitution provides everyone with the right to inherent 
dignity and the right to have such dignity respected and protected. The 
Judges of the CC have yet to reach consensus regarding the meaning of 
human dignity. Nevertheless it has been held to entail that that all individuals 
are to be recognised as being able to make individual choices; that 'at its 
least...dignity requires us to acknowledge the value and worth of all 
individuals of our society' and that human dignity is 'the foundation of many of 
the other rights that are specifically entrenched in ... the Bill of Rights.'124 
In the ground breaking judgment of Dawood, the Court held that human 
dignity is not only a justifiable and enforceable right that must be respected 
and protected [but] it is also a value that informs the interpretation of possibly 
all other fundamental rights'. 125 The so-called right to family life which was 
afforded protection in the case of Dawood shows that the protection afforded 
to family life 'extends at the very least, to the core elements of these 
123 W o o d A Human Dignity, Right and the Realms of Ends (2007); Barnard - Naude AJ, 
Cornel l D and Du Bois F Dignity, Freedom and the Apartheid Legal Order: The Critical 
Jurisprudence of Laurie Ackerman (2008), 47. 
124 Curr ie I and De W a a l J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2010), 274. 
S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391; Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 
2000 (4) SA 757 (CC); Advance Mining Hydraulics v Botes NO 2009 (2) BCLR 119 (T); S v 
Pienaar 2000 (7) BCLR 800 (NC); S v Dodo 2001 (3) SA 382 (CC); Christian Education v 
Minister of Education of the Government of RSA 1999 (9) BCLR 951 (SE); S v Williams 1995 
(3) SA 632 (CC); S v Huma 1996 (1) SA 232 (W); National Coalition for Gay & Lesbian 
Equality v Minister of Justice 1999 (1) SA 6 (CC). 
125 Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) para 35. See further B v M 2006 
(9) BCLR 1034 (W); Patel and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2000 (2) SA 
343 (D) ; Booysen and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2001 (4) SA 485 (CC); 
Robinson and Another v Volks NO and Others (2004) 6 BCLR 671 (C); Gory v Kolver NO and 
Others (Starke and Others Intervening) 2007 (3) BCLR 249 (CC); EN and Others v 
Government of RSA and Others 2007 (1) BCLR 84 (D). 
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institutions, namely the right and duty of spouses to live together as spouses 
in community of life'. 126 
In the matter of Gory v Kolver NO and Others (Starke and Others Intervening) 
2007 (3) BCLR 249 (CC) the CC held that the failure of section 1(1) of the 
Intestate Succession Act 81 of 1987 to include permanent life partners within 
its ambit of 'spouse' was inconsistent with the right to equality and dignity. At 
this point, the Civil Union Act 17 of 2006 was not yet in operation and 
permanent same-sex life partners were prohibited from marriage.127 The 
Intestate Succession Act provided that only 'spouses' were entitled to inherit 
intestate. The Court held that because same-sex marriage was expressly 
prohibited by the Marriage Act 25 of 1961, the provision of the Intestate 
Succession Act was inconsistent with the Constitution, was discriminatory on 
the basis of sexual orientation (a listed ground) and marriage (analogously) 
and had the effect that the right to dignity of the complainant was impaired. 
In the 2005 case of Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 
(CC) the first Respondent had been successful in her application to the High 
Court for an order of invalidity regarding the definition of 'spouse' in the 
Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990.128 The first Respondent 
had been involved in a permanent life partnership with the deceased for 
sixteen years and a marriage had never been concluded. The parties had 
shared a home for twelve years and both contributed to each other's 
wellbeing and were ever present in each other's daily lives. Upon the death of 
the deceased, first applicant submitted a claim for maintenance in terms of the 
126 Art ic le 8 of the European Convent ion on Human Rights (ECHR) (previously the 
Convent ion for the Protect ion of Human Rights and Fundamenta l F reedoms 1950) prov ides 
that everyone has the right to respect for his or her pr ivate and fami ly life, his or her home and 
his cor respondence. For precedent relat ing to the right to fami ly life see C - 60/00 Mary 
Carpenter v Secretary of the State for the Home Department; Appl icat ion number 27138/04 
Ciubotaru v Moldava; Appl icat ion number 16318/07 Moretti and Benedetti v Italy. Internat ional 
Human Rights Law 'Blog of the internat ional just ice law centre ' avai lable at 
www.http://internationalhumanrightslaw.org/2010/04/72/echr-judgments-april-201/ (accessed 
on 6 January 2011); Mary Carpenter [2002]: EU Case Law avai lable at 
www.http://www.eucaselaw.info/mary-carpenter-2002 (accessed on 6 January 2011). 
127 2007' (3) BCLR 249 (CC). 
128 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). Sect ion 1 of the Main tenance of Surv iv ing Spouses Act 27 of 
1990 def ines a survivor as the surv iv ing spouse in a marr iage d isso lved by death. 
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Maintenance of Surviving Spouses Act 27 of 1990, which was subsequently 
rejected. 
The High Court based its finding on the fact that the CC had on previous 
occasions recognised different forms of life partnership and that a marriage 
was only but one form thereof and that the first Respondent, on the grounds 
of her marital status, was being discriminated against and the respective 
provision was unconstitutional.129 
When the matter was directed to the CC for an order confirming the 
unconstitutionality and the invalidity of the provision, on the grounds of dignity 
and equality, the first applicant appealed on the basis that it was clear that the 
deceased had chosen not to enter into a marriage and 'to have the 
consequences of marriage imposed.wou ld infringe the freedom and dignity 
of both the deceased and his estate'.130 
In both of the majority judgments, the CC found that the exclusion of life 
partners from the interpretation of 'survivor' in the Maintenance of Surviving 
Spouses Act was not unconstitutional and thus not invalid. The CC held that 
the distinction between married and unmarried persons was not unfair and did 
not violate the dignity of the surviving partner. 'To extend the provisions of 
such Act to the deceased's partner when they were not married and thus not 
obliged to maintain one another during life was to impose a duty that did not 
exist'.131 
129 Satchwell v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another 2002 (9) BCLR 976 
(CC) - permanent same-sex life par tnersh ips and Daniels v Campbell NO and Others 2003 
(9) BCLR 969 (C) - Musl im marr iages. 
130 Robinson and Another v Volks NO and Others 2004 (6) BCLR 671 (C) 672 G - H; Volks 
NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). 
131 Just ice Albie Sachs handed d o w n one of th ree d issent ing judgments . He referred to the 
pr inciple of restr ict ing main tenance c la ims to marr ied surv ivors only as the 'exclusiv i ty 
principle', and said the crit ical quest ion must have been whether there w a s a fami ly 
relat ionship of mutual dependency amongs t the part ies. Sachs stated that the mutual 
dependency is based not on the provis ion of 'equal support in mater ial and f inancial te rms ' , 
but rather on 'equal care and concern ' and whe ther such relat ionship revolved a round 
material and f inancial support or care and concern depended on the nature of the part icular 
relat ionship itself. Volks NO v Robinson and Others 2005 (5) BCLR 446 (CC). Lenaghan P 
'The right to be di f ferent: A retrospect ive analys is of the Const i tut ional Court ju r isprudence of 
Just ice Albie Sachs - weav ing the vo ice of d i f ference' (2010) SAPL, 180. 
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In Gory the right to dignity played a significant role in the interpretation of the 
right to inherit intestate. In Volks, the outcome was dissimilar: dignity was 
found not to have been infringed. The author submits that the difference in the 
outcome of these two matters revolved around the issue of same-sex 
partnership. Whilst in Volks the claimant had not been prohibited from 
marrying the deceased, in Gory, the claimant and the deceased were 
prohibited from becoming married on the basis of their sexual orientation. 
Thus in these two matters, dignity played two completely different roles.132 
Nevertheless, regardless of the fact that it may be very difficult to precisely 
define what the right to dignity entails, the concept of dignity has proven to be 
a vital tool in the interpretation and application of all rights. The right to dignity, 
and the invaluable role it plays in the interpretation of many rights, will form 
the heart of many of the forthcoming discussions regarding the constitutional 
implications of Chapter 19. 
3.2.3 Freedom and security of a person: Reproductive rights 
'The major s logan of the w o m e n ' s l iberat ion movement is a d e m a n d for control over our 
own bodies' .1 3 3 
When an individual or a couple choose to make use of a surrogate mother to 
give them a child that they would not ordinarily be able to have, such 
individual or couple make a decision regarding reproduction. Section 12(2) of 
the Constitution provides everyone with the right to bodily and psychological 
integrity including the right to make decisions concerning reproduction and to 
security in and the control over the body.134 No person may be subjected to 
132 For fur ther d iscuss ion see Smi th BS The development of South African Matrimonial Law 
with specific reference to the need for and application of a Domestic Partnership rubric 
(unpubl ished LLD thesis, Universi ty of Free State, 2009) ; Smi th B 'Reth ink ing Vo lks v 
Robinson: The impl icat ions of apply ing a "contextual ised choice model" to prospect ive South 
Afr ican Domest ic Partnership legislat ion' (2010) 13 PER; Smi th B 'Marry ing Domest ic 
Partnerships and the Const i tut ion: A d iscuss ion of Vo lks NO v Robinson 2005 (5) BCLR 446 
(CC)' (2005) 20 SAPR/PL. 
33 Scott JA The baby machine: Reproductive technology and the commercialisation of 
motherhood (1990), 1. 
134 Sect ion 9 of the Const i tut ion lists p regnancy as a g round of d iscr iminat ion. 
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medical and scientific experiments without their informed consent.135 The 
inclusion of section 12(2) recognises the power to make decisions concerning 
reproduction as a crucial aspect of one's control over one's own body.136 The 
primary motivation for the inclusion of the express right to make decisions 
concerning reproduction has been said to be 'symbolic' in that it recognises 
'that some of the most devastating and socially entrenched forms of physical 
and psychological oppression and exploitation relate to reproduction and 
sexuality'.137 
The effect of the inclusion of section 12(2) is that recognises the reality that 
many women do not enjoy security in and control over their bodies - the 
exceptionally high rate of rape, sexual abuse, forced sexual intercourse, 
domestic violence and femicide in South Africa is evidence of this. Often the 
135 The pr inciples in respect of in formed consent , wh ich were establ ished in case 's such as 
Stoffberg v Elliot 1923 C P D 128, Castell v Greef 1994 (4) SA 408 (C) and C v Minister of 
Correctional Services 1996 (4) SA 292 (T) have been largely codi f ied in the form of the 
Nat ional Heal th Act 61 of 2003 wh ich prov ides that in formed consent is 'the process of 
informat ion - shar ing and decis ion - mak ing based on mutual respect and part ic ipat ion' . 
Sect ion 6(1) read wi th 7(3) states that in formed consent requires that there is to be the 
'consent for the provis ion of a speci f ied health service g iven by a person wi th the legal 
capaci ty to do so'. More recent ly, the compos i t ion of in formed consent w a s d iscussed in the 
' reproduct ive rights' case of Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa and others v 
Minster of Health and others 2005 (1) SA 509 (T). The court held that, in the case of 
terminat ion of pregnancy, in formed consent is when : 'it is c lear ly shown that the risk w a s 
known, that it w a s real ised and that it w a s voluntar i ly taken. Knowledge, apprec iat ion and 
consent are essent ia l e lements , but know ledge does not invar iably imply apprec iat ion and 
both together are not necessar i ly the equivalent to consent . The requi rement of knowledge 
means that the w o m e n w h o consent to the terminat ion of p regnancy must have full 
knowledge "of the nature and extent of the harm or risk". The requi rement of "appreciat ion" 
impl ies more than mere knowledge. The w o m e n giv ing consent to the terminat ion of her 
p regnancy "must also comprehend and unders tand the nature and extent of the harm or risk". 
The last requi rement of consent means that the w o m e n must "in fact subject ively consent " to 
the harm or risk assoc ia ted wi th the terminat ion of her p regnancy and her consent "must be 
comprehens ive" in that it must "extend to the entire t ransact ion, inclusive of its sequences" . ' 
In the case of artif icial fert i l isation, before a patient undergoes surgery she must be in formed 
of w h y the procedure is necessary and what such procedure entai ls. For consent to be legal ly 
effect ive, the consent must be g iven by someone w h o possesses the capac i ty to act, the 
patient must be g iven suff icient informat ion regard ing the proposed procedure and the 
consent g iven must be clear, unequivoca l and comprehens ive w i th regards to in formed 
consent . Hass im J A, Heywood M and Berger J Health and Democracy: A guide to human 
rights, health law and policy in post-Apartheid South Africa (2007), 22; Cus ine DJ New 
Reproductive Techniques: A Legal Perspective (1990), 114; The Cent re for Reproduct ive Law 
& Pol icy (CRLP) W o m e n ' s Health Project 'Women ' s reproduct ive rights in South Afr ica: A 
shadow report ' (June 1998), 9, avai lable at http//:www.reproductiverights.org/en/our-
regions/Africa/south-africa (accessed on 10 February 2011). 
Sect ion 12(2) af fords recogni t ion to reproduct ive au tonomy: the right to reproduct ive self-
governance. Curr ie I and De Waa l J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2010), 308. 
37 B ishop M and W o o l m a n S Constitutional Law of South Africa: Freedom and security of the 
person 2ed (2007), 40-81. 
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circumstances in which women become pregnant are beyond their control.138 
Consequently, section 12(2) expressly recognises that South African women 
have and still are subjected to repression and degradation and with this, 
section 12(2) provides the much needed structure within which women can in 
fact enjoy their fundamental rights.139 
Although many of the provisions contained in Chapter 19 will be subsequently 
shown to have an unjustifiably restrictive impact on the exercise of our 
fundamental rights, Chapter 19 does in some manner give expression to the 
right to make decisions concerning reproduction. Nonetheless, before we 
determine the extent of the constitutional implications of Chapter 19, we must 
first examine Chapter 19 in light of the development of reproductive rights in 
South Africa. 
3.3 Development of reproductive rights in South Africa 
Prior to 1975, the acknowledgment of the right to reproductive health was so 
to say non-existent. Termination of pregnancy in South Africa was illegal and 
reproductive health services were incomprehensive, consisting mainly of 
maternal and child health services; prominence was placed on contraceptives 
as a means by which to minimise population growth.140 The promulgation of 
the Abortion and Sterilisation Act 2 of 1975 (hereinafter referred to as the 
138 Sul l ivan M Constitutional Law of South Africa: Reproductive Rights 2ed (2007), 37-17. 
139 Sect ion 12(2) 'expressly de l ineates the ambit of the right to secur i ty of the person so as to 
include protect ion of physical integrity and ex tends it to the protect ion of psycholog ica l 
integrity'. Sect ion 12(2) g ives w o m e n control over their own fertil ity and prov ides a f ramework 
wi th in wh ich w o m e n wil l actual ly be able to en joy the f reedom to chose how and w h e n to have 
chi ldren. Sul l ivan M Constitutional Law of South Africa: Reproductive Rights (2008), 37-18; 
Curr ie I and De Waa l J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2010), 274. 
140 In 1984, the government estab l ished the Populat ion Deve lopment P rog ramme (PDP), its 
goal w a s to ach ieve a lower populat ion g rowth rate and to p romote a smal ler fami ly norm 
amongst b lack or Afr ican famil ies. The a im of the PDP w a s two-fo ld; the control of the ferti l i ty 
of the Afr ican populat ion and the increase of the ferti l i ty of whi tes. In 1994, 65,000.00 
cont racept ive service points ex is ted in the country , other reproduct ive health serv ices were far 
and few be tween and most ly inaccessib le to the major i ty of South Afr icans. Cooper D et al 
'Ten years of democracy in South Afr ica: Document ing t ransformat ion in reproduct ive health 
pol icy' 2004 Reproductive Health Matters Journal 72. The Cent re for Reproduct ive Law & 
Pol icy (CRLP) W o m e n ' s Health Project Women's reproductive rights in South Africa: A 
shadow report (June 1998), 3; Palamuleni M, Kalule-Sabi t i I and Mak iwane M 'Ferti l i ty and 
chi ldbear ing in South Afr ica' (2007), 114, 129, avai lable at www.hsrcpress.ac.za (accessed 
on 10 February 2011). 
75 
 
 
 
 
'ASA') brought about the availability of the termination of pregnancies in 
certain circumstances and was the first legislation to expressly recognise a 
women's right to choice.141 
In terms of the ASA, termination could however only be performed when 
pregnancy would seriously threaten a women's life, her physical or mental 
health or the mental capability of the unborn child. In circumstances where the 
pregnancy was an unsolicited result of a rape and the desire for termination 
would arise, a woman first had to provide evidence of such rape before she 
could undergo the termination of the pregnancy.142 
Regarding the actual termination procedure, women had to receive approval 
from at least three independent medical practitioners.143 In some situations, a 
psychiatrist or magistrate's consent was required and all terminations had to 
be performed in government hospitals.144 Despite the ASA and the risks 
inherent in illegal terminations of pregnancy, many women still sought illegal 
terminations. Consequently, in 1993, the Medical Research Council of South 
Africa (hereinafter referred to as MRCSA) began monitoring the complications 
of unsafe and 'illegal' terminations.145 
141 Cooper D and Others 'Ten years of democracy in Sou th Afr ica: Document ing 
t ransformat ion in reproduct ive health pol icy and status' 2004 Reproductive Health Matters 
Journal, 72. 
142 Gut tmacher S et al 'Abort ion reform in South Afr ica: A case study of the 1996 Cho ice on 
Terminat ion of Pregnancy Act ' 1998 International Family Planning Perspectives, 191. 
143 Mh langa R 'Abort ion: Deve lopments and impact in South Afr ica' (2005) avai lable at 
http://bmb.oxfordjournals.org/content/67/1/115.full (accessed on 10 February 2011). Many 
w o m e n w h o s tayed in rural a reas w e r e unable to have legal ised terminat ions. Hospi ta ls we re 
understaf fed and the 1975 Act required at least th ree medical pract i t ioners to agree to the 
terminat ion. 
144 Gut tmacher S et al 'Abort ion reform in South Afr ica: A case study of the 1996 Cho ice on 
Terminat ion of Pregnancy Act ' 1998 International Family Planning Perspectives 193. 
145 The A N C establ ished a health commiss ion w h o were tasked wi th formulat ing a health plan 
a imed at t ransforming the health sector, especia l ly in respect to w o m e n ' s and gender rights. 
Prior to 1994, approx imate ly 200,000 il legal abor t ions occur red annual ly in South Afr ica. 
Accord ing to its est imat ions, the M R C S A stated that approx imate ly 45 000 w o m e n were 
admi t ted to hospi ta ls for miscarr iage or compl ica t ions result ing out of i l legal terminat ion. 
Poorer w o m e n wi th little to no access to health care w e r e unl ikely to have been included in 
th is survey. Gu t tmacher S et al 'Abort ion reform in South Afr ica: A case study of the 1996 
Cho ice on Terminat ion of Pregnancy Act ' 1998 International Family Planning Perspectives 
191; Cooper D and Others 'Ten years of democ racy in South Afr ica: Document ing 
t ransformat ion in reproduct ive health pol icy and status' 2004 Reproductive Health Matters 
Journal, 72. 
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When the ANC/NP coalition government came into power in 1994 they were 
faced with a 'deeply divided, fragmented and inequitable health system' and 
hence bona fide access to legal termination of pregnancy was considered as 
a vital component of the national health program.146 Many opposed the call for 
the replacement of the ASA. Opponents ranged from religious leaders, to 
parliamentarians and civil society groups such as Doctors for Life. However 
others supported the pro-choice argument as an instrument in the 
development of greater gender equality and the furthering of women's rights, 
specifically that of the right to make decisions regarding reproduction.147 
Concurrently, international conventions were making specific associations 
between reproductive health, women's rights and socio-economic 
development, and the need for founding an expanded definition of 
reproductive health.148 
In 1994, the newly established government undertook a rapid evaluation of 
reproductive health services in South Africa and national workshops were 
held to develop recommendations on research priorities and policy 
formulation.149 The year 1995, under the auspices of the Ministry of Health, 
brought about the formation of the directorate of Mother, Child and Women's 
Health with the objective of augmenting access to appropriate health care 
services and with that came about the establishment of an enhanced national 
reproductive and sexual health service.150 
146 Gut tmacher S et al 'Abort ion reform in South Afr ica: A case study of the 1996 Cho ice on 
Terminat ion of Pregnancy Act ' 1998 International Family Planning Perspectives 197; Cooper 
D and Others 'Ten years of democracy in South Afr ica: Document ing t ransformat ion in 
reproduct ive health pol icy and status' 2004 Reproductive Health Matters Journal, 201; The 
Cent re for Reproduct ive Law & Policy (CRLP) W o m e n ' s Health Project 'Women ' s 
reproduct ive r ights in South Afr ica: A shadow report ' (June 1998), 2. 
14 Gut tmacher S et al 'Abort ion reform in South Afr ica: A case study of the 1996 Cho ice on 
Terminat ion of Pregnancy Act ' 1998 International Family Planning Perspectives, 8. 
148 Cooper D and Others 'Ten years of democracy in South Afr ica: Document ing 
t ransformat ion in reproduct ive health pol icy and status' 2004 Reproductive Health Matters 
Journal, 194. 
149 Cooper D and Others 'Ten years of democracy in South Afr ica: Document ing 
t ransformat ion in reproduct ive health pol icy and status' 2004 Reproductive Health Matters 
Journal, 201. 
150 Cooper D and Others 'Ten years of democracy in South Afr ica: Document ing 
t ransformat ion in reproduct ive health pol icy and status' 2004 Reproductive Health Matters 
Journal, 201. 
77 
 
 
 
 
Although the CC has yet to have been afforded the opportunity to thoroughly 
investigate and interpret reproductive rights in a South African context, the 
subject has been broached in both the 1998 and the 2004 Christian Lawyers 
Association v Minister of Health cases. 151 Both of these judgments, although 
not CC decisions, dealt with the application of the Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act 92 of 1996 (hereinafter referred to as 'the CTOP'). Keeping in 
mind that the objective of this research is to illustrate the restrictive effect 
which Chapter 19 has on the exercise of, amongst others, the right to make 
decisions regarding reproduction, it now becomes necessary to determine 
whether the application of the CTOP has had a similar obstructing effect or if 
the CTOP accurately gives expression to the right to make decisions 
regarding reproduction. 
3.3.1 The CTOP of 1996 
Arguably one of the most significant steps in the recognition and further 
development of reproductive health rights in South Africa, the CTOP provides 
any woman of any age with the right to terminate her pregnancy on request 
during the first 12 weeks.152 The promulgation of the CTOP is a result of the 
ANC/NP government placing extreme importance on the realisation of access 
to equitable health services. The 1994 government realised that health, as a 
basic necessity of life, needed not only to be wholly accessible but certain 
aspects thereof also needed to be highlighted. For many advocates and 
stakeholders the CTOP embodies the success of a reproductive rights based 
framework.153 Access to safer termination of pregnancy is more readily 
151 Christian Lawyers Association v Minister of Health 1998 (4) SA 113 (T) and Christian 
Lawyers Association v National Minister of Health 2004 (10) BCLR 1086 (T). Other 
jur isdict ions such as the Uni ted States of Amer ica and Canada have recogn ised the right to 
make reproduct ive cho ices as f lowing f rom the right to pr ivacy and secur i ty of a person. See 
Morgentaler, Smoling and Scott v The Queen [1988]1 SCR 30; Eisenstadt v Baird 405 US 
4823 (1972) and Roe v Wade 410 US 113. 
152 Mh langa R 'Abort ion: Deve lopments and impact in South Afr ica' (2005) avai lable at 
http://bmb.oxfordjournals.org/content/67/1/115.full (accessed on 10 February 2011). In te rms 
of CTOP, the gestat ional per iod is broken up into th ree parts: 0 -12 weeks , 12-20 w e e k s and 
20 w e e k s up. F rom 20 w e e k s and up, all p regnanc ies are d e e m e d viable. 
153 Mahara j P and Rogan M Reproductive health and emergency contraception in South 
Africa: policy context and emerging challenges (July 2007), 12. 
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available and deaths of mothers as a result of illegal terminations have been 
reduced.154 
The legalising of termination of a pregnancy did not come about without 
controversy and dispute. The constitutionality of the Act was challenged in the 
1998 case of Christian Lawyers Association of South Africa v Minister of 
Health155 where the Act was challenged on the basis that it permitted the 
termination of human life. This case was the first to interpret reproductive 
rights in South Africa. The Court rejected the application judging that section 
11 of the Constitution (the right to life), and specifically the meaning of the 
word 'everyone', did not include a foetus to be a bearer of the right to life.156 
The decision by the Court was in line with section 12 of the Constitution which 
enshrines the right of all persons to make decisions concerning 
reproduction.157 
154 A year into operat ion, there were only 9 deaths result ing f rom septic te rminat ions as 
opposed to the 400 tab led in the 1994 M R C S A report. Mh langa R 'Abort ion: Deve lopments 
and impact in South Afr ica' (2005) avai lable at 
Mtp://bmb.oxfordjournals.org/content/67/1/115. full (accessed on 10 February 2011). 
155 ' 1998 (4) SA 1113 (T). 
156 In the case of S v Mshumpa and Another 2008 (1) S A C R 126 (E) the court had to 
de termine whe ther the kil l ing of an unborn chi ld in the mothers w o m b const i tu ted murder i.e. 
the intent ional kil l ing of another person. The court noted that a person w a s a lways unders tood 
to have been born al ive and thus an unborn chi ld did not meet the requ i rements of the 
definit ion. Practical di f f icult ies arose around formulat ing a reasonably precise def ini t ion of 
murder to ex tend to that of the kil l ing of the unborn child. The court d id not ex tend the 
def ini t ion of murder to the kil l ing of an unborn chi ld. However , in its interpretat ion of the right 
to make dec is ions concern ing reproduct ion and the right to secur i ty and control over the body, 
the court did f ind the accused to be gui l ty of a t tempted murder. From the above, w e can see 
that a l though a foetus is not d e e m e d to be the bearer of r ights and dut ies, the mother w h o is 
carry ing such unborn chi ld has the right to have her body protected and any assault upon her 
wh ich may lead to the injury or death of her unborn chi ld can be interpreted to be assault or 
a t tempted murder. Sect ion 239(1) of the Cr iminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 d e e m s a chi ld to 
have been born al ive if the chi ld has breathed. Boezaar t T Child Law in South Africa (2009), 
591. 
157 The const i tut ional i ty of the Act c a m e under cons iderat ion again in the 2004 case of 
Christian Lawyers Association v National Minister of Health 2004 (10) BCLR 1086 (T). 
Sect ion 5 of the C T O P w a s cha l lenged on the g rounds that it infr inged sect ion 28(1)(b) (the 
right to fami ly or parental care, or to the appropr ia te al ternat ive care w h e n removed f rom the 
fami ly env i ronment) and sect ion 28(1)(d) (the right to be protected f rom mal t reatment , 
neglect, abuse or degradat ion) of the Const i tut ion in that it permi t ted a chi ld to make a 
decis ion about terminat ion of p regnancy wi thout the ass is tance or gu idance of her 
parents /guard ian. The Court noted that the above argument did not cons ider the requi rement 
that before terminat ion could be carr ied out, the w o m a n had to provide her in formed consent . 
Despi te the fact that the issue regarding the genera l permissibi l i ty of terminat ion w a s not 
const i tut ional ly cha l lenged, the court d id note that the Const i tut ion recognised and protected 
the right to terminat ion of p regnancy th rough sect ion 12(2)(a) and (b). Curr ie I and De W a a l J 
The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2010), 308. 
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Conception and pregnancy more often than not involve two parties, a female 
and male; however the decision to terminate such pregnancy lies with the 
woman because it is her informed consent which is required.158 Despite the 
CTOP recognising that both men and women have the right to be informed of 
and have access to safe, effective, affordable and acceptable methods of 
fertility regulation of their choice, it is the woman in terms of the CTOP, who 
may request termination in the first 12 weeks of gestation. It is, after all, 
women's reproductive capacity which differentiates them from men.159 As this 
is the case, the CTOP indirectly fulfils the purpose of the equality clause: a 
woman cannot be discriminated against on the grounds of her pregnancy. The 
CTOP also gives expression to section 12(2) of the Constitution: the pregnant 
woman has the right to make a decision regarding reproduction in that she 
has the right to elect to terminate. From the outlook of the realisation of 
reproductive rights of South African women, CTOP represents one of the 
greatest successes. 
Despite the fact that the initial implementation of the CTOP did not escape 
constitutional challenge, the last fifteen years of its application has been 
largely successful in achieving what it set out to do: to reduce the number of 
illegal and fatal terminations of pregnancy and to provide a framework for all 
woman to exercise their freedom of choice regarding reproduction. 160 It is with 
this that I respectfully submit that the CTOP does accurately give expression 
to, amongst other rights, the right to make decisions regarding reproduction 
158 Early United K ingdom and Uni ted States case law i l lustrated that d iscr iminatory t reatment 
on the g rounds of p regnancy w a s not held to be unlawful and thus unfair because 'there w e r e 
no pregnant male comparators ' . F redman S Women and the Law (2002), 15; The Cent re for 
Reproduct ive Law & Policy (CRLP) W o m e n ' s Health Project Women's reproductive rights in 
South Africa: A shadow report (June 1998), 8. 
159 Dada MA and McQuo id -Mason Introduction to Medico-Legal Aspects (2001) 184; The 
Cent re for Reproduct ive Law & Policy (CRLP) W o m e n ' s Health Project Women's reproductive 
rights in South Africa: A shadow report (June 1998), 4, avai lable at 
http//:www.reproductiverights.org/en/our-regions/Africa/south-africa (accessed on 10 
February 2011). 
160 Despi te C T O P ' s overal l success in fulf i l l ing its initial object ives, the ' demand for abort ion 
serv ices has exceeded supply, w i th operat ional des ignated faci l i t ies decreas ing f rom 60-
43%' .Cen t re for the Study of V io lence and Reconci l iat ion, People Oppos ing W o m e n Abuse 
and Wes te rn Cape Network on V io lence Against W o m e n South African Shadow Report on 
the Implementation of the Convention of the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women: Submitted to the CEDAW Committee's 48th Session, 17 January-4 February 2011 
(February 2011), 46. 
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and that it does not impose the same restrictive effect that Chapter 19 inflicts 
on the exercise of our constitutionally guaranteed rights to equality, dignity 
and the right to make decisions regarding reproduction. This submission will 
be substantiated in the subsequent paragraphs. 
3.4 The constitutional implications of the application of Chapter 19 on the 
rights of the parties to the surrogacy agreement 
It has been illustrated above that prior to the enactment of the Constitution, 
reproductive health and the recognition of reproductive rights were in point of 
fact unknown to South Africans. The ASA may have attempted to give voice 
to the desire of many to terminate pregnancies, nevertheless the 
circumstances under which termination could occur were so limited that it 
cannot be said that the right to choose was truly pronounced. 
In 1996 the Constitution came into operation and for the first time all were 
afforded the opportunity to have access to reproductive health and to make 
decisions concerning reproduction.161 The duty on the State to implement 
legislation to give effect to our rights is visibly present in the form of the 
CTOP: all women of all ages could choose to terminate their unwanted 
pregnancies, whether or not this was because of medical or personal reasons. 
With the advent of the Children's Act almost a decade later, came Chapter 19 
and the legalisation of surrogate motherhood agreements in South Africa. 
Although Chapter 19 does not expressly give recognition to reproductive 
rights, surrogate motherhood is in many material aspects a reproductive rights 
issue. Both the AHPC recommendations and Chapter 19 of the Act have 
provided a positive bearing on the further recognition and development of 
reproductive rights in South Africa is arguable. It can be proffered that the 
legal recognition of surrogacy agreements and the subsequent permitting of 
South Africans to enter into surrogacy agreements is a step forward in the 
recognition of one's right to make choices concerning reproduction. 
161 See paragraph 3.9 be low for the d iscuss ion regard ing the right to access to reproduct ive 
health care serv ices (sect ion 27(1)(a) of the Const i tut ion). 
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Nevertheless, and it is rather unfortunate in a country which is so profoundly 
opposed to discrimination, many of the provisions in Chapter 19 do not 
equitably and fully realise the right to reproduction. It is with this that the 
author will now commence to show that many of these impugned provisions 
are in direct conflict with other constitutionally afforded rights. 
3.5 The constitutional implications of the application of Chapter 19 on the 
rights of potential commissioning parents 
'The capaci ty to bear chi ldren is in many cases the most creat ive of all human 
potential i t ies. It is also a social necessi ty. Yet, far f rom being va lued, w o m e n ' s unique 
reproduct ive funct ion has genera l ly been used as a pretext for s t igma and exclus ion 
f rom public life. The reasons for th is lie deep in the history of w o m a n ' s subord inat ion to 
men. As w e have seen, throughout history, w o m e n have been por t rayed as natural ly and 
all pervas ive ly reproduct ive creatures; a convenient just i f icat ion for impr isoning w o m e n 
in domest ic life. This essent ia l ly male perspect ive on the role of chi ld-bir th has been a 
major factor contr ibut ing to the perpetuat ion of w o m e n ' s subordinat ion ' .1 6 2 
Section 294 of the Act is headed the 'genetic origin of the child' and provides 
that at least one of the commissioning parent's gametes must be used in the 
process of assisted reproduction. The effect of section 294 is that at least one 
of the commissioning parents to the agreement must be able to provide a 
gamete for purposes of artificial fertilisation. In addition to section 294, section 
295(a) of the Act stipulates that surrogacy is only available to commissioning 
parent(s) who are permanently and irreversibly unable to give birth to a child. 
Thus, with regards to the above-mentioned sections, surrogacy is only 
available to a couple where one partner is able to provide a gamete for 
purposes of conception (i.e. fertile) and the other partner is permanently and 
irreversibly unable to give birth to a child (i.e. infertile) or a couple where the 
female partner is able to provide a gamete for purposes of conception but who 
is unable to carry a child to term.163 
^ O'Br ien M The Politics of Reproduction (1981), 20. 
163 A ferti le w o m a n may be able to prov ide a gamete for purposes of concept ion, but may be 
unable to gesta te a chi ld for nine months due to medical reasons. The inabil i ty to gesta te for 
nine months can be causes by a number of medical reasons, such as a low hCg level (human 
chor ianic gonadot rp ic level) or a thin uterus or endomet r ium lining. Both low hCg levels and a 
thin uterus lining results in the inabil i ty of the zygote to at tach itself to the uterus lining. If the 
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For many woman, infertility or 'involuntary childlessness' not only constitutes a 
physical defect but can also lead to placing a burden on a woman's personal 
relationships and a burden on her role in a society which often considers 
motherhood to be a vital part of femininity.164 In a world which predicates a 
woman's very humanness upon the products of her womb, a woman who 
chooses not to bear children runs the risk of being seen as 'abnormal'.165 For 
many infertile women the infertility itself moulds their identity: for some the 
inability to reproduce may lead them to perceive themselves as in fact not 
being a real woman.166 
One of the many reproductive issues facing woman today is the issue of 
infertility.167 In South Africa it is a familiar problem which often goes 
unacknowledged. Currently South Africa has one of the lowest fertility levels 
in Africa.168 Many traditional communities place paramount importance on 
families and resultantly women face a great deal of pressure to reproduce. 
'Women who cannot have children often experience social isolation, stigma, 
psychological and even physical abuse, as it is often automatically assumed 
that the problem lies with them'.169 In summary, the inability to give birth to a 
child is a serious problem in South Africa and for many, infertility is not only 
zygote is unable to at tach itself to the l ining, the foetus wil l not deve lop and the w o m a n wil l 
miscarry, thus she is unable to g ive birth to a chi ld. Elefthenial E 'Causes of uterus reject ion' 
(17 August 2007) avai lable at www.groundreports.com (accessed on 12 May 2011) . 
64 Koch L Issues in Reproduction: The fairytale as a model for women's experience of in vitro 
fertilisation (1994), 276. 
165 Scott JA The baby machine: reproductive technology and the commercialisation of 
motherhood (1990), 196. 
166 Scott JA The baby machine: reproductive technology and the commercialisation of 
motherhood (1990), 196. 
167 A coup le is cons idered inferti le w h e n they have yet to conce ive a chi ld after 12 months of 
regular unprotected sexual intercourse; or if the w o m a n is above 35 years of age, after 6 
months of regular unprotected intercourse. Cuis ine CJ New reproductive Techniques: a legal 
perspective (1990), 5-8; Bequaer t Ho lmes H Issues in reproductive technology (1994), 417. 
168 As of 1 March 2011, the fertil ity rate in South Afr ica w a s 2.3. In context , th is rate is 
ca lcu lated on the amount of ch i ldren to be born of w o m a n if all w o m e n live to the end of their 
chi ld bear ing years (RSA approx imate ly 43 years) . South Afr ica ranks 101 out of 224 
countr ies regard ing fertil ity. The three most important prox imate de terminants of the 
inhabitat ion of ferti l i ty are marr iage, cont racept ion and lactat ional infecundity. 'Ferti l i ty stats 
wor ldwide ' (2011) avai lable at www.indexmundi.com (accessed on 28 March 2011); 
Palamuleni M, Kalule-Sabi t i I & Mak iwane M 'Ferti l i ty and chi ldbear ing in South Afr ica' (2007) 
avai lable at www.hsrcpress.ac.za (accessed on 10 February 2011). 
169 Ombel le t W 'Inferti l i ty and the provis ion of inferti l i ty medical serv ices in deve lop ing 
countr ies ' (2008) avai lable at www.humupd.oxfordjournals.org (accessed on 28 March 2011). 
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seen as a physical 'disability', but a psychological one with far reaching 
effects. 
Notwithstanding the fact that the legislature has acknowledged that many 
people bear the burden of this disability and thus has enacted of legislation 
which permits surrogacy as a form of assisted reproduction, section 294 and 
the requirement that at least one of the commissioning parent's must provide 
a gamete for artificial fertilisation purposes was still incorporated. 
In the 1999 Report, the SALC and AHPC offered two explanations for the 
recommendation which was subsequently codified in the form of section 294. 
Firstly, it was noted that exclusively donor surrogacy agreements would give 
rise to arrangements akin to adoption, and that adoption was already 
regulated in our law, and secondly, with at least one of the commissioning 
parents providing a gamete, this would ensure that a genetic link was 
established between commissioning parent and child. 
Whether it is on the basis of fertility or infertility, section 294, read with section 
295(a) (commissioning parent(s) must be permanently and irreversibly unable 
to give birth) has the effect that four categories of persons are excluded from 
valid surrogacy agreements: 
i a single infertile commissioning parent is unable to provide a 
gamete for fertilisation purposes and thus he or she is excluded; 
ii a couple where both partners are infertile are also excluded 
because neither party will be able to provide a gamete for 
fertilisation purposes, 
iii a single fertile person, because he or she does not meet the 
requirement that he or she is permanently and irreversibly unable to 
give birth to a child, and 
iv a couple where both partners are fertile are excluded because 
neither of them meets the requirement of being commissioning 
parents who are unable to permanently and irreversibly give birth to 
a child. 
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In summary, the application of section 294 of the Act has the effect that 
categories i and ii above are excluded from entering valid surrogacy 
agreements on the basis of their infertility, and the application of section 
295(a) has the effect that categories iii and iv are excluded from entering into 
a valid surrogacy agreement on the basis of their fertility. Such exclusion 
amounts to differentiation on the ability/inability to provide gametes for the 
purpose of conception and/or on their ability/inability to give birth to a child. 
Hence it is necessary to determine if the application of these two sections, 
could amount to an unwarranted limitation on the rights of equality, dignity and 
to make decisions regarding reproduction of potential commissioning parents. 
However, before the implication of the application of Chapter 19 on the rights 
of the potential parties to a surrogacy agreement is further examined, it is 
necessary to determine as to whether the right to make decisions regarding 
reproduction can be said to include the right to have a child. For the reason 
that if it can be established that the right to make decisions regarding 
reproduction could be interpreted to establish the right to have a child, it would 
be difficult to submit that the limitations that the application of Chapter 19 has 
on such right could be warranted. Ultimately, if there does indeed exist a right 
to have a child, it would be problematic to justify that the restrictions which 
arise out of the application of Chapter 19 of the Act on the rights of potential 
parties (especially the rights of potential commissioning parents) 
accomplishes a constitutionally suitable objective. 
3.5.1 The right to family life 
In paragraph 3.2.2 above, the groundbreaking judgment of Dawood and the 
protection the CC afforded to institutions such as marriage and other forms of 
family life was discussed. Initially, the author intended to argue that such 
protection, although not expressly provided for in the Constitution, could also 
be extended to the right to form and found a family by means of artificial 
fertilisation and surrogate motherhood agreements, and thus failure to permit 
certain categories of persons from entering a surrogacy agreement on the 
basis of their ability to conceive and give birth to a child was discriminatory. In 
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particular the author intended to argue that Dawood, read with section 12(2) 
of the Constitution, could perhaps be interpreted to include that there exists 
an implied right to a child. 
Although the CC stated that the protection afforded to family life 'extends at 
the very least, to the core elements of marriage-like institutions, namely the 
right and duty of spouses to live together as spouses in community of life', the 
author cannot submit that the decision in Dawood can be interpreted to infer 
that the right to dignity, and the protection afforded to 'spouses in community 
of life', purports to include the right to family life as a whole. 
Despite the inclusion of the right to family life in international instruments such 
as the UNCRC and the ECHR, 'the Constitution deliberately did not include a 
right to family life'.170 Although the courts have recognised that there do 
indeed exist different forms of families (i.e. the narrow, more archaic definition 
which restricts the concept of family to spouses in a valid civil marriage and 
their children has been eradicated), it has been submitted that if the right to 
family life had been included in the Constitution, such right 'may have given 
rise to a dominance of conservative, parent-centred jurisprudence'.171 
Hence, despite the fact that the court in Dawood extended the protection of 
the Constitution to the institutions of marriage and family life, the word 
protection does not mean that we have a constitutional right to form and found 
a family. It merely means that we must respect the family and the 
relationships which arise out of its establishment.172 
In addition to this, although section 12(2) provides that we have the right to 
make decisions regarding reproduction, section 12(2) does not provide that 
170 Du Toit v Minister of Welfare J v Director-General of Home Affairs B v M 2006 (9) BCLR 
1034 (W); Patel and Another v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2000 (2) SA 343 (D); 
Booysen and Others v Minister of Home Affairs and Another 2001 (4) SA 485 (CC). Boezaart 
T Child Law in South Africa (2009), 278; Cronje DSP and Heaton J The South African Law of 
Persons (2003), 3. 
171 Boezaar t T Child Law in South Africa (2009), 278. 
172 Dawood v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (3) SA 936 (CC) para 35. 
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we have the right to a child. Section 12(2) can be submitted to mean that we 
may choose whether to procreate and to terminate and we may choose in 
which manner we want to procreate, but section 12(2) cannot be interpreted 
to include that we have the right to a child. 
In conclusion, the court in Dawood merely interpreted the right to dignity to 
extent to the protection of institutions such as marriage and family like 
situations, the court did not interpret the right to human dignity to mean that 
we have a right to a family. If we do not have the right to a family, it cannot be 
submitted that we have a right to a child. Keeping this in mind, the author will 
now determine whether the application of Chapter 19 of the Act imposes 
unwarranted limitations on the rights of potential commissioning parents. 
3.5.2 The impact of section 294 and section 295 of Chapter 19 on the rights 
of potential commissioning parents 
In paragraph 3.5 above the author submitted that the effect of the operation of 
section 294 and section 295 of the Act is that four categories of persons are 
excluded from entering into a valid surrogacy agreement on the basis of their 
ability/inability to provide gametes for the purpose of conception as well as 
their ability/inability to give birth. 
Whether such exclusion on the basis of the ability to provide gametes for 
purposes of conception and on the ability to give birth is in fact warranted will 
be determined with reference to the Harksen test and the limitations clause. 
Applying constitutional theory, it is obvious from the above that sections 294 
and sections 295(a) do differentiate between categories of people on the 
basis of their ability/inability to provide gametes for purposes of conception 
and on the basis of their ability/inability to give birth to children. The SALC and 
AHPC submitted that the purpose of section 294 was, firstly to avoid a 
situation similar to adoption when our laws already provided for this. 
Secondly, the SALC and AHPC were of the opinion that when at least one of 
the commissioning parents' gametes was used in the process of artificial 
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fertilisation, there would exist a genetic link between commissioning parent 
and child and this would ultimately assist in protecting all parties' interests. 
In support of section 295(a), the limitation on the rights of potential 
commissioning parents who were able to give birth to a child was justified on 
the basis that 'surrogacy should be seen as a last option and not merely a 
way for women to avoid the rigours of pregnancy i.e. for the sake of 
173 convenience'.1 '3 
3.5.2.1 Section 294: Exclusion on the basis of single persons or both 
partners in a couple being unable to provide a gamete for 
purposes of conception - exclusion on the basis of infertility 
It has been established above that section 294 does differentiate on the basis 
of the ability to provide gametes for the purpose of conception, but whether 
such differentiation bears a rational connection to a legitimate governmental 
purpose needs to be determined. It is the author's submission that if surrogate 
motherhood agreements create a situation similar to that of adoption, this 
alone does not warrant the exclusion of persons who are unable to conceive 
and to give birth from valid surrogacy agreements. Hence, in order to reach 
an apposite conclusion regarding whether or not the limitation found in the 
application of section 294 on the rights of individuals who are unable to 
contribute their own gametes to the process of artificial fertilisation is fair and 
reasonable and ultimately proportionate to the purpose, it becomes necessary 
to simultaneously refer to the second submission which was made in favour of 
the inclusion of section 294. 
The second argument which was submitted by the SALC and AHPC in 
support of section 294 was that when at least one of the commissioning 
parent's gametes was used in the process of artificial fertilisation, there would 
exist a genetic link between commissioning parent and child and this would 
ultimately assist in protecting all parties' interests. Despite the fact that this 
173 Louw A S Acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights (unpubl ished LLD thesis, 
Univers i ty of Pretor ia, 2009) . 
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rational is supposed to reflect the interests of 'all the parties', the impact that 
section 294 has on the best interests of the child will only be examined in 
paragraph 3.8.2 below. Thus any reference made at this juncture to 'all the 
parties' will refer only to the interests of the commissioning parents and the 
surrogate mother. 
In relation to the Harksen test, the question that arises is whether 
differentiation on the basis of being unable to contribute a gamete and 
ensuring that a genetic relation is created between the commissioning parent 
and child, thus not creating a situation similar to adoption, bears a rational 
connection to a legitimate governmental purpose (the protection of all parties 
concerned)?174 
The author submits that the protection of all the parties' interests does bear a 
rational connection to the limitation of the rights of potential commissioning 
parents. Nonetheless, despite the fact that one of the initial purposes of 
Chapter 19 of the Act was to provide legal protection to all parties to a 
surrogacy agreement, and that it is vital that the provisions of Chapter 19 give 
effect to such objective, it remains to be seen whether despite the rationality 
for the inclusion of section 294, whether the impact of section 294 on the 
rights of potential commissioning parents is in fact still discriminatory. 
Ultimately it must be determined whether the restriction created by section 
294 is proportionate to the limitation i.e. whether the exclusion of persons on 
174 This submiss ion wi l l be further examined in chapter4, where the inf luence of genet ic 
relat ions on the enforceabi l i ty of the contract is d iscussed. In te rms of sect ion 298 of the Act , 
whe re the surrogate mother is also the genet ic mother of the chi ld to be born of the 
agreement , she has up until 60 days after the date of the birth of the chi ld to de te rmine 
whe ther or not she wan ts to keep the chi ld as her own or rel inquish all parental r ights and 
responsibi l i t ies towards such chi ld to the commiss ion ing parents. Sect ion 297(e) however 
prov ides that no surrogate motherhood agreement may be te rminated after artif icial 
fert i l isation has taken effect. A l though sect ion 297(e) is not express ly made subject to sect ion 
298, it can be submi t ted that in the case of full sur rogacy ag reements (where no genet ic link 
exists be tween surrogate and child) the agreement is who l ly val id and enforceable once 
artif icial fert i l isat ion has taken effect, whe reas in the case of part ial sur rogacy agreements 
(where a genet ic link does exist be tween surrogate and chi ld), the enforceabi l i ty of the 
agreement post artif icial fert i l isation is subject to the rights of the part ial sur rogate to te rminate 
in te rms of sect ion 298. As it wil l be presented in chapter 4, sect ion 298 has the effect that 
part ial sur rogates wil l a lways possess the stronger contractual posi t ion than the 
commiss ion ing parents, and the commiss ion ing parents, in the case of a part ial sur rogacy 
contract , wil l also bear the addi t ional concern regarding whe ther or not the surrogate wil l 
exerc ise her right to terminate. 
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the basis of their inability to conceive (single infertile persons and couples 
where both partners are infertile) achieves the protection of all the parties' 
interests. 
Even though it cannot be said that such differentiation is founded on a section 
9 listed ground, it is important to bear in mind Carnelley's submission that 
differentiation on the basis of the inability to contribute a gamete for purposes 
of establishing a genetic relation between the commissioning parent and the 
unborn child, and the ability to give birth, could be regarded as discrimination 
on the grounds of disability.175 If this is indeed the case and it can be said that 
the inability to provide gametes for the purpose of conception and the ability to 
give birth amounts to a disability, then such differentiation is presumed to 
equate to unfair discrimination for the reasons set out in paragraph 3.5 above 
as well as in the discussion below. 
In Harksen v Lane the CC provided the following explanation for what 
constitutes a section 9(3) specified ground: 
'What the speci f ied g rounds have in c o m m o n is that they have been used (or misused) 
in the past (both in Sou th Afr ica and e lsewhere) to categor ise, marginal ise and of ten 
oppress persons w h o have had, or w h o have been assoc ia ted wi th , these attr ibutes and 
character ist ics. These g rounds have the potent ial , w h e n manipulated, to d e m e a n 
persons in their inherent humani ty and dignity. '1 7 6 
In addition to this, the CC held that 'in some cases these grounds relate to 
immutable biological attributes or characteristics'.177 
In light of the above, it could be argued, as Carnelley submits, that the inability 
to provide gametes for the purposes of conception could equate to a disability 
on the basis that it is an immutable biological attribute or characteristic. If we 
are to accept that the inability to provide gametes for the purpose of 
conception is a disability, and that such inability has the potential to demean 
175 Carnel ley M and Son i S (2008) 22 Speculum Juris, 42. 
176 Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) para 49. 
177 Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 300 (CC) para 49. 
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persons in their inherent humanity and dignity, then in accordance with the 
Harksen test, differentiation on such ground is presumed to be unfair. 
Nevertheless, even if such differentiation on the basis of the inability to 
conceive cannot be deemed to amount to a disability, exclusion on this basis 
does have the potential to impair the fundamental dignity of these persons as 
human beings as was illustrated above where the psychological impact of not 
being able to bear a child was discussed. 
With regard to section 294, the impact that the implementation of this 
provision has on the rights of potential commissioning parents is 
discriminatory. The effect of such discrimination is that people who are unable 
to contribute their own gametes to the process of artificial fertilisation are 
disqualified from exercising their right to make decisions regarding 
reproduction, and in that, they cannot choose to make use of surrogacy as a 
formed of assisted reproduction. Such discrimination is resultantly unfair. 
In terms of the limitations clause, any right may be limited if such limitation is 
in the form of a law of general application and section 294 is a law of general 
application. Whether section 294 serves a constitutionally acceptable purpose 
and sufficient proportionality exists between the limitation and the 'benefit' 
section 294 intends to achieve will have to be determined in light of factors 
such as the composition of the impacted rights, the significance of the 
purpose of the section 294, the composition and degree of the limitation in 
section 294, the relation between the limitation and the purpose; and whether 
less restrictive means exist to fulfil such purpose. In the end it must be shown 
that section 294 serves a purpose which the majority of persons would find 
analogously compellingly. In totality, does proportionality exist between the 
restriction created by section 294 and the advantage it supposedly aims to 
achieve? 
The right to equality and dignity form the foundation for our Constitutional 
supremacy. The right to make decisions regarding reproduction recognises 
that many women do not enjoy security in and control over their bodies as a 
result of many years of patriarchal supremacy. Section 294 was included so 
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that children born of a surrogacy agreement would have a genetic tie with the 
commissioning parent, and it was submitted that if no genetic tie existed, this 
would amount to a situation comparable to adoption.178 In the opinion of the 
SALC and the AHPC this would be in the best interests of all parties 
concerned, because if a genetic tie existed between commissioning parents 
and the child to be born of the agreement the willingness of the surrogate to 
relinquish the child upon birth would supposedly be more likely, and thus, the 
protection of the interests of all the parties to the agreement would be 
enhanced. 
If the only argument provided in support of section 294, was that when there 
is no genetic link then surrogacy gives rise to a situation similar to adoption, 
then it could possibly be submitted that the limitation imposed on persons who 
are unable to provide a gamete for purposes of conception could be 
justifiable, for the reason that if adoption is available in law to persons who are 
unable to provide gametes for conception, then such persons should make 
use of adoption. However, it could also be argued that when one has the right 
to make decisions regarding reproduction and surrogate motherhood is 
available as a form of assisted reproduction, why must persons who are 
unable to provide gametes for purposes of conception make use of adoption 
when they can find a surrogate willing to give birth to their child? 
Taking the above into consideration, and the submission by the SALC and the 
AHPC that when there is a genetic tie between the commissioning parent and 
the child born of the agreement that it will be in the interests of all the parties 
concerned because the surrogate mother would be more likely to hand over 
the child to the commission parents upon birth, the author submits that her 
initial submission which was made in chapter two (that it is debatable if 
section 294 imposes a warranted or unwarranted limitation on the rights of 
potential commissioning parents) was incorrect. 
178 See paragraph 3.8.2 be low for further d iscussion. 
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Without conclusive evidence that because the child born of the agreement 
shares a genetic tie to his/her commissioning parent will make it less likely 
that the surrogate will fail to refuse to relinquish the child born of the 
agreement upon birth, the author cannot submit that the limitation which is 
imposed on infertile persons as a result of the operation of section 294 
amounts to a reasonable limitation on their rights. In addition to this, and this 
will be further argued in paragraph 3.8.2 below in terms of the effect of section 
294 on the best interests of the child, a child's best interests does not require 
that he/she be genetically related to his/her parent. There are many children 
who are not genetically related to their children, i.e. adopted children and 
children in foster care, and it cannot be submitted that because they are 
raised by non-genetic parents that it is not in their best interests. 
I submit that the limitation which arises out of the application of section 294 on 
would-be infertile commissioning parents is unjustifiable and does not serve a 
constitutionally acceptable purpose. The Act expressly discriminates against 
infertile persons and such discrimination is unfair. As a result of the operation 
of section 294 of the Act, infertile persons are not permitted to exercise their 
right to make decisions regarding reproduction and the dignity of these 
persons is further impaired because they are not permitted to resort to 
surrogacy as a form of assisted reproduction. The author agrees that the 
protection of all the parties to the agreement interests must be considered, but 
without conclusive evidence to show that when the child born of the 
agreement is genetically related to the commissioning parent that the 
surrogate mother will be less likely to refuse to hand over the child upon birth, 
the author cannot submit that the inclusion of section 294, and the restrictive 
effect that it imposes on infertile persons is warranted and is proportionate to 
the benefit which aims to achieve. 
3.5.2.2 Section 295(a): Exclusion on the basis of not being permanently 
and irreversibly unable to give birth 
After having determined that the limitations imposed on the rights of would-be 
commissioning resulting from the application of section 294 of the Act are 
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unreasonable and unjustifiable, it is now necessary to determine the 
constitutionality of the rationale for the differential treatment arising out of the 
operation of section 295. 
In chapter two, the author submitted that the differentiation which arises as a 
result of the application of section 295(a) could be justifiable and reasonable. 
It was stated that the limitation imposed on commissioning parents in section 
295(a) has been 'justified insofar as surrogacy should be seen as a last option 
[available for persons who are permanently and irreversibly unable to give 
birth] and not merely a way for women to avoid the rigours of pregnancy i.e. 
for the sake of convenience'.179 
Section 295(a) of the Act provides that only those persons who are 
permanently and irreversibly unable to give birth to a child are permitted to 
enter into a valid surrogacy agreement. Consequently, through the application 
of section 295(a) of the Act, single fertile persons and couples, where both are 
fertile, are not permitted to enter into valid surrogacy agreements. 
In support of the inclusion of section 295(a) was the submission that 
surrogacy should not be available to persons who are able to give birth, but 
nonetheless choose surrogacy because it could be argued to be 'easy' way in 
which to have a child. With surrogacy these persons can avoid the physical 
and emotional dilemmas' which are involved in pregnancy.180 
179 Louw A S Acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights (unpubl ished LLD thesis, 
Universi ty of Pretoria, 2009) , 345. 
180 Such 'd i lemmas' noted by the S A L C and the A H P C were the fact that w o m e n w h o are 
pregnant undergo both physical and emot ional changes dur ing and pregnancy, and that 
th rough surrogacy, w o m e n w h o do not want to endure such changes , can f ind another 
w o m a n to gesta te their chi ld so they need not wor ry about mood swings, stretch marks and 
many of the ord inary physio logical and physical consequences of pregnancy. In addi t ion to 
this, many w o m e n choose not to have chi ldren because they want to concent ra te on their 
careers. A s a result, some w o m e n may want chi ldren much later in their l ives and struggle to 
conceive, and others may want chi ldren, but wor ry about how having a chi ld may impact on 
their career growth. In the first respect, the 'career' w o m a n w h o struggles to have a chi ld at a 
later s tage may be able to conceive, but unable to g ive birth, and thus may want to turn to a 
surrogate to assist her. In the second example , these career focused w o m e n may want 
chi ldren, but may not want to endure the 'burden' assoc ia ted wi th the nine months of 
pregnancy, and they too may turn to a surrogate to 'carry' such a burden. Report of the A d 
Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) 
avai lable at http//www.pmg.org.za/docs/1999/990211.saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apri l 
2011). 
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Taking the above into consideration, with reference to the Harksen test and 
the limitations clause, the author will determine if the limitation imposed by the 
application of section 295(a) on the rights of potential commissioning parents 
to enter into a surrogacy agreement is justifiable. 
The impact of section 295(a) on the rights of potential commissioning parents 
is that where commissioning parents are not permanently and irreversibly 
unable to give birth to a child (i.e. they are fertile), they are excluded from 
entering into a valid surrogacy agreement. The effect is that section 295(a) 
differentiates on the basis of the ability to give birth. The objective behind the 
inclusion of Chapter 19 was to provide the opportunity for persons who are 
naturally unable to conceive and to give birth to enter into a valid and 
enforceable surrogacy agreement where the child born of the agreement 
would for all intents and purposes be recognised as their child. 
Although it can be submitted that the differentiation could serve a reasonable 
purpose in that it gives expression to the intention of the Act, such reasonable 
differentiation may still amount to discrimination. 
In the preceding section, the impact of the application of section 294 on the 
rights of commissioning parents was comprehensively examined. It was 
submitted that differentiation on the basis on the inability to provide gametes 
for the purposes of conception may amount to discrimination on the ground of 
disability. It was also submitted that differentiation on the basis of the ability to 
give birth may also amount to discrimination on the grounds of disability, 
because such ability could be deemed as an immutable biological attribute.181 
Taking this into consideration, the author needs to determine if the ability to 
give birth can be said to amount to a disability. The CC described 'immutable 
biological attributes or characteristics' as a specified ground on which people 
are treated differently and the author has previously submitted that both the 
181 See paragraph 3.5 and 3.5.2.1 above. 
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inability to provide gametes for purposes of conception and the inability to 
give birth are immutable biological attributes which has lead to differentiation, 
the impact thereof which may impair the fundamental dignity of those affected. 
In contrast, differentiation on the basis of being able to conceive and being 
able to give birth cannot be said to have the same implications: being able to 
conceive and to give birth is not a disability. Hence it is submitted that 
differentiation on the basis of the ability to conceive and give birth does not 
amount to differentiation on a specified ground. 
With regards to the above, if the differentiation is not based on a specified 
ground, can it be concluded that such differentiation is based on attributes 
and characteristics which have the potential to impair the fundamental human 
dignity of persons as human beings or to affect them adversely in a 
comparably serious manner? 
It is the author's submission that this is not the case. Chapter 19 was not 
enacted to assist 'able' persons to have children because they choose not to 
burden themselves physically or psychologically with pregnancy. 'Able' 
persons are as the word says, able to have their own genetically related child 
through natural conception, and if such people do not want to 'burden their 
bodies and minds', they can always adopt. We have the right to make 
decisions regarding reproduction, but when other opportunities exist other 
than surrogacy, the author submits that she partially agrees that these options 
should be exhausted first. 
However, even if it cannot be said that that the ability to give birth has the 
potential to impair the fundamental human dignity of persons as human 
beings or to affect them adversely in a comparably serious manner, the author 
nevertheless submits that the application of section 295(a) imposes an 
unjustifiable limitation on the rights of would-be fertile commissioning parents. 
Merely because a single fertile person or a couple where both are fertile 
choose not to endure the ordinary 'dilemmas' of pregnancy and opt rather for 
surrogacy does not serve as a constitutionally acceptable purpose for the 
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limitation of the above-mentioned persons' rights to equality and to make 
decisions regarding reproduction. 
To conclude, the author's initial conclusion in chapter two that the limitation 
which arises out of the application of section 295(a) on would-be fertile 
commissioning parents was justified has changed. All persons should be 
afforded the right to make decisions regarding how they wish to reproduce. 
3.6 The constitutional implications of the application of chapter 19 on the 
rights of potential surrogate mothers 
After having considered the constitutional implications of the application of 
Chapter 19 on the rights of potential commissioning parents, the author will 
now examine the impact that the operation of specific provisions of Chapter 
19 has on the rights of potential surrogate mothers. 
Section 295 of the Act is headed 'Confirmation by the court' and lists the 
qualifications necessary for confirmation of the surrogacy agreement by the 
Court. With regards to potential surrogate mothers, the implications of the 
application of section 295(c)(viii) on their rights will be discussed. Section 
295(c)(viii) stipulates that a potential surrogate must have a living child of her 
own. 
In addition to this, the author will also examine the implication of the exclusion 
of an age limitation in respect of would-be surrogates i.e. whether or not the 
initial AHPC recommendation that potential surrogate mothers should be 
subjected to an age limitation should have been incorporated into the Act 
despite the fact that the AHPC did not include such requirement in their final 
report which was presented to government.182 
3.6.1 Section 295(c)(viii): Exclusion on the basis of not having a living child 
of her own 
182 The const i tut ional impl icat ions that these prov is ions may have on the best interests of the 
chi ld wil l be examined separate ly in paragraph 3.8 below. 
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The first provision which needs consideration is that of section 295(c)(viii) of 
the Act and impact that the application thereof could have on the rights of a 
women who wants to be a surrogate mother. The SALC and AHPC's 
hesitancy surrounding 'childless woman' being surrogates was based on the 
supposition that a women who had a living child of her own would be better 
equipped emotionally to understand the consequences of entering into a 
surrogacy agreement, specifically that of having to relinquish the child and to 
forego all the rights and responsibilities towards such child at birth.183 Having 
your own child would presumably provide sufficient emotional preparation and 
enhance the chances of success of the agreement being adhered to i.e. 
reducing the risk of the surrogate wanting to keep the child after birth.184 
Professor Louw submits that the 'reasoning behind the requirement...may be 
found in the argument that a woman who no longer has a living child of her 
own may be more inclined to bond with the child born of a consequence of the 
surrogate motherhood agreement and [thus] more reluctant to relinquish [such 
child]'.185 
Whether or not a woman who has a living child will be able to cede her rights 
and responsibilities to a child she has subsequently given birth to less 
effortlessly than a woman who does not have a child of her own is unknown 
and a complete investigation of this would exceed the ambit of this 
research.186 What is necessary is to determine is whether or not this argument 
in support of the inclusion of section 295(c)(viii), and the resultant limitation on 
183 Louw A Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood in Davel CJ and Skel ton A Commentary on the 
Children's Act 38 of 2005 (2007), 19-17. 
184 Par l iamentary Moni tor ing Group Report of the South African Law Commission on 
Surrogate Motherhood (1997) avai lable at http://www.pmg.org.za (accessed on 1 June 2010), 
4. 
185 Louw A S Acquisition of Parental Responsibilities and Rights (unpubl ished LLD thesis, 
Universi ty of Pretoria, 2009) , 351. 
186 The S A L C submi t ted that in fact, this could be both an advantage and a d isadvantage. 'On 
the one hand the surrogate mother, having g iven birth to a child, wou ld be able to appreciate 
the r isks assoc ia ted wi th p regnancy and the impl icat ions of surrender ing the chi ld upon birth. 
On the other hand the chi ldren born of the surrogate mother could be t raumat ised upon 
surrender of the chi ld, fear ing that they too wil l be g iven away' . Dur ing my personal 
exper iences in the draf t ing of a sur rogacy agreement , one surrogate did inform me that ' there 
is nothing better than being able to g ive the gift of life to others and then go home to your own 
gift [your own child]. ' Louw A S Acquisition of Parental Responsibilities and Rights 
(unpubl ished LLD thesis, Universi ty of Pretoria, 2009) , 351. 
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the rights of potential surrogates who do not have a living child of their own, is 
reasonable. 
The effect of section 295(c)(vii) is that it differentiates against women on the 
basis of whether they have or had not had children. Without clear evidence 
that proves that the fact that a surrogate has her own child will make her less 
likely to refuse to relinquish all parental rights and responsibilities towards a 
child born of the surrogate agreement to the commissioning parents, the 
author cannot submit that the purpose for this exclusion, and thus the 
limitation on the rights of the surrogate is rational. 
In light of the above, the author needs now to determine if such differentiation 
amounts to discrimination. Differentiation on the basis that the surrogate has 
or does not have a child cannot be categorised as differentiation on a listed 
ground as provided for in the equality clause. If such differentiation is not 
based on a section 9 listed ground, it will only amount to discrimination if the 
impact of such differentiation can be said to have the potential to impair the 
fundamental human dignity of the would-be surrogate as a human being or to 
affect her adversely in a comparably serious manner. 
The author submits that, in this respect, there can be no clear cut conclusion. 
Some woman may argue that not being permitted to be a surrogate on the 
basis that they do not have a living child of their own does impair their dignity 
because their suitability as a surrogate is pre-determined on an unproven 
basis (it is unknown whether having a child of your own will make it less likely 
that you will fail to relinquish the child born of the agreement upon birth), 
whereas others may deem such requirement legitimate because they agree 
that their intentions before and after the birth of the child could change. In this 
respect, the author submits that the suitability of the surrogate should be 
determined on an agreement-to-agreement basis. Nevertheless, if the 
differentiation is found to have the potential to impair the fundamental human 
dignity of the would-be surrogate mother concerned, and is resultantly 
discrimination, the question then arises as to whether such discrimination 
unfair? 
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Such discrimination is not based on a listed ground, however, once again the 
impact such discrimination has on such a person or persons in her situation 
will have to be determined in light of the individual surrogacy agreement 
concerned. If we are to assume that the discrimination is unfair to the person 
eager to serve as a surrogate, can such discrimination be justified in terms of 
the limitations clause? 
Section 295(c)(iv) is in the form of a law of general application. Whether 
section 294 serves a constitutionally acceptable purpose and sufficient 
proportionality exists between the limitation and the 'benefit' section 294 
intends to achieve will have to be determined in light of factors such as the 
composition of the impacted rights. 
The rights which are limited as a result of the application of section 295(c)(vi) 
are the rights to equality, the right to dignity and the right to make decisions 
concerning reproduction (after all it is the surrogate whose body is used in the 
process or artificial fertilisation and pregnancy).187 The purpose of section 
295(c)(vi) is to fulfil one of the objectives of Chapter 19: the protection of the 
interests of all the parties concerned, the submission being that a surrogate 
who has a child of her own is less likely to withdraw from her legal obligations 
in terms of the agreement. Whether or not less restrictive means exist to fulfil 
such purpose is unknown. The author cannot submit that having a living child 
or not having one makes a woman more or less suitable to be a surrogate 
mother. One cannot predict if a surrogate will, whether intentionally or without 
fault, form a bond with the child growing inside of her womb. 
Although the author submits that the purpose of section 295(c)(vi) is in 
accordance with the overall objective of Chapter 19 and that, in the interests 
of all the parties concerned, it can be that the limitation that this provision 
187 Professor Louw argues that it is of even more impor tance that the surrogate unders tands 
the legal consequences of a sur rogacy agreement , than the commiss ion ing parents. Her 
submiss ion is that 'it is the surrogate w h o is exposed to all the risks inherent in the conc lus ion 
of a surrogate motherhood agreement [and it is the surrogate w h o is] subject ing herself to the 
physical r isks of an artif icial ly induced pregnancy ' . Louw A S Acquisition of parental 
responsibilities and rights (unpubl ished LLD thesis, Universi ty of Pretoria, 2009), 349. 
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places on the rights to equality, dignity and reproductive choices of would-be 
surrogate mother's is, in this respect, reasonable and justifiable and 
proportionate to the purpose, the author is still drawn to the argument that 
each case must be decided on its own merits. Hence, as it was concluded in 
chapter two regarding the inclusion of this AHPC recommendation, it cannot 
be said that just because a woman has a living child of her own she is less 
likely to breach the terms of the contract. 188 Conversely, it cannot be said that 
not having a living child of her own would make the surrogate mother more 
likely to rengage on her obligation to hand over the child upon birth. 
In light of the above, every person has the right to make decisions regarding 
reproduction, and every person has the right to decide whether or not they 
want to have a child. When a would-be surrogate illustrates her intention to 
become a surrogate mother, she is exercising her right to make decisions 
regarding reproduction, even though it is a decision to reproduce a child which 
will not be her own. Section 12(2) does not contain a proviso stipulating that 
we may only make decisions regarding reproduction of our own children. 
Hence it is concluded that the limitation arising out of the application of 
section 295(c)(viii) on the rights of would-be surrogates without a living child 
of their own is unwarranted. 
Lastly, in support of this submission, the author quotes the following: 
'If procreat ional au tonomy is to be taken ser iously, it should not be possib le for it to be 
t rumped easi ly; it is necessary for any democrat ic society ... to demons t ra te that it has 
compel l ing reason before deny ing individual c i t izens control over their own reproduct ive 
cho ices and decis ions. '1 8 9 
3.6.2 The impact of the exclusion of age as a determining factor in the 
suitability of a surrogate mother 
188 Further d iscuss ion regarding the re l inquishment of the chi ld by the surrogate wil l be made 
in chapter 4. 
189 Cook R, Day Slater S and Kaganas F Surrogate Motherhood International Perspectives 
(2003), 78. 
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After having considered the impact of the application of section 295(c)(viii) on 
the rights of potential surrogate mothers, the author will now examine whether 
age should have been included as one of the determining factors of the 
suitability of a potential surrogate. 
In chapter two it was noted that some members of the AHPC were of the 
opinion that a general age limitation should be implemented in respect of 
potential surrogate mothers; nonetheless, when it came to the finalisation of 
the recommendations for the qualifications of a surrogate, no indication was 
made as to the inclusion of such requirement.190 
Despite the fact that 'the maternal childbearing age range has widened over 
the past decade [as a result of] advances in medical technology and assisted 
reproduction' the risks associated with pregnancy and childbirth amongst 
older woman are still higher than that in younger woman. 191 The risks 
included in 'geriatric pregnancies' are the increase in the possibility of birth 
defects, miscarriage, premature birth, stillbirth and, in addition to this, pre-
existing health conditions such as high blood pressure, diabetes, kidney and 
heart problems can also affect the outcome of the pregnancy.192 Geriatric 
pregnancies are also more likely to be associated with complications in the 
delivery of the child as well as the death of the child and the death of the 
190 It w a s not stated in the A H P C recommenda t ions if the age l imitat ion wou ld be in respect of 
a m in imum or a m a x i m u m age l imitat ion (or both). Report of the Ad Hoc Par l iamentary 
Commi t tee on Report of SA Law commission on Surrogate Motherhood (1999) avai lable at 
http//www.pmg.org.za/docs/1999/990211.saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011). 
Kenner L and Wr ight Lott J 'Comprehens ive neonata l care: An interdiscipl inary approach ' 
(2007) Elsevier Health Science Journal, 651, 653. 
92 Geriatr ic p regnancy (or advanced maternal age pregnancy) refers to p regnancy over the 
age of 35 years. W o m e n w h o are over the age of 40 years are two t imes more likely to 
miscarry than w o m e n be low 30 years of age. W o m e n over the age of 45 years are nine t imes 
more likely to miscarry than w o m e n below the age of 30 years. March of Dimes 'Pregnancy 
after 35' (2010) avai lable at http://www.marchofdimes.com/trying after35.html (accessed on 
20 Apri l 2011) ; Babb idge C 'The new, late baby boomers ' (2009) avai lable at 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk news/4105083.stm (accessed on 20 Apri l 2011) ; Murray LJ & 
Others The babycentre essential guide to pregnancy and birth: Expert advice and real-world 
wisdom from the top of pregnancy and parenting resources (2005), 544; Kenner L and Wr ight 
Lott J 'Comprehens ive neonatal care: An interdiscipl inary approach ' (2007) Elsevier Health 
Science Journal, 652. 
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mother.193 Lastly, and this could be vital in respect of the success of the 
surrogacy agreements, the older the woman, the less fertile she is.194 
The author submitted in chapter two that the reason why the AHPC did not 
include an age limitation in respect of their final recommendations was more 
than likely as a result of the enactment of the Constitution and the fact that 
age had been included as a section 9 listed ground of discrimination. In this, 
the AHPC acknowledged that any differentiation on the basis of age may not 
have been justifiable. 
With this is mind, it needs now to be considered whether if legislature had 
implemented an age restriction on potential surrogates, if this would have 
indeed amounted to discrimination, or whether the exclusion of the legislature 
of an age limitation for would-be surrogates has its own constitutional 
implications for the rights of would-be surrogates that do not serve a 
constitutionally acceptable purpose. 
It has already been said that any differentiation on the basis of age would 
amount to differentiation. If such age limitation was implemented because 
older women are more likely to endure, amongst others, a heightened risk of 
injury or death during pregnancy and childbirth than the risk which younger 
women may endure. The author submits that an age limitation on would-be 
surrogates would amount to a reasonable justification for such limitation on 
their right to make decisions regarding reproduction. 
Differentiation on the ground of age is a listed ground in section 9 of the 
Constitution and will resultantly be presumed unfair. 'Age is different from 
most of the other grounds of discrimination in that it does not refer to an 
unchanging characteristic. Age changes constantly throughout the course of 
193 Middleburg MI Promoting reproductive security in developing countries (2003), 28. 
194 Grosvenor M B and Others Visualising nutrition: everyday choices (2009), 381; Midd leburg 
MI Promoting reproductive security in developing countries (2003), 28; March of D imes 
'Pregnancy after 35' (2010) avai lable at http://www.marchofdimes.com/trying after35.html 
(accessed on 20 Apri l 2011). 
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one's life.'195 However, even if such discrimination on the basis of age is 
unfair, the limitation imposed on, amongst others, the right to reproduction 
may still be warranted if it is proved to be proportionate to the purpose: the 
health and safety of older would-be surrogate mothers. 
With reference to the above, any right may be limited if such limitation is in the 
form of a law of general application. Despite the fact that we are dealing with 
a hypothetical provision, the author submits that if such age limitation was 
prescribed it would amount to a law of general application. The rights which 
will be affected are the rights to equality, dignity and the right to make 
decisions regarding reproduction. 
The composition of the above-mentioned rights has been comprehensively 
examined throughout this chapter, and thus the author submits that it is not 
necessary to recapitulate. The purpose of the limitation on these rights is the 
protection of the overall health and safety of the would-be surrogate and the 
child, because if she were to enter into a surrogacy agreement the risk to her 
and the child's health and safety may be elevated as a result of the pregnancy 
and childbirth. The content of the limitation is that older would-be surrogates 
are unable to exercise their right to make decisions regarding reproduction on 
the basis of their age. The relation between the limitations on the rights of 
older would-be surrogates and the purpose is to guard against permitting 
these women the opportunity to put themselves in a position which may have 
the result of causing them and the child physical harm. 
The author cannot submit that less restrictive means may exist to achieve this 
purpose, however the author does submit that the limitation which arises as a 
result of implementing an age restriction on potential surrogate would serve a 
purpose which the majority of persons would find compelling. 
Hence, the author submits that despite the fact that a maximum age limitation 
for would-be surrogates may limit their right to make decisions regarding 
195 Curr ie I and De W a a l J The Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2010), 256. 
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reproduction, such limitation is warranted. Therefore the author submits that 
the legislature should have included a provision which provided for an age 
limitation of would-be surrogates, and that the failure to incorporate such a 
provision in Chapter 19 is far more of an unjustifiable infringement of the 
rights of would-be surrogates than that of the inclusion of such a maximum 
age limitation. In conclusion, the health of these women is a reasonable 
objective behind this limitation. Therefore it is submitted that proportionality 
does exist between the inclusion of the limitation on the rights of potential 
surrogate mothers and the advantage which the would-be surrogate would 
obtain: preservation of her general health. 
After having investigated the above-mentioned limitations and the arguments 
in favour thereof, I submit as follows: the inclusion of section 295(c)(viii) of the 
Act, and the limitation which its application has on the rights of potential 
surrogates, is not justifiable. There is no cast-iron evidence which proves that 
a surrogate who does not have a child of her own is more likely to fail to 
honour her obligation to hand over the child to the commissioning parents at 
birth and thus it cannot be concluded that the inclusion of section 295(c)(viii) 
of the Act fulfils a constitutionally acceptable purpose. 
With regard to the exclusion by the legislature (as a result of the failure of the 
AHPC to recommend such inclusion) of a provision which would provide for a 
maximum age restriction for would-be surrogates, the author submits that, 
despite the advancement of medical technologies, there still exists an inherent 
danger in 'geriatric pregnancies' (not only for the mother, but for the child as 
well). In conclusion, although the implementation of a maximum age limitation 
for would-be surrogates would amount to discrimination on the grounds of 
age, such limitation would be justifiable as it would proportionate to the 
purpose: the protection of the health and safety of the would-be surrogate and 
the child conceived as a result of the agreement. Ultimately, failure to 
implement a maximum age limitation for potential surrogates amounts to a 
failure to recognise that older women are not only more likely to be at a 
heightened risk through pregnancy, but are also more likely not going to be 
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able to perform in terms of the surrogacy agreement i.e. to give birth to a 
healthy child. 
With reference to the above, the author now directs the reader's attention to 
another omission made by the legislature. The Act does not make provision 
for cultural surrogacy and not only will this be shown to amount to 
differentiation on the basis of cultural belief and practice, but it will also be 
proven to have serious constitutional implications for all the parties to the 
agreement. 
3.7 The constitutional implications of the application of Chapter 19 on the 
rights of potential commissioning parents and potential surrogate 
mothers in cultural surrogacy 
The Constitution was remarkable in that it was the first legislation to recognise 
the equal rights of all. It was also significant in that customary law, for the first 
time, became an issue of constitutional importance. In the form of section 30 
and 31 of the Constitution, customary law is recognised as a basic component 
of South African law.196 
196 Sect ion 31(1) (a) of the Const i tut ion prov ides that 'persons be longing to a cultural, 
rel igious and l inguistic commun i t y may not be den ied the right to en joy their cul ture, pract ise 
their rel igion and use their language' . Sect ion 31 is similar to that of Art ic le 27 of the 1966 
United Nat ions Internat ional Covenant on Civil and Polit ical Rights. Art ic le 27 p laces a duty on 
states to guaran tee the rights of minori ty populat ions, and reads as fol lows: 'Persons 
belonging to minori t ies shall not be den ied the right, in commun i t y w i th other members of their 
group, to enjoy their cul ture, to profess and pract ise their own rel igion, or to use their own 
language' . Cus tomary Law is def ined in sect ion 1 of the Reform of Cus tomary Law of 
Success ion and Regulat ion of Related Matters Act 11 of 2009 as 'the cus toms and pract ices 
observed amongst the ind igenous Afr ican people of Sou th Afr ica wh i ch fo rm part of the 
cul ture of those people ' . Cus tomary law has also said to 'compr ise the wr i t ten and unwri t ten 
rules wh ich have deve loped f rom the cus toms and tradi t ions of communi t ies , they have to be 
known by the communi t ies , fo l lowed by the commun i t ies and be enforceable ' . Internat ional 
convent ions such as the Convent ion on the El iminat ion of all Forms of Discr iminat ion Against 
W o m e n and The Protocol to the Afr ican Char ter on Human and People 's Rights on the Rights 
of W o m e n in Afr ica also express ly recognise the right to culture. Le Roux L Harmful traditional 
practices, (male circumcision and virginity testing of girls) and the legal rights of children 
(unpubl ished LLM thesis, Universi ty of the Wes te rn Cape, 2006), 48; Bekker JC and Others 
Introduction to legal pluralism in South Africa 2ed (2006), 19; Bennet T W Customary Law in 
South Africa (2004), 34, 77; M w a m b e n e L and Sloth-Nie lsen J 'Benign accommoda t i on? 
Ukuthwala, ' forced marr iage' and the South Afr ican Chi ldren 's Act ' (2011) Law in Context 
(forthcoming). 
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The appreciation of customary law and the right to language and culture and 
the issues surrounding these were only truly ascertained in 1993.197 This was 
despite the fact that Traditional Leaders attempted to have customary law 
wholly exempted from the application of the Bill of Rights. Today customary 
law is regarded as an integral part of the South African legal system.198 
When the right to culture is scrutinised, courts must take into account the 
significance of the cultural practice to the community concerned and the rights 
which such practice has potentially infringed.199 In the instance of culture, the 
scope of the right as contained in section 30 and 31 is 'virtually limitless' as 
culture embraces a wide variety of human activities.200 However, as with other 
rights contained in the Bill or Rights, the right to culture can be limited. Both 
section 30 and 31 contain a proviso or 'internal limitation clause': no right may 
be exercised in a manner inconsistent with any Bill of Rights provision.201 
197 W h e n the Interim Const i tu t ion w a s being draf ted, the right to cul ture w a s assoc ia ted wi th 
certain r ight-wing polit ical g roups and their activit ies; such groups were using their cultural 
identi ty as a just i f icat ion for c la iming a separate and se l f -governed nat ionhood. However , 
w h e n greater impor tance w a s p laced on cus tomary law in or about 1993, const i tuenc ies of 
t radi t ional leaders w e r e represented by a mult i -party negot iat ing process wh ich w a s a result 
of polit ical bargains struck be tween the then in-power Nat ional Party and the recent ly 
unbanned Afr ican Nat ional Congress . The equal i ty c lause, specif ical ly the right not to be 
d iscr iminated on g rounds of sex and gender th rea tened to overr ide the cus tomary sys tem of 
patr i l ineal success ion and in that the cus tomary pract ise of Tradi t ional Leaders and Chief 
Headmen in having leadership for men only. Wi th regards to the above, a member of the 
Cape Tradi t ional Leaders Associat ion, Nkosi Nonkonyana vo iced his concerns saying that 
'my son can be successfu l ly cha l lenged for my throne by my daughter , because the Bill (of 
R igh ts ) says that all fo rms of d iscr iminat ion-and its emphas is on gender -shou ld not be 
permit ted' . Moyo PT The relevance of culture and religion to the understanding of children's 
rights in South Africa (unpubl ished LLM thesis, Universi ty of Cape Town, 2005), 30; Bennet 
T W Customary Law in South Africa (2004), 77 fn 6. 
198 Bennet T W Customary Law in South Africa (2004), 77; M w a m b e n e L and Sloth-Nie lsen J 
Talking the talk and walking the walk: How can the development of African customary law be 
understood? (2011) Law in Context (forthcoming), 1. 
199 Le Roux L Harmful traditional practices, (male circumcision and virginity testing of girls) 
and the legal rights of children (unpubl ished LLM thesis, Universi ty of the Wes te rn Cape, 
2006), 114. 
200 Sect ion 30 g ives indiv iduals the right to culture, whereas sect ion 31 speaks of individuals 
having the right wi th other members of the communi ty . Thus 30 and 31 are complementa ry . 
Bennet T W Customary law in South Africa (2004), 84; Curr ie I and De W a a l J The Bill of 
Rights Handbook 5ed (2010), 199; Le Roux L Harmful traditional practices, (male 
circumcision and virginity testing of girls) and the legal rights of children (unpubl ished LLM 
thesis, Universi ty of the Wes te rn Cape, 2006), 45, 46. 
201 The proviso w a s included to prevent commun i t ies f rom "pr ivat is ing" of fensive pract ices and 
including oppress ive features of cultural t radi t ions. Th is is in accordance wi th many 
internat ional convent ions and guide l ines such as article 24(3) of the Uni ted Nat ions 
Convent ion on the Rights of the Chi ld and art icle 21 of the Afr ican Char ter on the Rights and 
Wel fa re of the Child. In th is regard, sect ion 12(3), (4), (8) and (9) of the Act prohibi ts female 
c i rcumcis ion, v irgini ty test ing (below the age of 16) and forced male c i rcumcis ion. Male 
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The rights to equality and to culture have come to heads on several 
occasions. In the case of Bhe and Others v Magistrate-Khayelitsha and 
Others the constitutionality of primogeniture was dealt with. 202 The CC held 
section 23 of the Black Administration Act 38 of 1927 was inconsistent with 
the Constitution as it discriminated against woman, young children and 
children born of unmarried parents on the grounds of sex and birth.203 Despite 
the recognition given to customary law in the Constitution, the CC found that 
the right to equality (on the basis of birth or gender) outweighed the right to 
culture and took into account the changing nature of customary law in South 
Africa both in terms of the historical and current content.204 
In the matter of Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education the 
prohibition on corporal punishment in schools was challenged on the grounds 
that it violated the religious freedom and practice of the applicant who 
administered corporal punishment as a biblical directive.205 However, despite 
the fact that the CC recognised corporal punishment as a form of religious 
and cultural practice, the prohibition in schools was found to be permissible on 
the grounds that, for amongst other reasons, it afforded respect to and 
promoted the right to human dignity.206 
ci rcumcis ion may occur be low 16 only for rel igious or medical purposes. Above the age of 16 
years, male c i rcumcis ion may only occur w i th the chi ld 's in formed consent . Le Roux L 
Harmful traditional practices, (male circumcision and virginity testing of girls) and the legal 
rights of children (unpubl ished LLM thesis, Universi ty of the Wes te rn Cape, 2006), 17, 46; 
Moeketse W Virginity testing and male circumcision: harmful traditional practices of 
customary law? (unpubl ished LLM thesis, Universi ty of the Wes te rn Cape, 2005), 46; 
Boezaar t T Child Law in South Africa (2009), 186-194 and 238-241; Bennet T W Customary 
law in South Africa (2004), 89; Bekker JC and Others Introduction to legal pluralism - Part 1: 
Customary law 2ed (2006), 35, 105. 
2°3 2005 (1) BCLR (CC). 
203 Moyo PT The relevance of culture and religion to the understanding of children's rights in 
South Africa (unpubl ished LLM thesis , Universi ty of Cape Town, 2005) , 42-48; Boezaart T 
2C04hild Law in South Africa (2009), 230, 233, 277. 
204 The purpose of the Reform of Cus tomary Law of Success ion and Regulat ion of Related 
Matters Act 11 of 2009 w a s to abol ish the cus tomary rule of pr imogeni ture as far as it w a s 
appl icable to the law of success ion so as to br ing it into accordance wi th the Const i tut ion as 
wel l as to g ive effect to the Bhe j udgment wh ich w a s held to be inconsistent wi th the not ions 
of equal i ty and human dignity. M w a m b e n e L and Sloth-Nie lsen J Talking the talk and walking 
the walk: How can the development of African customary law be understood? (2011) Law in 
Context (forthcoming), 14. 
206 2000 (10) BCLR 1051 (CC). Boezaar t T Child Law in South Africa (2009), 426. 
206 In appl icat ion of the l imitat ions c lause the CC held that the purpose of the prohibi t ion w a s 
to p romote respect for d igni ty and physical and emot ional integrity of all ch i ldren and any 
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In Kwazulu-Natal MEC for Education v Pillay a claim of unequal treatment by 
a school on the ground of religious and cultural affiliation was upheld.207 The 
CC held that refusal by a school to permit learners to wear nose studs, as 
required by their religion, amounted to discrimination on the grounds of 
religion and culture.208 The CC noted that whether or not the individual was 
compelled or voluntarily chose to dress in religious and cultural attire was 
immaterial, what was important was that the Constitution "confirm[ed], 
encourage[ed] and celebrate[d] diversity."209 The CC drew a connection 
between culture and religion, and in this particular case, 'religious belief[s] 
informe[d] cultural practice and cultural practice attaine[d] religious 
significance.'210 
Lastly, in a recent matter brought before the Equality Court (Bisho High Court) 
court, the applicant successfully lodged a constitutional challenge against his 
parents who wanted to have him circumcised. The applicant argued that 
forced circumcision, although forming part of his right to passage in terms of 
Xhosa tradition, was a violation of his right to freedom of and security of his 
person and his religious beliefs.211 
The inclusion of the right to culture in the Constitution was controversial from 
the outset, specifically in so far as the right related to other rights. Some 
constitutional commentators argued that when conflict arose, the right to 
equality or dignity must always override culture; whilst others stated that no 
exempt ion 'even if one rel igious g rounds wou ld disturb the who le symbol ic , moral and 
pedagog ica l purpose of the measure , and wou ld undermine the states duty to protect people 
f rom v io lence ' . Le Roux L Harmful traditional practices, (male circumcision and virginity 
testing of girls) and the legal rights of children (unpubl ished LLM thesis, Universi ty of the 
Wes te rn Cape, 2006), 51; Boezaar t T Child Law in South Africa (2009), 426. 
207 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC). 
208 Curr ie I and De W a a l J The Bill of Rights handbook 5ed (2010), 794-797; Boezaart T Child 
Law in South Africa (2009), 423, 431, 441. 
2°9 Boezaar t T Child Law in South Africa (2009), 431. 
210 Lenaghan P 'The right to be di f ferent: A ret rospect ive analys is of the Const i tut ional Court 
ju r isprudence of Just ice Albie Sachs - weav ing the vo ice of d i f ference' (2010) SAPL 25: 1; 
Boezaar t T Child Law in South Africa (2009), 431, 442. 
211 S m o o k E Forced circumcision: Son takes parents on (August 2009) avai lable at 
http://www.iol.com (accessed on 30 March 2011) ; Ncube M E and Ross E 'Reproduct ive 
health issues emanat ing f rom the Chi ldren 's Act No. 38 of 2005 as amended in 2008: A pilot 
s tudy of the rights of parents versus rights of chi ldren' (2010) SAJBL Vol III, 14. 
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one right will prevail over the other. In his 1999 address to the Southern 
African Society of Legal Historians on the topic of the Law in Africa: New 
Perspectives on Origins, Foundations and Transition, now retired Justice 
Albie Sachs stated that: 
'it is important to avoid an unfor tunate but prevalent t endency to put cus tomary law and 
the const i tut ional pr inciple of equal i ty on a col l is ion course, i.e. to say that for the one to 
live, the other must die, or to use a less dramat ic metaphor , if cus tom t r iumphs, equal i ty 
must fail [or v isa versa] . I th ink that is a pro found ly mis taken v iew. Our Bill of Rights is 
not based on a hierarchy of r ights, nor is it an assemb lage of categor ical ly def ined rights 
sea led off f r om each other. Rather it con templa tes in terdependence of mutual ly 
support ive r ights. '212 
The right to culture, although difficult to define exactly, encompasses the right 
of religious and cultural groups to foster their cultural identity by maintaining 
separate schools, speaking different languages, practising certain religions 
and applying their own individual legal system.213 However, when faced with 
conflicting rights, it could be said that the right to culture is the most difficult to 
give effect to, in that traditional cultural practices have often not been seen to 
be in accordance with our societies views of equality, dignity and freedom.214 
Having regard to the above, I turn now to informal surrogacy (hereinafter 
referred to as cultural surrogacy) and pose a two fold question. Firstly, 
whether or not cultural surrogacy is accordance with the Constitution and if 
so, whether the non-recognition thereof in Chapter 19 amounts to a 
reasonable limitation of the rights of both potential commissioning parents and 
potential surrogates in a cultural setting? 
3.7.1 Cultural surrogacy as a customary practice 
212 Moyo P T The relevance of culture and religion to the understanding of children's rights in 
South Africa (unpubl ished LLM thesis, Universi ty of Cape Town, 2006), 30-31. 
2°3 Bennet T W Customary Law in South Africa (2004), 33, 77. 
214 Examples of such pract ices wou ld be virgini ty test ing, forced c i rcumcis ion and forced 
marr iage. 
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Cultural surrogacy was defined in SALC Report as the insemination of the 
surrogate mother with the gametes of the commissioning parent. It is privately 
performed by the parties according to accepted customary practice without 
the intervention of medical doctors or clinics. As a result, a surrogate to a 
cultural surrogacy arrangement is both the genetic and gestational mother.215 
Cultural surrogacy has been briefly discussed in chapter two under the 
heading 'types of surrogacy'.216 To recapitulate, the AHPC recommendations 
provide that 'informal surrogacy is practised in most communities and is 
regulated by cultural norms and practices.217 [The] overall view on informal 
surrogacy [was that it] should be practiced within families only.' In the AHPC's 
Recommendations, paragraph 3.3, the reasons for the non-regulation of 
cultural surrogacy were stated as follows: 
'Legislat ion should not make provis ion for " informal surrogacy" s ince it is per formed 
pr ivately (and qui te often in secret) wi thout the intervent ion of medical doctors or cl inics 
and is regulated by cus tomary law. The Commi t tee wou ld , however , encourage people 
current ly engag ing in informal sur rogacy to make use of the processes set out in the 
p roposed legislat ion, if they so wish. This will be in the in the best interest of the chi ld 
and wil l ensure better protect ion to all part ies involved. ' 
The SALC noted that cultural surrogacy, despite 'the urbanisation of the Black 
population [and the] falling into disuse of [cultural surrogacy], [was] a form of 
surrogate motherhood which was generally known and practiced by them (the 
Black population).'218 Cultural surrogacy is most often preferred seeing that it 
is the more 'cost effective' option and because it is practiced 'according to 
'custom'. Often in the case where one member of the community is unable to 
215 Report of the Ad Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) avai lable at 
http//www.pmg.org.za/docs/1999/990211.saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 9. 
2°7 ' Paragraph 2.2.1. 
217 Report of the Ad Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) avai lable at 
http//www.pmg.org.za/docs/1999/990211.saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 4. 
Par l iamentary Moni tor ing Group Report of the South African Law Commission on 
Surrogate Motherhood (1997) avai lable at http://www.pmg.org.za (accessed on 1 June 2010). 
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reproduce she will turn to another to assist. One could say that this practice 
fulfils the meaning behind 'ubuntu' - a person is a person through others.219 
The constitutional implications which arise as a result of the exclusion of 
potential commissioning parents on the basis of the inability of both to 
conceive and to give birth was discussed in paragraph 3.5 above. At this 
juncture, it now becomes necessary to examine such exclusion in the 'African 
cultural context'. 
'Despi te the unders tand ing that every w o m a n , whe the r or not she has bio logical 
chi ldren, is to take up the role of mother ing all o ther chi ldren in the communi ty , 
pract ical ly speaking, it is not that s imple and a childless w o m a n ' s status is severe ly 
d imin ished. ' 2 2 0 
As far as the African individual is concerned, 'being healthy means having the 
right relationship with the environment...illness is connected not so much to 
viruses or infections in the body, [but rather] as to the question of who 
disturbed the societal order and why.'221 The African communal tradition 
places a very high value on a man's ability to father children; to be without 
children and a home is seen as an evil that is very hard to bear.222 Infertility in 
the traditional African context is not about medical problems or unexplained 
causes; the community immediately reflects on such person's presumed faulty 
conduct.223 
3.7.2 The constitutional implications raised in connection with the practice of 
cultural surrogacy 
219 The word Ubuntu is def ined as 'an ethnic or humanis t ph i losophy focus ing on peop les 
a l leg iances and relat ions wi th each other ' In 1999, now retired Archb ishop Desmond Tutu 
descr ibed a person wi th Ubuntu as a person w h o is 'open and avai lable to others, af f i rming 
others, does not feel th reatened that others are able and good, for he or she has proper self-
assurance that c o m e s f rom knowing that he or she be longed in a greater who le and is 
d imin ished w h e n others are humi l iated or d imin ished, w h e n others are tor tured or oppressed. ' 
Ulwazi 'Shar ing Ind igenous Knowledge- Ubun tu ' avai lable at 
http://ulwazi.org/index.php5?title=Ubuntu (accessed on 7 January 2011). 
Gravett I Narratives of Couples Affected by Infertility: Daring to be Fruitful (unpubl ished D 
Phil thesis, Universi ty of Pretoria, 2008) , 167. 
221 Bennet T W Customary Law in South Africa (2004), 266. 
222 Lucier RM et al Issues in Reproductive Technology: Heritage, Surrogacy and Ethics of 
Community - Choice and Avoidance in African and African-American Traditions (1994), 334. 
223 Bennet T W Customary Law in South Africa (2004), 165. 
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Having regard to the above, a women's body in the 'African cultural context' is 
inter alia seen as the reincarnation of her ancestors, and in most parts of 
Africa, motherhood is seen as a sacred religious duty and a way in which to 
prove that you are a full and faithful person. In light of this, the author needs 
firstly to determine if the practice of cultural surrogacy will pass constitutional 
muster, and secondly, what constitutional implications the non-recognition of 
cultural surrogacy in Chapter 19 may have on the rights of the potential 
parties to the surrogacy agreement, specifically the rights of the 
commissioning parents where, in accordance with their culture, cultural 
surrogacy as a form of assisted reproduction has been in existence for many 
years. 
Cultural surrogacy, unlike the practices of virginity testing and forced female 
and male circumcision, is not a harmful practice. Unlike formal surrogacy 
arrangements, in cultural surrogacy there is no artificial fertilisation procedure: 
the surrogate and the male commissioning parent have sexual intercourse by 
way of natural means. The surrogate agrees to carry the child to term for the 
'good of the community', and when the child is born, the child is deemed the 
child of the commissioning family. 
Despite the deficiency of literature in respect of customary surrogacy, I submit 
that the ideology and legal consequences of the practice run parallel to 
customary adoption i.e. the 'institution of an heir', and in this respect the child 
who is adopted is regarded by the community as the child of the adoptive 
parents.224 
Customary adoption has been recognised by our courts. In the cases of 
Maneli v Maneli and Metiso v Padongelukfonds, where, after the adoption of a 
child in terms of customary law, both sets of parents had divorced, both the 
224 Bennet T W Customary Law in South Africa (2004) 319; M w a m b e n e L and Sloth-Nie lsen J 
'Talking the talk and wa lk ing the wa lk : How can the deve lopment of Afr ican cus tomary law be 
unders tood? ' (2011) Law in Context (forthcoming), 3. 
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respective courts upheld the validity of customary adoption and the obligation 
of the parties to maintain the respective children.225 
Nevertheless it has been said that customary law adoptions, although having 
been recognised as upholding the best interests of the child, may not pass 
constitutional muster on the basis that 'customary adoption involves a private, 
non regulated arrangement with the two families in terms of which the 
adoptive father may make payment for the child.'226 
In terms of section 30 and 31 of the Constitution, neither an individual nor a 
community may exercise his or her/their rights to culture in a manner which is 
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights as a whole. Though many will argue that 
payment in respect of the gestation of a child could amount to conduct which 
is inconsistent with the Bill of Rights, the author will make a submission to the 
contrary in chapter 4. Nonetheless, due to the fact that a shortage of literature 
exists concerning the practice of cultural surrogacy, and the fact that the only 
bona fide source the author has available to here is the commentary made in 
the SALC Report on Surrogate Motherhood, where there is no evidence to 
suggest that cultural surrogacy involves the payment of the surrogate mother 
for the gestation of the child, the author submits that apart from the similarities 
in the legal consequences and the 'private agreement between parties', it 
cannot categorically be stated whether or not cultural surrogacy, as is the 
case of cultural adoption, involves payment to the surrogate mother.227 
However, even if cultural surrogacy involved payment, in many traditional 
African communities, payment does not constitute monetary currency and 
may consist of a number of objects such as cattle or land. Hence, even if 
cultural surrogacy agreements did involve the payment of the surrogate 
225 Maneli v Maneli 14/3/2-234/05, [Unrepor ted Judgment ] South Gau teng High Court and 
Metiso v Padongelukfonds 2001 (3) SA 1142 (T). M w a m b e n e L and Sloth-Nie lsen J 'Talking 
the talk and walk ing the wa lk : How can the deve lopment of Afr ican cus tomary law be 
understood? ' (2011) Law in Context (forthcoming), 3. 
226 Kewana v Santam Insurance Co Ltd 1993 (4) SA 771 (TkA). Bennet T W Customary Law in 
South Africa (2004), 230; Boezaar t T Child law in South Africa (2009), 320. 
227 Par l iamentary Moni tor ing Group Report of the South African Law Commission on 
Surrogate Motherhood (1997) avai lable at http://www.pmg.org.za ( accessed on 1 June 
2010), 103, 104. 
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mother, the author is unsure as to whether this could amount to a practice 
which is inconsistent with the Constitution. In South Africa we permit the 
practice of lobola, whereby 'marriage in the African tradition is characterised 
by the transfer of goods between the families of prospective spouses...the 
family of husband-to-be 'compensates' the family of the bride-to-be in 
'consideration of a customary marriage'.228 
Taking cognisance of the above, the author submits that she cannot make an 
accurate finding as to whether the practice of cultural surrogacy is 
inconsistent with the Bill of Rights. Hence it will be assumed for further 
research purposes that cultural surrogacy is not a customary practice that is 
inherently inconsistent with the Bill of Rights and thus it will be determined in 
the subsequent paragraph whether or not the non-recognition of cultural 
surrogacy in Chapter 19 of the Act has constitutional implications for the rights 
of potential commissioning parents and potential surrogate mothers. 
3.7.3 The constitutional implications in the non-recognition of cultural 
surrogacy 
In the determination of whether the non-recognition of cultural surrogacy in 
Chapter 19 amounts to an unwarranted limitation on the rights to potential 
commissioning parents and potential surrogate mothers, the author will refer 
to the Harksen test and the limitations clause. 
Although the Act does not expressly differentiate on the basis of culture, 
failure to explicitly identify cultural surrogacy in the Act amounts to 
differentiation on the basis of cultural practice. The reasoning behind this 
exclusion was founded on the perception that because cultural surrogacy is 
privately performed, without medical intervention and regulated through 
customary law, cultural surrogacy was not favoured.229 The SALC and AHPC 
228 Bekker JC, Labuschagne JMT and Vorster LP Introduction to legal pluralism in South 
Africa - Part I: Customary Law (2002), 62. 
229 Report of the Ad Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) avai lable at 
http//www.pmg.org.za/docs/1999/990211.saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 916. 
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suggested that 'in the interests of the protection of all parties to the 
agreement' formal surrogacy was the preferred option.230 At this point I submit 
that the objective of protecting all the parties to the contract is a justifiable 
reason for the exclusion of cultural surrogacy; nevertheless, such exclusion 
may still amount to discrimination. 
Differentiation on the basis of culture is a listed ground of discrimination in 
terms of the equality clause. Everyone has the right to participate in the 
cultural life of their choice and every cultural community may not be denied 
the right to enjoy their culture. These rights must however be practiced in a 
manner consistent with the Bill of Rights, and as was presented in paragraphs 
3.7.1 and 3.7.2 above, the practice of cultural surrogacy is not inherently in 
consistent with the Bill of Rights and thus failure to recognise it in the form of 
Chapter 19 of the Act may give rise to unfair discrimination on cultural 
grounds. 
With reference to the limitations clause, the exclusion of cultural surrogacy, 
although not explicit in the Act, is based on a law of general application. The 
rights which are impacted as a result of such exclusion are the rights to 
equality (on the basis of culture), dignity (the possible psychological effect that 
was alluded to in paragraph 3.5 above as a result of the inability to procreate 
an heir will have on a person) and the right to make decisions regarding 
reproduction (choosing to reproduce the way you want). 
To recapitulate, the purpose of the exclusion of cultural surrogacy agreements 
was that the AHPC were of the opinion that the interests of the parties to a 
cultural surrogacy agreement would not be adequately protected. As 
previously submitted, the importance and the objective of the exclusion is 
reasonable and justifiable: protecting the interests of all parties to the 
agreement is vital. Nonetheless, the impact that such exclusion has on the 
rights to equality, dignity, the right to make decisions regarding reproduction 
and culture are as important. 
230 The impl icat ion of this exc lus ion on the interests of the chi ld wi l l be d iscussed in paragraph 
3.8.6 below. 
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The non-recognition of cultural surrogacy has the effect that persons of 
cultural communities in South Africa are not afforded the same legal 
protection in respect of their culturally mandated surrogacy agreements as 
those who can afford to make use of expensive medical procedures and can 
afford to appoint legal representation in respect of a confirmation application 
to the High Court. They may choose to continue to exercise their right to make 
decisions concerning reproduction, but if they choose to do so through cultural 
surrogacy, their interests and particularly the interests of the child will not 
receive equal protection.231 In addition to this, if these cultural communities 
continue to practice cultural surrogacy, although this is not stipulated in the 
Act, there does indeed exist the possibility that the parties to cultural 
surrogacy agreements may be acting in contravention of the Act and thus 
subject to criminal liability as provided for in section 301-303 of the Act. 
Less restrictive means do exist rather than complete and absolute non-
recognition of cultural surrogacy. Further consultation with Traditional Leaders 
and/or those qualified in the field of cultural surrogacy should have taken 
place.232 The opinions and views of such persons should have in the least 
been used to develop guidelines concerning the practice of cultural surrogacy. 
The AHPC (and the SALC) chose not to foreground cultural surrogacy and 
therefore did not legislate for it. Many months were spent travelling the 
predominantly black provinces of the Northern Province, Limpopo, Eastern 
Cape and Kwazulu Natal conducting study tours so as to form a perspective 
of the people's opinion towards surrogacy. They obtained their answer: South 
231 Even though the chi ld born of a cultural sur rogacy agreement wil l be recognised as the 
chi ld of the commiss ion ing parents, the parents and the surrogate do not have statutory 
mechan isms to protect t h e m and the chid in the instance of a dispute. 
232 The Black Admin is t ra t ion Act 38 of 1927 permi t ted commiss ioners ' cour ts and the court of 
Appea l to call assessors f rom the commun i t y concerned to g ive advice on the respect ive 
cus tomary law. A l though this hardly ever occurred, the S A L C in its Report on the Conflict of 
Laws r ecommended reviv ing this opt ion in the hope that it cou ld assist cour ts in keep ing 
abreast of cus tomary pract ise. The S A L C w e r e of the opinion that assessors should be taken 
f rom a more representat ive sample of the commun i t y and that anthropologists , w h o w e r e 
exper ts on part icular cus tomary pract ices, should also be uti l ised in assist ing the cour ts in 
their interpretat ion and appl icat ion of the law. Previously t radi t ional leaders were preferred as 
their t ra in ing imposed procedura l constra ints ca lcu la ted to p roduce a more rel iable vers ion of 
cus tomary pract ice than the results acqui red f rom tests. 
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African black cultures accept and practice cultural surrogacy where assisted 
reproduction is required.233 'Whatever the advantages and disadvantages of 
surrogacy, it seems to be a practice that will continue unabated for as long as 
infertility is a reality.'234 
When faced with infertility and insufficient national fertility health services, 
surrogacy agreements, whether formal or cultural, are the alternative. In the 
case of traditional cultural communities, where reproductive health care 
services are not as readily available as in affluent areas, cultural surrogacy is 
a mechanism of assisted reproduction used to repair the void created by 
infertility.235 
In conclusion, cultural surrogacy is neither expressly included nor excluded 
from the Act and as a result cultural surrogacy could be said to be neither 
permitted nor prohibited. The non-recognition of cultural surrogacy in Chapter 
19 of the Act amounts to unfair discrimination on the grounds of culture which 
amounts to a crucial restriction on the rights of parties to cultural surrogacy 
agreements. However, for purposes of legal clarification and more 
importantly, in the best interests of the child, if the legislature truly intended 
cultural surrogacy be excluded, it should have expressly provided as such. In 
spite of this it is nevertheless the authors submission that cultural surrogacy 
should be regulated, or in the very least, guidelines should have been drafted 
which would as a minimum regulate the positions of the parties to the 
agreement and the legal status of the child born of a cultural surrogacy 
agreement. 
The right to culture requires that cultural practices, which are not inconsistent 
with the Bill of Rights, be respected and protected. Cultural surrogacy is in 
accordance with the Constitution. Our Constitution 'confirms, encourages and 
233 Par l iamentary Moni tor ing Group Report of the South African Law Commission on 
Surrogate Motherhood (1997) avai lable at http://www.pmg.org.za (accessed on 1 June 2010). 
234 Carnel ley M and Son i S (2008) 22 Speculum Juris, 39. 
235 'In both deve loped and less deve loped countr ies, artif icial reproduct ive techno log ies [are] 
perce ived [to be] a luxury for wea l thy couples, and not as a service for anyone want ing a son 
or a daughter . ' Ikemoto LC 'Reproduct ive Tour ism: Equal i ty Concerns in the Global Market for 
Ferti l ity Serv ices (2009) 27 Law and Inequality Review, 277. 
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celebrates diversity', and it is the duty of the legislature to give effect to its 
extraordinary features.236 The exclusion of cultural surrogacy from Chapter 19 
of the Act does not fulfil a constitutionally acceptable purpose. Hence, the 
non-recognition of cultural surrogacy in Chapter 19 of the Act is an 
unwarranted limitation of the rights of the parties to a cultural surrogacy 
agreement. 
3.8 The constitutional implications of the application of Chapter 19 on the 
best interests of the child 
During the course of this research the author has regularly made reference to 
the interests of 'all the parties' to the agreement. However this research has 
yet to determine the impact of Chapter 19 on what can be argued to be the 
most important interests of all: the interests of the child. It is with this that a 
number of the issues which were examined above will be re-discussed with 
regard to the other party to the agreement: the child to be born as well as the 
child(ren) of the surrogate mother and/or of the commissioning parents who 
are already in existence. 
The best interest of the child principle is not novel to South African law. 
Despite the fact that its first codification came about in the form of section 
28(2) of the Constitution and subsequently section 7 and 9 of the Act, the best 
interest principle has been applied as far back as in the 1948 case of Fletcher 
v Fletcher.237 Today, what was originally a common law principle of family law 
has developed as the 'golden thread which continues to run through case law' 
and has become stronger ever since'.238 
Internationally, both Article 3 of the United Nations Convention on the Rights 
of the Child (hereinafter referred to as the 'UNCRC') and Article 4 of the 
236 Kwazulu-Natal MEC for Education v Pillay 2008 (1) SA 474 (CC). 
237 1948 (1) SA 130 (A). 
238 Boezaar t T Child Law in South Africa (2010), 62, 439. 
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African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (hereinafter referred to 
as the 'ACRWC') incorporate the principle.239 
Domestically, section 28(2) of the Constitution provides that the child's best 
interests are of paramount importance in every matter concerning the child. 
Section 9 of the Act stipulates that in all matters concerning the care, 
protection and well-being of a child the standard that the child's best interest 
is of paramount importance must be applied and section 7 lists the factors 
which are to be considered when determining the best interests of the child. 
Although these two provisions could be seen to be as mandatory, it will be 
shown that, although the child's best interests must be taken into account, 
such interests can be limited and as a result can be trumped by other 
conflicting interests and rights.240 
3.8.1 Interpreting the best interests of the child 
The best interest of the child principle as contained in section 28(2) of the 
Constitution is not merely a guiding a principle, but a right in itself.241 Though 
the courts have had many opportunities to examine exactly what constitutes 
'the best interests of the child', an exact definition still does not exist.242 
239 Art ic le 3 of the U N C R C prov ides that 'in all act ions concern ing chi ldren, whe ther 
under taken by publ ic or pr ivate social wel fare inst i tut ions, cour ts of law, administ rat ive 
author i t ies or legislat ive bodies, the best interests of the child shall be of primary 
consideration. Art ic le 4 of the A C R W C descr ibes the best interest of the chi ld as the pr imary 
cons iderat ion in all act ions concern ing the chi ld. The pr inciple w a s initially incorporated in the 
1959 Declarat ion on the Rights of the Chi ld and the 1979 Convent ion on the El iminat ion of Al l 
Forms of Discr iminat ion against W o m e n . Zermat ten J Best interests of the child principle: 
literal analysis and function (2010), 18 International Journal of Children's Rights, 405; 
Boezaart T Child Law in South Africa (2010), 315, 317, 323. 
^ H o w e v e r , in the case of M v S (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2008 (3) SA 232, 
2007 (2) S A C R 539 (CC) the C C held that the best interest pr inciple in not absolute, is 
capab le of l imitat ion and other interests are not t rumped in all matters concern ing the chi ld. 
241 Minister of Welfare and Population Development v Fitzpatrick 2000 (3) SA 422 (CC). 
242 Bannatyne v Bannatyne 2003 (2) SA 363 (CC); Sonderup v Tondelli 2001 (1) SA 1171 
(CC); De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local Division) and Others 
2004 (1) SA 406 (CC); Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom and Others 
2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); Fraser v Children's Court, Pretoria North, and Others 1997 (2) SA 261 
(CC); Du Toit and Another v Minister of Welfare and Population Development and Others 
(Lesbian and Gay Equality Project as Amicus Curiae) 2003 (2) SA389 (W); AD and Another v 
DW and Others (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae; Department for Social Development 
as Intervening Party) 2008 (3) SA 183 (CC); Bhe and Others v Magistrate Khayelitsha and 
Others (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus Curiae; Shibi and Sithole and Others; 
South African Human Rights Commission and Another v President of the Republic of South 
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Despite the fact that 'the literature on the "best interests is voluminous" and 
the criticisms of the concept are wel l - rehearsed.dec id ing what is best for a 
child poses a question no less ultimate than the purposes and values of life 
itself'.243 
In the matter of S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae), the CC 
considered the best interest principle simultaneously with a child's right to 
family and parental care as contained in section 28 of the Constitution.244 The 
CC held that 'a truly child-centred approach requires an in depth consideration 
of the needs and rights of the particular child in the 'precise real-life situation 
he or she is in. Thus to apply a predetermined formula [of what constitutes the 
bests interests of the child] for the sake of certainty, irrespective of the 
circumstances, would in fact be contrary to the best interests of the child'.245 
A case which is relevant to the interpretation of the best interests of the other 
children to a surrogacy agreement is the case of B v M.246 An improved 
employment opportunity in Cape Town resulted in a mother of two children 
wanting to relocate to Cape Town with her new husband. The Court granted 
the application of the mother. It held that despite the fact that this would 
separate the children of her previous marriage from their father (first 
husband), not being permitted to relocate would not be in the best interests of 
her child from the second marriage because such she would be separated 
from his father (second husband). Although not expressly provided for, the 
court interpreted the right to family and parental care to include the intention 
Africa and Others 2005 (1) SA 580 (CC); Khosa v Minister of Social Development; Mahaule v 
Minister of Social Development 2004 (6) SA 505 (CC); Johncom Media Investments Limited v 
M and Others (Media Monitoring Project as Amicus Curiae) 2009 (4) SA 7 (CC); Director of 
Public Prosecutions, Traansval v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Services and Others 
2009 (2) S A C R 130 (CC) and Centre for Child Law v Minister of Justice and Constitutional 
Development and Others (National Institute for Crime Prevention and Reintegration of 
Offenders as Amicus Curiae) 2009 (2) S A C R 477 (CC). 
243 F reeman M A Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: 
Article 3 -The Best Interest of the child (2007), 1. 
244 2008 (3) SA 232, 2007 (2) S A C R 539 (CC). 
245 Boezaar t T Child Law in South Africa (2010), 283. 
246 (2006) 9 BCLR 1043. 
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that family units should be kept together and 'actions leading to permanent 
dislocation should not be allowed.'247 
However the principle and right that the 'child's best interests are of 
paramount importance' does not mean that the best interest of the child can 
never be limited by the application of another right.248 'Although the word 
'paramountcy' means that the interests of the child are more important than 
anything else, it does not mean that everything else is unimportant'.249 
Taking into account the above, the author must submit that not only is the true 
constitution of the best interests' standard still unfolding, but in addition to this, 
when considering the best interest principle, one must also take cognisance of 
'current' and 'future-orientated' interests.250 With this in mind, the author will 
now endeavour to determine if the application of Chapter 19 of the Act affords 
adequate regard to the best interests of the child, or conversely if the 
application of some of the provisions found in Chapter 19 unwarrantedly limit 
the rights of the child born of the agreement and/or any other children of the 
surrogate mother or the commissioning parents who are already in existence. 
3.8.2 Section 294: Genetic origin of the child 
In paragraph 3.5.2.1 above it was determined that the limitation imposed on 
prospective commissioning parents through the application of section 294 of 
the Act was not proportionate to the purpose. The author concluded that 
without conclusive evidence to prove that where a genetic relation exists 
between the commissioning parent and the child born of the agreement then 
247 In F v F 2006 (3) 42 (SCA) the S C A d ismissed an appeal lodged by a mother against a 
dec is ion wh ich refused her permiss ion to relocate to England wi th her daughter on the 
g rounds that it wou ld not be in her daughters best interests to be separa ted f rom her father. 
Boezaart T Child Law in South Africa (2009), 285. 
248 De Reuck v Director of Public Prosecutions (Witwatersrand Local Division) and Others 
2000 (3) SA 422 (CC); Boezaart T Child Law in South Africa (2009) 282. 
249 S v M (Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae) 2008 (3) SA 232, 2007 (2) S A C R 539 
(CC); Boezaart T Child law in South Africa (2010), 284. 
50 'Current interests tend to be fo rmula ted in relat ion to exper ient ia l cons iderat ions: future-
or ientated interests, by contrast , focus on deve lopmenta l considerat ions ' . F reeman M A 
Commentary on the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child: Article 3 - the best 
interest of the child (2007), 3. 
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the surrogate mother will be more likely to fulfil her obligations to hand over 
the child upon birth, the justification that a genetic relation is required for the 
purpose of the protection of all the parties interests was not reasonable. The 
impact that section 294 had on the rights of single infertile persons and 
couples where both partners are infertile was not constitutionally warranted. 
In addition to the above submission presented in favour of the requirement 
that at least one of the commissioning parents must contribute a gamete to 
the process of conception, the AHPC recommended that if the child born of 
the agreement was genetically related to at least one of the commissioning 
parents, such child would be ensured of growing up with at least one 
genetically related parent. 
As it was stated in S v M a 'truly child-centred approach requires an in depth 
consideration of the needs and rights of the particular child in the 'precise 
real-life situation he or she is in.251 The 'precise real-life situation' of a child 
born of a surrogacy agreement is that he/she is brought into the world as a 
result of a real desire of their commissioning parents to have him/her. 
Children born of surrogacy agreements are comparable to many other 
children who are born as a result of natural conception: their parents sought to 
have them. However, in the case of surrogacy agreement, where no genetic 
relation exists between the child and at least one of the commissioning 
parents, the situation is not similar to a child born of normal conception, but is 
more akin to that of adoption. 
Despite the fact that neither the Constitution nor the Act provides that a child 
has the right to information or knowledge regarding their genetic origin or 
parentage, the right to know one's genetic origins can be found in 
international treaties such as the UNCRC and the European Convention on 
Human Rights (hereinafter referred to as the 'ECHR').252 
^ Boezaar t T Child Law in South Africa (2010), 283. 
252 Art icle 7-1 of the U N C R C prov ides that 'as far as possible, [a chi ld has] the right to know 
and to be cared for by his parents ' . In the matter of Odievre v France Appl icat ion no. 
42326/93, 13 February 2003, the court acknow ledged 'the ex is tence of the vital interest 
protected by Art ic le 8 of the ECHR in obtain ing informat ion necessary to d iscover the truth 
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In support of the right to know one's genetic origins, Richard J. Blauwhoff 
states as follows: 
'In a wea l th of social sc ience and legal l i terature that deals w i th access to information on 
genet ic descent , it has remained a content ious issue whe the r (all) chi ldren should be 
able to know the truth i r respect ive of their b i r th . . . two [ just i f icat ions in support of the right 
to know one's genet ic origin are] in the medica l sense, in the prevent ion of heredi tary 
d iseases and incestuous relat ionships, and secondly , in the psycho log ica l sense, to 
enable a chi ld to further deve lop [their] narrat ive i d e n t i t y . [ c h i l d r e n w h o are] depr ived of 
this informat ion may feel 'deracinated ' or cut off f rom an essent ia l part of themselves ' . 
Taking the above into consideration, although the author submits that it could 
be in interests of the child to be genetically related to at least one of their 
commissioning parents, not being genetically linked to his/her commissioning 
parent will not contravene the best interest standard. There are many children 
who are not genetically related to their parents, such as adopted children and 
foster children, and merely because they do not share a genetic link with their 
adoptive or foster parents do not mean that their best interests have been 
disregarded. 
The AHPC recommended that the child born of a surrogacy agreement should 
have access to information regarding their genetic origin and the author 
submits that she agrees with this recommendation. It will be in the best 
interest of the child to have access to knowledge of his/her genetic origin, 
however access to such knowledge is not dependant on the fact that he/she is 
genetically related to at least one of his/her commissioning parents. Such 
knowledge is afforded to a child born of a surrogacy agreement through the 
application of section 41 of the Act. 
concern ing important aspects of one 's persona l identity, such as the identity of one 's parents ' . 
B lauwhof f RJ 'Tracing d o w n the historical deve lopment of the legal concept of the right to 
know one's origins- Has to ' know or not to know' ever been the legal quest ion? In Boele-
Woelk i K Debates in family law around the globe at the dawn of the 21st century (2009), 145, 
161. 
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Section 41 of the Act provides for 'Access to biographical and medical 
information concerning genetic parents', and thus the child born of a 
surrogacy agreement has the right to access information regarding his/her 
genetic origin. Though a child born of a surrogacy agreement is only entitled 
to medical information concerning his/ her genetic parents and is not entitled 
to information regarding the actual identities of his/her surrogate mother 
and/or his/her gamete donor, with this is information, the author submits, the 
child born of the agreement will have some form of genetic 'link' with his/her 
genetic parents.253 The AHPC did not state that such information only be 
available at the age of 18 years or that the access to such information be 
restricted to only the medical and biological aspects of the surrogate mother 
and/or the gamete donor.254 
Hence it is again submitted that the constitutional implications arising out of 
the application of section 294 of the Act on the rights of would-be 
commissioning parents are unjustifiable. Taking into consideration the 
submission that it will be in the best interests of the child to be genetically 
related to at least one of his/her commissioning parents, the author concludes 
that the limitation which arises out of the application of section 294 on single 
infertile persons and couples (where both partners are infertile) far outweighs 
the purpose i.e. the protection of the best interests if the child which 
purportedly is ensured through the creation of a genetic link between at lease 
one of the commission parents and the child born of the agreement. 
To conclude, the author agrees that it will be in the best interests of the child 
born of the surrogacy agreement to have access to knowledge of his/her 
genetic relation. Nonetheless, the author submits that such access is not 
dependant on a genetic tie between the commissioning parent and the child 
born of the agreement. Section 41 of the Act provides for the right of a child 
253 Sect ion 41 (1 )(b) of the Act prov ides that access to such informat ion will on ly be avai lable 
to the chi ld born of the sur rogacy agreement f rom the age of 18 years. Louw A S Acquisition of 
parental responsibilities and rights (unpubl ished LLD thesis, Universi ty of Pretoria, 2009), 
369. 
254 Report of the Ad Hoc Commi t tee on Report of SA Law Commission on Surrogate 
Motherhood (11 Feb 1999) avai lable at 
http//www. pmg. org. za/docs/1999/990211. saclreport.html (accessed on 20 Apr i l 2011), 10. 
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born of a surrogacy agreement to access information regarding his/her 
genetic origin. 
3.8.3 Section 295(a): Surrogacy is reserved for commissioning parents who 
are permanently and irreversibly unable to give birth to a child of their 
own 
In paragraph 3.5.2.2 above the author found the limitation of the rights of 
potential commissioning parents arising out of the application of section 
295(a) of the Act to serve a constitutionally unacceptable purpose. The author 
submitted that although fertile persons could make use of other means of 
conception, the limitation which arises out of the application of section 295(a) 
on the rights of single fertile persons and couples where both partners are 
fertile was not justifiable on the basis that fertile persons are not permitted to 
exercise their right to make decisions regarding reproduction in that they are 
prohibited from entering into a valid surrogacy agreement. 
The AHPC submitted that if commissioning parents were not irreversibly and 
permanently unable to give birth, and subsequent to the birth of the child born 
of the surrogacy agreement, the commissioning parents later conceived 
through natural means, the child born of the surrogacy agreement 'may like 
Cinderella, face reduced parental investment after a genetic child enters the 
previously non-genetic household'.255 Hence, in this respect, it could be 
argued that the inclusion of section 295(a) purports to protect the child born of 
the surrogacy agreement from future psychological harm. 
The author respectfully disagrees with the above AHPC submission. All 
children experience a little bit of jealousy and sadness when a sibling enters 
their life, but it cannot be expected of commissioning parents (actually all 
parents) to only have a second child if the first child says that it is okay. In 
truth, this submission is actually nonsensical, and the author will not expend 
any more time examining it. 
255 Louw A S Acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights (unpubl ished LLD thesis, 
Universi ty of Pretor ia, 2009) , 345. 
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To conclude, the submission that the limitation arising out of the application of 
section 295(a) of the Act on fertile would-be commissioning parents is 
proportionate because it gives recognition to the best interests of the child 
(because he/she may be faced with reduced parental investment if his/her 
parents have a child through natural conception) is illogical and unreasonable. 
Hence, the author submits that the limitation which arises as a result of the 
application of section 295(a) on the rights of fertile would-be commissioning 
parents is unwarranted. 
3.8.4 Section 295(c)(viii): The surrogate mother must have a living child of 
her own 
In chapter two and in paragraph 3.6.1 of this chapter, the author submitted 
that without conclusive evidence that a surrogate who does not have a child of 
her own will be more likely to rengage on her obligation to hand over the child 
born of the surrogacy agreement at birth, the inclusion of section 295(c)(viii) 
and the limiting effect it has on the rights of would-be surrogates is 
unjustifiable and does not serve a constitutionally acceptable purpose. 
Taking this into consideration, it is of significance to note that some of the 
SALC members were not in favour of the inclusion of this provision. Initially 
some members expressed the view that because the surrogate will have a 
living child of her own, the effect of having a child for the commissioning 
parents, and having to give up such child upon birth could traumatise her 
living child through the fear that he/she may also be given away.256 
In addition to the above, there are two important provisions of the Act which 
also need to be taken consideration of in the determination of whether section 
295(c)(viii) is in the best interests of the child. The first is section 295(e), 
which was briefly introduced in chapter two, paragraph [][][], where it was 
argued by the author that the phrase 'family situations' can be interpreted to 
256 Louw A Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood in Davel CJ and Skel ton A Commentary on the 
Children's Act 38 of 2005 (2007), 19-12, 19-18. 
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include the children of the surrogate and the commissioning parents who are 
already in existence. The second important provision is section 10 of the Act 
which reads as follows: 
'every chi ld that is of such an age, maturi ty, stage of deve lopment as to be able to 
part ic ipate in any mat ter concern ing that child, has the right to part ic ipate in an 
appropr ia te way, and v iews expressed by the chi ld must be g iven due considerat ion ' . 
Having regard to section 295(e) and section 10, it is clear that the Act requires 
that the interests and considerations of all the children involved in a matter 
concerning them must be given due consideration. 
Unlike the position of children born to the commissioning parents after the 
birth of the child of a surrogacy agreement (see discussion in paragraph 
3.8.2), it is the authors submission that in the case of the living child of the 
surrogate, the effects of the birth of the child born of the surrogacy agreement 
will have far more implications on the interests of the child of the surrogate 
who is already in existence. In this instance, when the surrogate gives birth to 
the child of the commissioning parents, the living child of the surrogate may 
more than likely not comprehend the situation, and within this, he/she may 
truly fear that he/she will also be given away. 
Thus, even though due regard is supposed to be afforded to the views and 
considerations of the living child of the surrogate (in terms of section 295(e) 
and section 10), the author submits that there is a less unproblematic manner 
in which to avoid a situation which could have terrible repercussions for the 
overall stability of the surrogates living child. The author submits that section 
295(c)(viii) of the Act should be repealed. 
Hence, in addition to limiting effect that the application of section 295(c)(viii) 
has on the rights of would-be surrogates to enter into a valid surrogacy 
agreement, the impact that the application of section 295(c)(viii) may have on 
the interests of the living child of the surrogate provides further substantiation 
for the unjustifiabilty of the inclusion of section 295(c)(viii). Not only can it not 
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be undoubtedly stated that a surrogate who does not have a living child of her 
will be more likely to fail to honour her obligations to hand over the child born 
of the agreement to the commissioning parents upon birth, but there also 
exists a possibility that the living child of the surrogate may suffer 
psychological harm as result of the relinquishment of the child born of the 
surrogacy agreement. 
3.8.5 The impact of the exclusion of age as determining factor in the 
suitability of a potential surrogate on the best interests of the child 
The author submitted in paragraph 3.6.2 above that the exclusion of age as a 
suitability requirement in section 295 of the Act amounted to a failure of the 
legislature to take cognisance of the fact that older women are more likely to 
experience risks during pregnancy and child birth than younger women.257 At 
this juncture, the author will now endeavour to determine if the exclusion of a 
maximum age limitation of potential surrogate mothers is in the best interests 
of the child. 
It has been presented that not only are older women more at risk of death and 
injury as a result or pregnancy than younger women, but the child born of an 
older woman is also more likely to be stillborn, to have chromosomal 
abnormalities and to be born below birth weight than children born to younger 
women.258 This is the case for all pregnant women, and in the case of 
surrogacy agreements, neither a partial surrogate nor a full surrogate is 
immune to the above-mentioned consequences which are associated with 
older pregnancies. 
Taking the above into consideration, not only can it be said that it is not in the 
best interests of the child that older women are permitted to be surrogates 
257 'Older w o m e n ' are d e e m e d to w o m e n over the age of 35 years. 
258 Grosvenor M B and Others Visualising nutrition: Everyday choices (2009), 381; Midd leburg 
MI Promoting reproductive security in developing countries (2003), 28; Murray LJ and Others 
The babycentre essential guide to pregnancy and birth: Expert advice and real-world wisdom 
from the top of pregnancy and parenting resources (2005), 544; Kenner L and Wright Lott J 
'Comprehens ive neonata l care: An interdiscipl inary approach ' (2007) Elsevier Health Science 
Journal, 652. 
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(because of the risks to the health of the child), but on a whole, the entire 
enforceability of the agreement will be jeopardised because there is a risk that 
the surrogate may not even be able to become pregnant because her fertility 
levels are inherently lower than that of a younger woman. When the older 
surrogate does fall pregnant, there exists an additional worry that she may 
miscarry, and/or that the child will be stillborn and/or that the child born of the 
agreement may have chromosomal disorders. 
To conclude, the author submits as she did in paragraph 3.6.2 above that the 
failure by the legislature to include a provision which limits the age of potential 
surrogates is a failure firstly recognise the risks inherent to both the surrogate 
and the child in 'geriatric pregnancy' and secondly, a failure to protect the 
interests of all the parties to the agreement.259 
3.8.6 The impact of the non-recognition of cultural surrogacy on the best 
interests of the child 
In paragraph 3.7.3 above it was submitted that the non-recognition of cultural 
surrogacy in Chapter 19 of the Act amounted to unfair discrimination on the 
ground of culture and that it was an unreasonable limitation on the rights of 
potential commissioning parents and potential surrogates to make decisions 
regarding reproduction. 
259 In chapter 2 the author also d iscussed the issue of an age l imitation in respect of potent ia l 
commiss ion ing parents and reference w a s made to Sir Elton John and the birth of his son 
Zachary v ia surrogate motherhood. The author submi t ted that she could not outr ight conc lude 
that there should be a m a x i m u m age l imitat ion in respect of commiss ion ing parents because 
unl ike in the case of surrogate mothers, being a commiss ion ing parent does not involve 
inherent health risks. Though s o m e may submit that the older one is the less 'capable ' one is 
of being a parent , the author submi ts that it wou ld be difficult to say that age af fects ones 
overal l suitabi l i ty to be a parent. Regard ing the best interests of the chi ld, it may be submi t ted 
that an older parent may be less l ikely to be able to engage wi th the chi ld than a younger 
parent, and the older one is, there does exist the l ikel ihood that such an older parent won ' t 
have as many years avai lable to the chi ld as a younger parent. However , the author does not 
bel ieve that the imposi t ion of a m a x i m u m age l imitat ion for potent ial commiss ion ing parents 
could amount to a const i tut ional ly acceptab le purpose wi thout conc lus ive proof to show that 
older parents are less sui table for parentage than younger parents. Whe the r such a l imitat ion 
should have been imposed on the g rounds that it wou ld be in the best interests of the chi ld is 
also debatab le . 
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In addition to the above, the author concluded that the non-recognition of 
cultural surrogacy was not in the best interests of the child, because non-
recognition amounted to failure to provide clarity regarding the legal position 
of the child born of a cultural surrogacy agreement. However it is still 
necessary to determine in greater detail why the non-recognition of cultural 
surrogacy in Chapter 19 of the Act can be concluded to not be in the best 
interests of the child. 
The purpose of Chapter 19 of the Act was to firstly permit people who were 
unable to have children by natural means to enter into a legally recognised 
surrogacy agreement, secondly, and this is significant to this examination, 
Chapter 19 was to provide legal clarity regarding the children born of 
surrogacy agreements. 
Prior to the operation of Chapter 19 of the Act, children born as a result of a 
surrogacy agreement were seen as the child of the surrogate. The only 
manner in which the legal parentage of the commissioning parents would be 
recognised was via the process of adoption. Chapter 19 has altered this 
position as all children born of a valid surrogacy agreement are considered for 
all purposes the children of the commissioning parents. However, children 
born of cultural surrogacy agreements do not share in this legal certainty. 
Though children born of cultural surrogacy agreements are for cultural 
purposes considered the child of the commissioning parents, the position in 
terms of law is unclear as a result of the failure of the legislature to legally 
recognise cultural surrogacy as a form of assisted reproduction. 
It is true that because cultural surrogacy is privately performed without 
medical intervention, it will not be easy to regulate, thus the recommendation 
in both chapter two and paragraph 3.7.3 above that maybe guidelines are the 
correct way to regulate and recognise cultural surrogacy. However, whether 
or not it will prove difficult to regulate cultural surrogacy, the interests of the 
child born of the agreement must be considered of paramount importance. 
And if such children are not afforded equal legal protection by comparison to 
those children born of valid surrogacy agreements, this cannot be said to 
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considering the interests of children born of cultural surrogacy agreements as 
paramount. Despite the fact that the community which they live in might 
regard them as the children born of their commissioning parents, legally this 
will not be the case. 
The failure of the legislature to legally recognise cultural surrogacy as a form 
of assisted reproduction not only amounts to discrimination on the grounds of 
culture and an unwarranted limitation on the rights of potential commissioning 
parents and potential surrogates to make decisions regarding reproduction, 
but most significantly, the failure by the legislature to legally recognise cultural 
surrogacy as a form of assisted reproduction flies in the face of the principal of 
the best interests of the child. 
3.9 The right of access to reproductive health care 
After having considered the constitutional implications of the application of 
Chapter 19 of the Act on the rights and interests of all the parties, there 
remains one further constitutional right which needs to be examined in light of 
Chapter 19 of the Act: the right to access to reproductive health care. Bearing 
in mind the earlier discussion in chapter two in respect of State funded fertility 
clinics and in paragraph 2.2.6 above regarding reproductive rights, surrogacy 
can also be dealt with as a section 27 right. Section 27(1)(a) of the 
Constitution provides for the right to access to reproductive health care and 
places a duty on the state to take all reasonable legislative and other 
measures that are within its available resources to achieve the progressive 
realisation of this right.260 The right to access to reproductive health care is a 
socio-economic right.261 
The State has a positive duty to respect the right of access to reproductive 
health care services by not unfairly or unreasonably obstructing people in their 
260 C T O P is an example of such a legislat ive measure. 
261 Soc io-economic rights have the object ive of address ing the press ing socia l and economic 
needs that face ord inary South Afr icans everyday. In this, the Const i tut ion does not mere ly 
recognise and emphas ise rights wh i ch guaran tee f reedom and equal i ty but p laces emphas is 
on the genera l wel fare of the people. 
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access to existing health care services, whether in the public or private 
domain. In furtherance of its obligation to protect and promote, the State must 
continue to develop and implement comprehensive policy frameworks as well 
as implement mechanisms in order for individuals to realise these rights on 
their own.262 
In paragraph 3.3 above, the development of reproductive rights was 
discussed. To recapitulate, the primary objection for the inclusion of section 
12(2) of the Constitution is that section 12(2) recognises 'that some of the 
most devastating and socially entrenched forms of physical and psychological 
oppression and exploitation relate to reproduction and sexuality'.263 Section 
12(2) read with section 27(1)(a) acknowledges that in the past, women had 
very restrictive access to reproductive health. These sections intend to 'assist 
women to live out their fundamental human rights to dignity, autonomy and 
freedom, as well as to bring about gender equality'.264 
Section 27 stipulates the general right of everyone to access health care 
services. The State's positive constitutional duties arising out of socio-
economic rights were comprehensively discussed in the landmark socio-
economic rights judgment of Government of the Republic of South Africa v 
Grootboom in which the CC established that the Constitution imposes an 
obligation on the State to develop and implement reasonable measures to 
262 Be tween the per iod 1994 and 2004, the government had reached a number of genera l 
reproduct ive health mi lestones. For example in 1994 free public health serv ices were 
in t roduced for pregnant w o m e n and chi ldren be low 6 years; 1998 brought about the format ion 
of the SA Nat ional A ids Counci l and in 2000 the Nat ional Guide l ines for Cerv ical Screen ing 
P rog ramme were launched. In 2002 the Nat ional Cont racept ion Policy w a s launched and a 
year later, in 2003, the Government approved a plan to provide ant iretroviral medicat ion to 
people wi th HIV/Aids th rough the public health sector. Cooper D et al 'Ten years of 
democ racy in South Afr ica: Document ing t ransformat ion in reproduct ive health pol icy' 2004 
Reproductive Health Matters Journal, 70. 
263 B ishop M and W o o l m a n S Constitutional law of South Africa: Freedom and security of the 
person 2ed (2007), 40-81. 
264 Sect ion 12(2) and 27(1)(a) are in accordance wi th C E D A W , The Beij ing Declarat ion and 
Plat form of Act ion; The Declarat ion on the El iminat ion of V io lence against W o m e n and 
ICESCR. Hass im J and Others Health and democracy: A guide to human rights, health law 
and policy in post-apartheid South Africa (2007), 361, 362. 
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ensure that the socio-economic rights provided for in the Constitution are 
realised, and that such rights are justiciable. 265 
Importantly, the case of Grootboom provided clarity in respect of the extent 
and nature of the State's obligation regarding the realisation of such rights. 
Whilst the CC held that the needs of the poor require particular and special 
attention, the State's duty to realise such rights must be proportionate to the 
available means and resources available. Therefore, the fulfilment of socio-
economic rights is qualified by the term "progressive realisation". 
In the TAC case, the CC, although placing much reliance on the Grootboom 
decision, took a further step forward.266 The CC held that, the State shoulders 
'the primary responsibility as regards provision of basic health care for 
children when the implementation of parental or family care is lacking'.267 
265 2000 (3) BCLR 227 (C). The appl icants, as a result of poor l iving condi t ions, had moved to 
a p iece of land wh ich they had incorrect ly thought to be vacant . Once evicted, they dec ided to 
return to their or iginal p lace of res idence, an informal set t lement, however , the informal 
set t lement w a s ful ly occup ied and thus they were left wi th nowhere to reside. The High Court 
rel ied on the obl igat ions created in sect ion 28(1)(c) of the Const i tut ion (the right of chi ldren to 
shelter) and held that such obl igat ions were enforceable i rrespect ive of the resources 
avai lable to the State. The CC however reached a di f ferent conc lus ion. Despi te the fact the 
CC found that the State 's housing p rog ramme 'fell short ' of compl iance wi th sect ion 26 (the 
right of everyone to have access to housing), the C C held that the obl igat ion on the State w a s 
to under take reasonable and legislat ive measures to progress ive ly real ise the right, and the 
State must 'devise, fund, implement and superv ise measures to prov ide relief to those in 
despera te need' . The C C found no violat ion of sect ion 28(1)(c) and held that such right w a s 
not automat ica l ly enforceable. ESCR-Net 'Government of the Republ ic of South Afr ica v 
Groo tboom & Ors 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC)' avai lable at www.http://escr-
net.org/caselaw show.html (accessed on 20 Apri l 2011) ; L iebenberg S Socio Economic 
Rights: adjudication under a transformative constitution (2010), 146 - 151; L iebenberg S 
'Towards a t ransformat ive adjudicat ion of soc io -economic r ights ' in Osode PC & Glover G 
Law and transformative justice in post-apartheid South Africa (2010), 37; Gov ind jee A and 
Olivier M 'Chapter 6: Finding the boundary - the role of the cour ts in giv ing effect to socio-
economic rights in South Afr ica' in Osode PC & Glover G Law and transformative justice in 
post-apartheid South Africa (2010), 86, 87. 
266 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). The Court w a s faced wi th two key issues, first: whe the r the State 
w a s ent i t led to limit the provis ion of neviraphine, and secondly, whe ther the State had 
'devised and implemented wi th in it's avai lable resources a comprehens ive and coord inated 
p rog ramme to realise progress ive ly the rights of pregnant w o m a n and their ch i ldren to have 
access ' to such services. The Treatment Act ion Campa ign (TAC) made a publ ic cha l lenge 
regarding the State 's ' research and training' pol icy concern ing nev i raphine as an accepted 
antiretroviral. The CC held that the States l imited admin is ter ing pol icy w a s not ' inf lexible', and 
because it w a s a potent ial ly l i fesaving drug that could be admin is tered wi th in the States 
avai lable resources, such pol icy w a s unreasonable . 
267 Mbazi ra M and Sloth-Nie lsen J ' Incey-wincey spider went c l imbing up again -
Prospects for const i tut ional (re) interpretat ion of sect ion 28(1)(c) of the South Afr ican 
Const i tut ion in the next decade of democracy ' (2007) 22 Speculum Juris,146. 
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In respect of the above-mentioned judgments, the author submits that the CC, 
although yet to determine a matter regarding the implementation of 
reproductive health rights in South Africa, has presented us with some 
tentative guidelines to assist when determining if section 27 has in fact been 
infringed. 
In light of the above, the author does however submit that in respect of access 
to surrogacy-enabling medical procedures such as artificial fertilisation, it 
cannot be said to be a 'desperate need' which, at this point in time, 
necessitates the State to 'devise, fund, implement and supervise measures' to 
progressively achieve access for all. As was concluded in chapter two, taking 
into account the limitations clause, the failure by the State to provide 
immediate access to methods of assisted reproduction (specifically surrogacy 
enabling methods such as artificial fertilisation) is arguably not a limitation on 
our right to access to reproductive health. With reference to the above-
mentioned judgments, the State has limited resources and their duty only 
extends to progressively realising access to reproductive health services 
within available resources. Despite the fact that South Africa has a low fertility 
rate and that the procedure of artificial fertilisation is expensive, immediate 
access to surrogacy-enabling medical procedures cannot, at a point when the 
State has yet to get a grips on other reproductive health issues such as the 
combating of HIV/Aids, be seen to be a 'desperate need' which requires 
immediate implementation. 
The State has taken measures and implemented legislation which affirms the 
right to make decisions regarding reproduction and which are progressively 
realising our right to access to reproductive health services.268 Nonetheless, I 
submit that failure to implement policies and introduce legal mechanisms 
which would provide immediate access to methods of assisted reproduction is 
not an unwarranted limitation on the right to access to reproductive health. 
Within the limited resources of the State, the State's obligation to introduce 
such policies must be proportionate to the means. The State is required 
268 An example of such legislat ion wou ld be the CTOP. 
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merely to progressively realise the right to reproductive health, and it is my 
submission, that at this point, access to methods of artificial fertilisation is not 
a desperate need which requires immediate attention. 
3.10 Conclusion 
This chapter has reflected that the application of Chapter 19 of the Act has 
varying results on the rights of all the parties to surrogacy agreements. 
Although it can be said that Chapter 19 of the Act provides the necessary 
framework for the legalisation and recognition of valid surrogacy agreements 
in South Africa, a number of the provisions of Chapter 19 impose stringent 
limitations on the rights of the contracting parties. All the provisions which 
were examined were found to impose unwarranted limitations on the rights of 
the respective parties. 
In addition to this, this chapter has illustrated that the legislature has been 
remiss in its task: it has failed to recognise cultural surrogacy as a form of 
assisted reproduction and in this, has failed to afford the parties of cultural 
surrogacy agreements the same protection which is afforded to other 
categories of persons who make use of formal surrogacy as a form of 
assisted reproduction. Not only does this have implications regarding the 
enforceability of the agreements, but it also does not uphold the principle of 
the best interests of the child and it can lead to criminal sanctions if cultural 
parties choose to continue to practice cultural surrogacy. 
A further omission on the part of the legislature was failing to include a 
provision which provides that would be surrogate mothers would be subjected 
to a maximum age restriction. In this, the legislature has neglected to 
acknowledge that older women are more prone to experience risks as a result 
of pregnancy and childbirth than their younger counterparts, and 
consequently, not only does this have implications for the health of the 
surrogate and the child, but this may also have an impact on the outcome of 
the agreement. 
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Although it is an immense achievement when a country can recognise that 
assisted reproductive arrangements such as surrogate motherhood exist and 
that these agreements require regulation for purposes of legal certainty, it is 
nevertheless distressing that when faced with such a big issue (ethically, 
morally and legally) the legislature fell short of what was required to draft 
constitutionally adequate legislation. 
Therefore the author submits that Chapter 19 does not in every respect fulfil 
its purpose. The author respectfully agrees that only commissioning parents 
who are permanently and irreversibly unable to conceive and give birth should 
be permitted to enter valid surrogacy agreements, and, similarly the author 
concurs that it will be in the best interests of all parties concerned if the child 
born of the agreement is genetically related to at least one of his/her 
commissioning parents. However, as a whole, Chapter 19 does not in fully 
recognise the right to make decisions regarding reproduction. 
The subject of enforceability of the agreements was briefly discussed in 
paragraphs 3.5.2.1, 3.6.1 and 3.6.2 above. Nonetheless the impact of the 
enforceability of surrogacy agreements on amongst others, the right to make 
decisions regarding reproduction, does necessitate further examination. 
Consequently the focus now turns to the contractual aspects of surrogacy in 
South Africa. 
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CHAPTER FOUR: 
THE CONTRACTUAL IMPACT OF CHAPTER 19 OF THE ACT 
'If there is one th ing more than another wh ich publ ic pol icy requires, it is that men of full 
age and competen t unders tand ing shal l have the utmost l iberty in contract ing, and their 
contracts, w h e n entered into f reely and voluntar i ly, shal l be held sacred and shal l be 
enforced by Courts of Just ice' .2 6 9 
4.1 Introduction 
The Bill of Rights recognises and protects, amongst others, individual 
freedom, equality, dignity and the right to engage in economic activity.270 
Many of these values, albeit in a different appearance, are innate to the law of 
contract in respect of the freedom to contract, enforceability of obligations and 
reasonableness.271 
The law of contract revolves around the 'unconditional' twin principles of pacta 
servanda sunt and the freedom to contract. In simple terms, these two 
principles imply that the obligations arising out of contracts must be 
enforceable and that the parties are not restricted as to the terms upon which 
they contract.272 'Absolute freedom of contract...apparently means a meeting 
of free wills where neither party acts under the pressure of external forces'.273 
Regrettably these two principles only exist in an illusory world. Both principles 
are subject to the 'values of society' and are affected by the substantial 
269 Barnard AJ A critical legal argument for contractual justice in the South Africa law of 
contract (unpubl ished LLD thesis, Universi ty of Pretoria, 2005), 83. 
270 Sect ion 22 of the Const i tut ion prov ides that 'every ci t izen has the right to choose their 
t rade, occupat ion or profess ion freely. The pract ice of trade, occupat ion or profession may be 
regulated by law.' 
27 Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 12; Du Bois F and 
Others Wille's principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 8. 
272 Brisley v Drotsky 2002 (4) SA 1 (SCA); Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA) ; Magna 
Alloys and Research (SA) (Pty) Ltd v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A). Van der Merwe S and Others 
Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 12; Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of South 
African Law 9ed (2007), 737; Kerr AJ The principles of the law of contract 6ed (2002), 8,129. 
273 Kerr AJ The principles of the law of contract 6ed (2002), 8. 
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inroads created by legislation and judicial decisions which establish 
limitations.274 
'The rules of the law of contract reflect the at tempts in the legal sys tem to ach ieve a 
ba lance be tween relevant pr inciples and pol ic ies so as to sat isfy prevai l ing percept ions 
of just ice and fa i rness. . . the very pr inciples of moral or soc io-economic expediency, 
wh ich wil l in many c i rcumstances support a pol icy favour ing the exact en forcement of 
contracts f reely entered into by consent ing part ies, may in part icular c i rcumstances 
require that less weight be a t tached to the ideals of individual au tonomy and f reedom of 
275 
act ion. ' 
Taking the above into consideration, the author intends to submit that Chapter 
19 of the Act, which brought about the legal recognition of surrogacy in South 
Africa, is in itself legislation which substantially limits the absolute freedom 
and enforceability of contracts. Parties are not free to decide with whom they 
wish to contract, upon the terms on which they wish to contract nor can it be 
said that the contractual obligations are wholly enforceable. 
In the case of breach of contract and the remedies which are provided by the 
general law of contract, the author intends to show that surrogacy 
agreements, unlike ordinary contracts, although they possess the usual 
requirements of a valid contract, are not 'ordinary' in the sense of general 
contract law. In the case of a surrogacy contract, breach and the issue of 
enforceability must be viewed from a different perspective. Surrogacy 
contracts are not contracts which deal with everyday objects or ordinary 
performance, surrogacy agreements are sui generis contracts. When a 
dispute arises out of a surrogacy agreement, we are faced with conflicting 
human rights and human interests. I intend to show that in the event of 
breach, the remedies provided by the general law of contract will not suffice. 
Nonetheless, before we reach that point in this research, it is first necessary 
274 The recent promulgat ion of the Nat iona l Credit Act 3 4 of 2005 and the Nat iona l Consumer 
Protect ion Act 68 of 2008 have restr icted the r ights of part ies to such an extent that in some 
c i rcumstances, it is not the part ies to the contract , but the legislature that de termines the 
te rms of the contract and the repercuss ions for breach. 
275 Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 11. 
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to determine whether surrogacy agreements are valid contracts for the 
purposes of contract law. 
In determining whether a South African surrogacy agreement is in fact a valid 
and wholly enforceable contract, one has to start off with the basic principles 
and mechanisms of contract law. 
4.2 Cornerstones of a contract 
Contracts are legally binding agreements which comprise of the following 
seven essential elements:276 
i) agreement to performance or non-performance, 
ii) capacity to contract, 
iii) intention, 
iv) possibility of performance, 
v) certainty, 
vi) formality, and 
vii) absence of illegality. 
In the subsequent paragraphs, the author will examine the above-mentioned 
requirements and at the same time, determine whether a surrogacy 
agreement meets the requirements of a valid contract in terms of the general 
law of contract. 
4.2.1 Capacity 
The requirement of capacity requires that the parties entering the agreement 
must be capable of contracting.277 The capacity of persons to enter into legal 
276 The fo l lowing requ i rements are necessary in the conc lus ion of a cont ract : 1) part ies must 
agree to per form or not per form; 2) part ies must possess the requisi te cont ractua l capaci ty , 3) 
part ies must have the intent ion to be bound (animus contrahendi); 4) the per fo rmance or non-
per fo rmance must be possib le; 5) the te rms of the contract must be ascer ta ined or readily 
ascer ta inable; 6) the contract must be absent of i l legality and 7) the contract must fulfi l the 
part icular requ i rements of formal i ty. Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of South African 
Law 9ed (2007), 736-772; Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed 
(2007), 19-54; Kerr AJ The principles of the law of contract 6ed (2002); Treitel G H An outline 
of the law of contract 6ed (2004), 1. 
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transactions is determined by the law of persons where a distinction is made 
between no capacity to act, limited capacity to act and full capacity to act.278 
In the case of surrogacy agreements, the capacity of the contractant is 
determined by section 295 of the Act which stipulates the suitability 
requirements necessary to become a party to the agreement. 
4.2.2 Agreement, intention and certainty 
Once it has been determined that the parties to the contract possess the 
necessary capacity to contract, it will then be determined if the parties agree 
to performance or non performance, whether they intend to be bound by the 
obligations arising out of the agreement as well as if they are certain as to 
their legal obligations which will arise out of the operation of the contract. 
Hence these three requirements will be simultaneously examined. 
When parties enter into a contract they agree to performance or non-
performance, they intend their agreement to give rise to contractual 
obligations and in so agreeing, they intend to be bound by such contractual 
agreement (they have animus contrahendi).279 In addition to agreement and 
intention, the parties to the contract must clearly define the legal 
consequences which will arise out of the contract i.e. they must be certain as 
to what their respective obligations will be. An agreement which does not 
exhaustively delineate the obligations of the parties may nevertheless still be 
valid if adequate provision is made for determination at a later stage.280 
277 Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 853. 
278 An example of persons wi th no capac i ty to act wou ld be an infans. Prodigals and minors 
are examp les of persons w h o have l imited capac i ty to act and adul ts, persons over the age of 
18 years are p resumed to have full capaci ty. Boezaar t T Law of Persons (2010), 7. 
279 The part ies must agree on the consequences they w ish to create, must be aware of the 
agreement and must intend to bind themse lves legally. Bosman v Prokureursorde van 
Traansvaal 1984 (2) SA 384 (W); Bourbon-Leftley v WPK (Landbou) Bpk 1999 (1) SA 902 
(C). Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 23. 
280 For example , part ies may include a c lause in their contract that says the price of the 
product wh ich is to be sold f rom contractant A to contractant B at X date will be 0.2 t imes the 
market va lue of that product on X date. Burroughs Machines Ltd v Chenille Corporation of SA 
(Pty) Ltd 1964 (1) SA 669; Westinghouse Brake & Equipment (Pty) Ltd v Bilger Engineering 
(Pty) Ltd 1986 (2) SA 555 (A); Shell SA (Pty) Ltd v Corbitt 1986 (4) SA 523 (C); Genac 
Properties Jhb (Pty) Ltd v NBC Administrators CC 1992 (1) SA 566 (A). Van der Merwe S and 
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4.2.2.1 Offer and acceptance 
Very often, prior to the coming into existence of a contract, there will be an 
offer (an invitation to consent to the creation of obligations between the 
parties) and a corresponding unequivocal acceptance (affirmative response) 
to the offer.281 Generally contracts come into existence where consensus is 
reached i.e. as soon as the offeree accepts the offer by the offeror.282 An offer 
must contain an affirmation of intention which sets out the essential and 
material terms of the proposed contract. The degree of such affirmation must 
be that mere acceptance will render the legal consequences of the contract 
ascertained or readily ascertainable.283 An offer in itself does not give rise to 
contractual rights and obligations, it merely gives rise to an expectation or 
spes (promise) of a future right. Only once acceptance has occurred does the 
agreement convert into a contract which confers legal accountability.284 An 
effective acceptance is one which corresponds with the terms as provided for 
in the offer.285 
At the commencement of the 'negotiations', all of the parties are made 
candidly conscious of what a surrogate motherhood agreement entails. The 
surrogate mother agrees to undergo artificial fertilisation, gestate the unborn 
child and upon birth, relinquish all rights and responsibilities towards that child 
to the commissioning parent(s). In exchange, the commissioning parent(s) 
agree to compensate the surrogate for all the necessary expenses involved in 
Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 225, 226, 227; Kahn E et al Principles of the 
law of Sale & Lease (2008), 12, 13, 15; Kerr AJ The law of sale and lease 3ed (2004), 29, 34, 
35, 37, 55, 98, 245, 259. 
281 Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 54; Treitel G H An 
outline of the law of contract (2004), 7. 
282 Bloom v The American Swiss Watch Company 1915 A D 100; Seeff Commercial & 
Industrial Properties (Pty) Ltd v Silberman 2001 (3) SA 952 (SCA) ; Ideal Fastener Corporation 
CC v Book Vision (Pty) Ltd t/a Colour Graphic 2001 (3) SA 1028 (D). Van der Merwe S and 
Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 55; Christ ie RH The law of contract in South 
Africa 3ed (1996), 29. 
283 Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 57; Kerr AJ The 
principles of the law of contract 6ed (2002), 64. 
284 Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 59; Kerr AJ The 
principles of the law of contract 6ed (2002), 63. 
285 Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 62; Christ ie RH The 
law of contract in South Africa 3ed (1996), 60, 64; Treitel GH An outline of the law of contract 
6ed (2004), 10; Kerr AJ The principles of the law of contract 6ed (2002), 71. 
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the artificial fertilisation procedure and the pregnancy as well as to accept the 
child as their own upon birth. Nevertheless, in the case of South Africa, a 
surrogate motherhood agreement only becomes binding upon the parties 
once the Court has confirmed such contract which is formulated in a court 
order. As a result, the legal rights and obligations that emanate from a 
surrogacy contract are by no means immediately and automatically 
enforceable.286 
4.2.3 Possibility of performance 
Even after the parties have agreed to performance, have agreed to be bound 
to the legal obligations arising out of the contract and are certain as to the 
obligations which are imposed, such contract will not come into being if the 
performance or non-performance to which the parties have agreed to is not 
possible. If the performance to which they have agreed to is wholly impossible 
i.e. no other person in the position of the debtor will be able to fulfil the 
obligations, then the agreement is void ab initio and all legal obligations will 
cease to exist.287 
Possibility of performance may arise out of a surrogacy agreement if, after the 
parties have agreed to performance, the surrogate falls pregnant with her 
partners child. In the ordinary law of contract, if the creditor is able to find 
another debtor to fulfil the original debtor's contractual obligations, the original 
debtor will be guilty of breach and liable to the creditor. However, in the case 
of surrogacy agreements, the agreement only becomes a valid and 
286 In the instance of an ord inary contract , whe re a d ispute ar ises as to whe the r the part ies to 
the ag reement possessed the necessary intention to be bound, a dist inct ion wi l l have to be 
d rawn be tween impl ied and express terms. In the case of impl ied terms, 'the court must be 
able to conc lude wi th conf idence that the part ies intended to create contractual obl igat ions' . 
The onus rests on the par ty al leging the ex is tence of the contract . In the case of express 
terms, it is the party deny ing the ex is tence of the contract w h o has to d ischarge the onus of 
proof. Treitel G H An outline of the law of contract 6ed (2004), 58; Kerr AJ The principles of 
the law of contract 6ed (2002), 4, 41; Christ ie RH The law of contract in South Africa 3ed 
21996), 29, 30-33. 
87 However , if the inabil i ty to per form is as a result of the debtor him/hersel f , th is wil l not 
automat ica l ly amount to an impossibi l i ty of per formance. The impossibi l i ty wil l have to be 
de termined f rom an object ive v iewpoint i.e if another person wil l be able to fulfil the debtors 
obl igat ion then the original debtor wil l be liable for breach. Du Bois F and Others Wille's 
principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 751, 2. 
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enforceable contract upon confirmation by the Court, and thus if the 
impossibility to perform arises before the agreement is confirmed and before it 
becomes a legally valid and enforceable agreement, the author presupposes 
that this would not amount to breach because there is no valid agreement. In 
view of the commissioning parents, it can be submitted that a reasonable 
likelihood exists that the commissioning parents will find another surrogate to 
gestate their child. 
Once the agreement has been confirmed, in accordance with the general 
principles of the law of contract, the author submits that the surrogate could 
be liable for breach. However the Act does not make provision for such 
possibility and further examination will thus be carried out regarding this 
submission in paragraph 4.3.5.2 below (prevention of performance). 
4.2.4 Legality and Public Policy 
After all of the above mentioned requirements are met it then becomes 
necessary to determine if the agreement and/or the obligations which arise 
from are legal, because illegal agreements do not constitute enforceable 
contracts. Illegality is present when the actual conclusion of the agreement is 
illegal, or the performance in terms of the agreement is illegal, or where the 
objective of the contract is prohibited by legislation or common law.288 
4.2.4.1 Statutory illegality 
The voidability of contracts which contravene a statute will be dependant on 
the statute concerned. In some cases, the party who belongs to the class for 
whose benefit the statute was intended can choose whether to abide or resile 
from the contract, whereas in other cases, contravention renders the contract 
288 Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 760; Treitel GH 
An outline of the law of contract 6ed (2004), 184; Christ ie RH The law of contract in South 
Africa 3ed (1996), 382- 4. 
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null and void and no opportunity for enforcement exists.289 More often than 
not, the statute itself will specify the penalties applicable to contravention.290 
4.2.4.1.1 The effect of statutory illegality on the rights of the parties to the 
surrogacy agreement 
In respect of surrogacy agreements, Section 305 of the Act stipulates the 
prescribed offences for when an agreement or any conduct arising out of such 
agreement is contrary to the Act. Persons who contravene section 301 - 303 
will be liable for a fine and/or imprisonment of a period not exceeding 10 
years. In the general law of contract, any act carried out in contravention of a 
statutory provision will have the effect of being null and void. 291 
The Act does not however provide details concerning the effect of illegality on 
the agreement itself. It is submitted that it is unclear whether such agreements 
are void ab initio (never came into existence), invalid (and then the same 
consequences of invalidity would apply) or whether the opportunity exists for 
parties to rectify their contravention and continue with the agreement as if the 
contravention never occurred. 
For example, in terms of section 296, no person may artificially fertilise a 
woman in terms of a surrogate agreement before the confirmation of the 
agreement or after 18 months from confirmation. Section 303 provides that 
artificial fertilisation not authorised by the Court is an offence and punishable 
in terms of section 301. In this respect, one could presuppose that artificial 
fertilisation after 19 months would be in contravention of the Act, and similarly, 
so would be artificial fertilisation before the agreement is confirmed. The effect 
289 Cape Dairy & General Livestock Auctioneers v Sim 1924 A D 167; Standard Bank of SA 
Ltd v Essop 1997 (4) SA 569 (D). Christ ie RH The law of contract in South Africa 3ed (1996), 
377-8. 
290 For example, Drugs and Drug Traf f ick ing Act 140 of 1992, Tobacco Products Contro l Act 
12 of 1999, Sect ion 10(1)(a)(b) C T O P and Sect ion 14 Sexual Of fences Act 23 of 1957. 
291 This is not a hard and fast rule. The court wil l cons ider the subject matter of the prohibi t ion, 
the purpose of the legislat ion, the avai lable remedies in the case of breach, the nature of the 
mischief the provis ion a imed to avoid, and any inconvenience that may f low f rom f inding that 
the agreement is invalid. Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of South African Law 9ed 
(2007), 761. 
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of such contravention and the subsequent illegality is not stipulated in terms of 
the Act. 
The ordinary principles of contract law provide that when an agreement is 
illegal, the agreement itself has no legal effect and is void. The parties to the 
contract are not permitted to bring an action founded on the contract and are 
thus not entitled to claim specific performance and/or damages or cancellation 
and/ or damages.292 However, if one party has 'innocently' performed in terms 
of an illegal agreement, that party may be able to claim relief in the form of 
unjustified enrichment, unless such party is of 'equal guilt'.293 
Hence it can be submitted that, although it is not expressly provided for in the 
Act, any surrogacy agreement which is either entered into in contravention of 
the Act, or any conduct which flows out of such agreement which amounts to 
a contravention, would result in the agreement being void. The parties will not 
be able to rely on any remedy as provided for in terms of the general law of 
contract and, only in the case where only one of the parties were 'guilty', could 
the other party rely on unjustified enrichment to recover that which he/she has 
performed.294 However, the law of unjustified enrichment provides that you 
can recover your performance or, if not possible, recover the monetary value 
of the performance and taking this into consideration I submit, as it will be 
argued later, that in the case of a surrogacy agreement, return of performance 
or a claim for the monetary value thereof will not adequately redress the harm 
or loss suffered as a result of performing in terms of the agreement. 
4.2.4.2 Common law illegality 
292 Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 768, 769 
293 W h e n part ies to an il legal agreement are of equal guilt they are prohib i ted by w a y of the 
par delictum rule f rom recover ing any of the per fo rmance that they have made. Thus if both 
the part ies to the il legal agreement w e r e aware that the agreement const i tuted an il legal 
agreement , nei ther party may at a later s tage c la im f rom the other recovery of any 
per fo rmance made. Jajbhay v Cassim 1939 A D 537; Essop v Abdullah 1986 (4) SA 11 (C); 
Jordaan v Penmill Investments CC 1991 (2) SA 430 (E). Du Bois F and Others Wille's 
principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 769. 
294 Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 769. 
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When the purpose of the agreement and/or the performance required therein 
is seen to be opposed to the interests of the state, to the interests of justice or 
to the interests of the public, the agreement is regarded as one which is 
against public policy.295 What constitutes public policy or the interests of the 
public varies from time to time as the opinions of generations vary. Today, the 
'appropriate norms of the value system embodied in the Constitution' provides 
the basic frame of reference'.296 Those agreements which interfere with the 
full exercise of a person's right or have the clear expected tendency to bring 
about a state of affairs which the law sees as harmful are regarded as 
agreements which are against public policy.297 In any event, our courts are 
required always 'when interpreting any legislation, and when developing any 
common law or customary l a w . [to] promote the spirit, purport and object of 
the Bill of Rights'.298 
In the 2007 case of Barkhuizen v Napier, the CC held public policy to 
encapsulate the following meaning: 
'Public pol icy imports the notion of fa i rness, just ice and reasonableness. Public pol icy 
wou ld prec lude the enforcement of cont ractua l te rms if its en fo rcement wou ld be unjust 
or unfair. Public pol icy, it should be recal led, is the genera l sense of just ice of the 
communi ty , the boni mores, mani fes ted in public opinion. '2 9 9 
If the agreement offends one's conscience or sense of morality, such 
agreement is contra bonos mores or contrary to the legal convictions of 
society.300 There is no clear-cut distinction between agreements which are 
against public policy and those which conflict with societies' convictions. In 
Eastwood v Shepstone 1902 TS 294, the court noted that it was not 
295 Richards v Guardian Assurance Co. 1907 T H 24; Sasfin (Pty) Ltd v Beukes 1989 (1) SA 1 
(A); Juglal NO v Shoprite Checkers t/a OK Franchise Division 2004 (5) SA 1 (A). Christ ie RH 
The law of contract in South Africa 3ed (1996), 384. 
296 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC); Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of 
South African Law 9ed (2007), 763; Treitel GH An outline of the law of contract 6ed (2004), 
188. 
297 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC); Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of 
South African Law 9ed (2007), 765. 
298 Sect ion 39(2) of the Const i tut ion. 
299 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) 
300 1902 T S 294 302. Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of South African Law 9ed 
(2007), 768. 
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necessary to classify contracts which are contrary to common law or contrary 
to public policy or contra boni mores. The court held that: 
' . [ t h e court ] has the power to treat as vo id and to refuse in any w a y to recognise 
contracts and t ransact ions wh ich are against public pol icy or contrary to good m o r a l s . 
once it is c lear that any ar rangement is against publ ic pol icy, [the court] wou ld be 
want ing in [its] duty if [it] hesi tated to declare such ar rangement void. [One must] look at 
the t endency of the p roposed t ransact ion, not its actual ly proved result. '301 
Taking the above into consideration, it can be submitted that whether or not 
we choose to deal with public policy and good morals as one form of illegality 
or as separate forms, they are both in the process of being made redundant 
by the 'appropriate norms of the objective value system embodied in the 
Constitution'.302 The core principles of equality, human dignity and freedom, 
as well as the limitations clause present us with a coherent system with which 
to determine whether or not the interests of society, the interests of justice or 
the boni mores have in any way been offended. In addition to the supreme 
law are the decisions by the CC which may assist us in determining what 
agreement is appropriate and just and what is not. As the opinions of people 
change daily and from generation to generation, the CC provides us with an 
up-to-date objective value system to assist in determining whether or not an 
agreement or the actual purpose thereof is illegal in terms of our common law. 
In the heavily criticised judgment of Barkhuizen v Napier, a divided CC held 
that, on the basis that public policy had to be determined with reference to the 
Constitution, a time bar clause which had been incorporated into the short 
term insurance contract prohibiting the applicant from legally challenging a 
decision on the part of the insurer not to pay, unless the applicant had 
instituted the claim within 90 days after the rejection of the insurer, to be in 
accordance with public policy, accordingly reasonable and fair and resultantly 
enforceable.303 Although in this case the applicant could not provide sufficient 
evidence as to why he had failed to comply with the time clause, the CC 
3 0 Christ ie RH The law of contract in South Africa 3ed (1996), 384, 385. 
302 Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 768. 
303 2007 (5) SA 232 (CC). 
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reasoned that in ordinary circumstances, it would be inconceivable to deny 
the applicant a claim when his reasons for non-compliance with the clause 
were caused by factors beyond his control.304 
The effect of such judgment for contract law as a whole is that 'for the first 
time, it will be necessary to analyse the circumstances under which the 
claimant failed to exercise his/her rights within the relevant time limits'.305 In 
effect, this case means that 'the notion that people should almost always be 
allowed to contract as they wished - regardless of whether its terms operated 
unfairly or harshly against one party - is no longer the case.'306 
4.2.4.2.1 The effect of common law illegality on the rights of the parties to the 
surrogacy agreement 
In light of the above, surrogacy contracts in themselves may perhaps be seen 
by many to be against public policy and contra bonis mores. The SALC and 
the AHPC dealt exhaustively with the ethical and moral issues of surrogacy in 
their 1991 Report and a detailed examination thereof would exceed the scope 
of this research. Nevertheless this research does necessitate some form of 
investigation into the 'common law illegality' aspects of surrogacy. 
In paragraph 4.2.4.2 above, it was submitted that it is no longer required that 
common law illegality be categorised into agreements which are opposed to 
304 In the SCA case, reported as Napier v Barkhuizen 2006 (4) SA 1 (SCA), the court also 
held that a t ime c lause did not v io late the te rms of the Const i tut ion. The matter w a s on appeal 
f rom the Pretoria High Court w h o had dec ided that the respect ive t ime c lause v io lated sect ion 
34 of the Const i tut ion in that it p revented the c la imant f rom approach ing a court to seek 
sui table redress, as wel l as it w a s against public pol icy. 
305 Chron is M 'Barkhuizen and Napier revisi ted - Not the final w o r d by the Const i tut ional 
Court ' (June 2007) Deneys Reitz genera l case law update 
http://denysreitz.caselaw.barkhuizenandnapier-not-the-final-word-by-the-constitutional-court 
accessed on 20 Apri l 2011; Meir ing I 'Const i tut ional i ty of a t ime- l imi tat ion c lause in a contract : 
Barkhu izen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC)' http://www. itine ws. co.za/print. aspx?type=2&i... 
3accessed on 21 Apri l 2011). 
06 De Vos P 'F reedom of contract no more: South Afr ica 's Const i tut ional Court and the 
hor izontal appl icat ion of the Bill of Rights' (February 2009) http:///www. thecourt. ca/... freedom-
of-contract-no-more/south-africa's-constitutional-court-and-the-horizontal-application-of-the-
bil-of-rights (accessed on 21 Apri l 2011) ; De Vos P 'Const i tut ional ly speaking: R.I.P pacta 
sunt servanda' (April 2007) http://www.constitutionallyspeaking.co.za/rip-pacts-sunt-servanda 
(accessed on 20 Apri l 2011). 
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the interests of the state, interests of justice, interests of the public or those 
which are contra boni mores. After 17 years of constitutional supremacy, we 
are able to determine so-called common law illegality with the aid of the 
Constitution, the limitations clause and judicial precedent. Any agreement 
which itself purports to be opposed to the full exercise of one's constitutionally 
entrenched rights, or has the expected tendency to bring about a state of 
affairs which the law sees as harmful or offends one's conscience or morality 
can be held to be illegal in terms of the common law. 
A surrogate motherhood agreement is an agreement between a surrogate 
mother and a commissioning parent(s) whereby the surrogate agrees to be 
artificially fertilised for the purpose of bearing a child for the commissioning 
parent(s).307 In this respect the surrogate is exercising her right to make 
decisions regarding reproduction. Surrogacy itself is a form of assisted 
reproduction which gives effect to this right on the part of the commissioning 
parents. The fact that surrogacy has sometimes been described as womb-
leasing or baby trading is inaccurate (further argument in support of this 
statement will be provided in paragraph 4.6 below: commercial surrogacy). If 
surrogacy was illegal in terms of our common law, and more importantly, if 
surrogacy was in conflict with the rights as contained in the Constitution, 
Chapter 19 would not be in existence. The effect of Chapter 19 is that 
surrogate motherhood has been recognised by Parliament as a form of 
assisted reproduction. In this respect it is submitted that the practice of 
surrogacy itself is not in conflict with the interests of the public, state, justice or 
contra boni mores: chapter 19 gives expression to the needs, desires and 
interests of many to found a family and make decisions regarding 
reproduction.308 
307 For the full def ini t ion see sect ion 1(1) of the Act. 
308 A l though the pract ice of sur rogacy has been submi t ted to not be cont rary to c o m m o n law, 
there may be te rms incorporated into the individual sur rogacy agreement wh ich could amount 
to be in confl ict wi th the c o m m o n law. For example, a te rm wh ich st ipulates that the surrogate 
mother must live in sol i tary conf inement dur ing the p regnancy may not only amount to an 
unwarranted l imitat ion on her right to f reedom, but in addi t ion to this, sol i tary conf inement of 
the surrogate mother may not be held to be in the interests of the publ ic, the state, just ice or 
the boni mores. 
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4.2.5 Formalities 
Once the requirements of capacity, agreement, intention, certainty, possibility 
and legality are fulfilled, the agreement must then conform to the required 
formalities. Contracts can take the form of written agreements with express 
and implied terms or alternatively, contracts can be entered into orally. Some 
contracts, such as deeds of sale and antenuptial contracts must be notarially 
executed.309 Formalities can be imposed by the contractants themselves 
and/or by statute.310 In the case of surrogacy contracts, the formalities 
required for confirmation are stipulated in sections 292 and 293 of the Act. 
The contract will only be legally enforceable upon confirmation by the High 
Court with the necessary jurisdiction. The contract must be signed by all the 
parties and must be entered into in South Africa. Upon entering into the 
agreement, at least one of the commissioning parents and the surrogate must 
be domiciled in South Africa.311 Where the commissioning parent and/or 
surrogate are married or involved in a permanent life partnership, the spouse 
or partner of the relevant party must provide his or her written consent.312 
In addition to the formal requirements stated above, the substantive 
requirements of suitability and competency must also be present before the 
High Court will confirm the contract (these requirements were 
comprehensively examined in Chapter 2 and 3). 
309 Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 759; Christ ie RH 
The law of contract in South Africa 3ed (1996), 142. 
310 For example, The Al ienat ion of Land Act 68 of 1981 requires the al ienat ion of all land to be 
in wr i t ing and s igned by the part ies or their respect ive agents. The Nat ional Credit Act 34 of 
2005 requires all credit ag reements to be in a documen ta ry format, to comp ly w i th the var ious 
requ i rements as set out in the Act and to be de l ivered to the consumer in the prescr ibed 
manner . Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 163, 164; 
Christ ie RH The law of contract in South Africa 3ed (1996), 122. 
311 The inclusion of the domic i le restr ict ion is to purpor ted ly reduce the l ikel ihood of foreign 
nat ionals seek ing surrogate mothers in South Afr ica. On good cause shown, the court may 
d ispense wi th the requi rement that the surrogate be domic i led in South Afr ica upon 
c o m m e n c e m e n t of the contract . Louw A Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood in Davel CJ and 
Skel ton A Commentary on the Children's Act 38 of 2005 (2007), 19-18. 
312 Sect ion 293(3) prov ides that if the surrogate is not the genet ic parent of the chi ld to be 
born of the agreement , and the spouse or par tner unreasonab ly w i thho lds his or her consent , 
the court may d ispense wi th this requi rement . 
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4.2.5.1 The effect of invalidity on the rights of the parties to the agreement 
In the case of a surrogacy agreement, once all the above mentioned 
requirements are present, the Court will be tasked with making a finding 
regarding the validity of the agreement. If the agreement is found to have met 
all the requirements, the Court will make an order reflecting this. The effect of 
a valid and enforceable surrogacy agreement is that it is legally binding on all 
the parties to the agreement, and as it was stated in chapter 3, the child which 
will be born of the agreement will be seen as a child born of the 
commissioning parents. 
However, if the agreement is found not to be in accordance with the Act and is 
resultantly invalid, the effects of such invalidity would be as follows. First, any 
surrogacy agreement which is not confirmed by the High Court is not 
considered as a valid and enforceable contract and has the effect that if a 
dispute were to arise at a later stage, the parties cannot rely on the contents 
of the agreement to protect their legal positions. Secondly, the effect of an 
invalid surrogacy agreement will be in accordance with the common law 
position which identifies the woman who gave birth to the child as the legal 
mother.313 
An example of conduct which could invalidate the contract would be if the 
surrogate was artificial fertilised before the application for confirmation. The 
result of such invalidity would be that any child born of that invalid surrogacy 
agreement will be for all purposes the child of the surrogate, whether or not 
such child has a genetic relation with the commissioning parent(s). Thus, no 
parental rights and responsibilities will be conferred on the commissioning 
parents. The only avenue available to the commissioning parents (to acquire 
the child as their own) is to apply for the adoption of the child. However, 
without a valid agreement, the commissioning parents have no leverage to 
313 The c o m m o n law posi t ion is encapsu la ted in the max im mater simper certa est: ' the effect 
o f . a n invalid surrogate motherhood agreement [is that it] wi l l reinstate the ord inary rules to 
de termine the status of the chi ld and the acquis i t ion parental responsibi l i t ies and r i g h t s . [and 
such parental responsibi l i t ies and rights] wil l ves t . . . in the surrogate mother w h o gave birth to 
the child'. Louw A S Acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights (unpubl ished LLD thesis, 
Universi ty of Pretoria, 2009), 357, 359. 
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compel the surrogate to relinquish the child, and in this respect, to consent to 
the child's respective adoption. 
Making use of the same example of pre-emptive fertilisation, invalidity may 
have the effect that the commissioning parents change their mind and no 
longer want to have the child as their own. Thus an additional consequence of 
invalidity could be that the surrogate may be burdened with a child which she 
never intended to have. The outcome of this is that the child will be 'unwanted' 
and will more than likely be raised in a home where he/she is unwelcome. 
Where the surrogate is in a relationship it is unclear whether her partner will 
have to assume parental rights and responsibilities towards the child born of 
the agreement as well. There exists a dreadful possibility that the surrogate 
may die, the commissioning parents do not want the child and the partner of 
the surrogate finds him/herself in the position where he/she must now raise a 
child on his/her own. 
In chapter two, paragraph 2.2.2.7, the requirement that the partner of the 
surrogate must consent to the agreement was discussed. It was noted that 
section 293 (which provides for the consent of the partner of both the 
surrogate and the commissioning parent) provides that if a surrogate is 
married or involved in a permanent relationship, the court may not confirm the 
agreement unless the surrogate's husband or partner provides his/ her written 
consent and becomes a party to the agreement. 
With reference to the above, attention must be drawn to section 299 of the Act 
which deals with the effect of the termination of a surrogacy agreement. 
Section 299(c) provides that where the agreement is terminated, the 
surrogate and her husband/partner, if any, or if no surrogate and no partner, 
the commissioning father, are obliged to accept the obligation of parenthood. 
Effectively what this means is that if the agreement is terminated, and the 
surrogate has passed on or disappeared or does not want responsibility 
towards the child, the Act provides that the surrogate mother's husband or 
partner is obliged to accept parentage of the child born of the agreement. 
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Despite the fact that Dr Louw argues 'that the words "obliged to accept" in 
section 299(c) rules out [the] possibility [that the surrogate mother's husband 
or partner will have to accept parentage of the child]', the author submits that 
she disagrees. The word 'obliged' can have two meanings, first, to force, 
necessitate or to coerce and secondly, to please or indulge. In the author's 
opinion, section 299(c) does not ask the husband or the partner of the 
surrogate mother to think about taking on the parentage of the child born of 
the agreement, there is no request for gratification. In the author's opinion, 
section 299(c) places and obligation on the husband or partner of the 
surrogate to accept parentage of the child born of the agreement in the event 
of termination. If the husband or partner was not required to provide written 
consent to the agreement, then the author could submit that the word 'obliged 
to accept' could possibly amount to a request on the part of the legislature, 
nonetheless the husband or partner does become party to the agreement, 
and is, in terms of section 299(c) obligated to accept the parentage of the 
child born of the agreement in the event of invalidity.314 
After having considered the seven requirements of a general contract, it is 
apparent that a surrogacy agreement, whether expressly or impliedly stated, 
also necessitates that these requirements be met. Nonetheless, although the 
Act provides for penalties in the case of contravention of the Act, the Act does 
not implicitly state what effect the illegality will have on the continued 
existence of the agreement. The author submitted that the effect of an illegal 
surrogacy agreement will mean that the agreement is void, and all the legal 
consequences which have arisen out of the operation of such agreement will 
cease to exist. In this respect, it is further unknown what the effect an illegal 
surrogacy agreement will have on the positions of the parties to the 
agreement. Does illegality have the same legal consequences as invalidity i.e 
the surrogate is deemed the mother of the child born of the agreement? This 
is an important question, one which the answer cannot be found in the Act, 
and resultantly will be further considered in forthcoming paragraphs. 
314 Louw A S Acquisition of parental responsibilities and rights (unpubl ished LLD thesis, 
Universi ty of Pretoria, 2009) , 364. 
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4.3 Breach of Contract 
After having discussed the seven requirements of a contract and the effect of 
invalidity and illegality, the author will now commence with a general 
discussion regarding breach of contract. The purpose hereof is first, to 
determine if surrogacy agreements can be 'breached' in the ordinary sense of 
the word and secondly, if the remedies which are available to normal 
contractants in the matter of breach are available to the parties of a surrogacy 
agreement. 
Breach of contract has been said to encompass all acts of a contractant that 
infringe his/her co-contractants rights under the contract.315 There are three 
categories of breach namely: negative performance (delayed performance by 
the debtor or the creditor), positive malperformance (defective performance by 
the debtor or creditor) and anticipatory breach (either in the form of 
repudiation or prevention of performance).316 The act of breach entails 
wrongful conduct on the part of the guilty party. 
Before commencing an investigation into the types of breach it is foremost 
necessary to qualify what 'performance' entails in terms of a surrogate 
motherhood agreement. The surrogate mother agrees to perform as follows: 
she agrees to be artificially fertilised with the gametes of the commissioning 
parent, to gestate, if any, the foetus(es) which results from the fertilisation and 
to relinquish the child to the commissioning parents upon birth or as soon as 
reasonably possible thereafter. The fertile commissioning parent agrees to 
have his/her gamete used in the process of artificial fertilisation and then the 
commissioning parent(s) agree(s) to compensate the surrogate for all the 
necessary expenses incurred and to accept the child as his/her/their own 
upon birth or as reasonably soon thereafter. Cognisance must be taken of the 
fact that in the examples which are illustrated below, neither of the parties are 
assumed to take on the role of the creditor or debtor. The author has 
315 Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 326. 
316 Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 325; Kerr AJ The 
principles of the law of contract 6ed (2002), 575; Christ ie RH The law of contract in South 
Africa 3ed (1996), 571 -4; Trei tel GH An outline of the law of contract 6ed (2004), 369. 
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attempted, where possible, to formulate examples which both parties can take 
on either role i.e. in some case the surrogate will be the debtor and other the 
creditor and visa versa. 
4.3.1 Negative malperformance: Mora debitoris 
Having regard to the above, the first type of breach that can occur is that of 
negative performance. Negative performance can occur when the debtor fails 
to tender performance timeously or renders defective performance timeously 
which the creditor rejects.317 Mora can only occur where the performance is 
still possible despite the delay.318 Nevertheless, even if the debtor performs 
after being in delay for some time, such performance does not repair the 
breach and he/she can still be held liable for loss suffered.319 Notably, if 
performance becomes impossible after the debtor has fallen into mora, he/she 
will be guilty of prevention of performance.320 
4.3.1.1 Requirements of mora debitoris 
The debtor must have failed or omitted to perform timeously as agreed to in 
terms of the contract. The debtor's failure or omission will however only be 
wrongful if the obligation to perform had become due and enforceable, or 
where a time has not been stipulated, a reasonable time has elapsed.321 
In the case of a surrogacy agreement the parties may have committed breach 
in the form of mora debitoris as follows: the agreement may stipulate that the 
surrogate is to relinquish the child born of the agreement at birth or as soon 
thereafter as reasonably possible and the surrogate fails to do so. In this 
317 Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 338. 
318 Alfred McAlpine & Son (Pty) Ltd v Transvaal Provincial Administration 1977 (4) SA 310 (T). 
Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 338. 
319 Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 338. 
320 Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 346. 
321 Three forms of mora are possible, namely mora ex re, ex persona and ex lege. To give 
rise to mora ex re, 'a prec isely calculable ' or specif ic date must have been st ipulated. W h e n a 
contract does not st ipulate a t ime for per fo rmance, the credi tor must p lace his debtor in mora 
by w a y of demand ing per formance. Th is is known as mora ex persona. Mora ex lege is w h e n 
the debtor is p laced in mora by operat ion of the law. Broderick Properties Ltd v Rood 1962 (4) 
SA 447 (T). Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 339. 
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instance the surrogate will be in mora because she has failed to perform 
timeously. In respect of the male commissioning parent/ donor gamete, he 
may fail to timeously fertilise the ovum. 
4.3.2 Negative malperformance: Mora creditoris 
When a creditor wrongfully fails to render his/her co-operation to enable the 
debtor to perform, the creditor is placed in mora. Mora creditoris can occur 
before performance by the debtor is to occur or at the time when performance 
is to occur.322 If performance becomes impossible after the creditor is placed 
in mora, the creditor is liable.323 
4.3.2.1 Requirements of mora creditoris 
If a contract stipulates the exact time which a debtor must perform, or 
alternatively when the creditor has demanded performance by the debtor, that 
is the time when the creditor is obliged to cooperate and accept performance. 
If he or she fails to cooperate when required, he/she will be guilty of negative 
malperformance.324 
A commissioning parent will be in mora if, when the time arises for the 
surrogate to undergo the fertilisation procedure, the commissioning parent is 
unable to produce one of his/her gametes for conception. Similarly, the 
surrogate may be guilty of mora creditoris if, when the time arises for her to 
undergo fertilisation, and the gamete of the commissioning parent is ready 
and available for implantation, the surrogate does not make herself available 
for fertilisation. 
4.3.3 Positive malperformance: Debtor 
322 Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 372. 
323 Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 374. 
324 LTA Construction Ltd v Minister of Public Works & Land Affairs 1992 (1)SA 339; Nel v 
Cloete 1972 (2) SA 150 (A); Goldstein and Wolff v Maison Blanc (Pty) Ltd 1948 (4) SA 446 
(C). 
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The second type of breach is positive malperformance. For ease of reference 
the author has separated positive malperformance by a debtor and positive 
malperformance of a creditor. 
A debtor is in breach by way of positive malperformance if for example he/she 
performs defectively or conducts himself/herself in a manner which is contrary 
to contractual prohibition. In the case of positive malperformance, the 
performance is tendered, however, it is not in compliance with the terms of the 
contract.325 
4.3.3.1 Requirements of positive malperformance: Debtor 
The debtor must have performed and such performance must be defective. 
As a general rule, performance only becomes possible with the cooperation of 
the creditor.326 Defective performance is one that does not confirm to the 
united provisions of the contract.327 
Some parties to a surrogacy contract include clauses which refer to the 
negative obligations of the parties. For example, in my personal experience, I 
dealt with a situation where a couple wanted to include a clause providing that 
the surrogate was not permitted to smoke, drink or have sexual intercourse 
during the pregnancy.328 The effect of this clause was that the agreement 
would be breached if the surrogate chose to smoke, drink or have sexual 
intercourse. In this respect, a negative obligation was placed on the surrogate, 
whereby she would be guilty of positive malperformance if she carried out any 
325 Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 348. 
326 Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 350. 
327 Sweet v Ragerguhara 1978 (1) SA 131 (D); Shatz Investments (Pty) Ltd v Kalovyrnas 
1976 (2) SA 545; SA Sentrale Ko-op Graanmaatskapy Bpk v Shifren 1964 (4) SA 760 (A). 
Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 352. 
328 The first two acts w e r e unders tandable : medical pract i t ioners strongly advise against 
smok ing and dr ink ing dur ing pregnancy. However , the third act i.e. sexual intercourse dur ing 
the p regnancy had to be qual i f ied. The surrogate w a s fully aware of the fact that sex dur ing 
the first few w e e k s after artif icial fert i l isation w a s dub ious in respect of ensur ing that the 
commiss ion ing father and not the partner or spouse of the surrogate become the father of the 
chi ld to be born of the agreement . However once the fert i l isation b e c o m e s effect ive and a 
chi ld is conceived, it should not be a prob lem if the surrogate chose to have sex wi th her 
partner or spouse. Never theless, the agreement w a s draf ted to include the c lause and the 
qual i f icat ion that sex be tween the surrogate and her partner w a s prohibi ted for the first th ree 
months of the pregnancy. 
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of these acts. Her breach would result out of the fact that she had performed 
in a manner in which she was obligated not to do. 
4.3.4 Positive malperformance: Creditor 
The circumstances in which a creditor can defectively perform are greatly 
limited, however it is possible.329 Performance will be defective if such 
performance does not comply with the terms of the contract or the conduct 
itself is contrary to a contractual prohibition. 
4.3.4.1 Requirements of positive malperformance: Creditor 
The requirements are the same as that of a debtor's positive malperformance: 
he/she must have performed defectively. 
The commissioning parent(s) will be in mora if when the child of the 
agreement is born, the parent(s) fail to accept the child as their own upon birth 
or as soon as possible thereafter. 
4.3.5 Anticipatory Breach 
The third form of breach is known as anticipatory breach, and it encompasses 
that which it says: anticipatory breach is breach which occurs prior to the 
rendering of performance.330 Anticipatory breach creates either an uncertainty 
as to whether the party is going to perform or a certainty that he or she will not 
perform. Repudiation and prevention of performance are the forms of 
anticipatory breach. The meaning and requirements of repudiation and 
prevention of performance are different and will thus be examined in separate 
paragraphs below. 
4.3.5.1 Repudiation 
329 Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 375. 
330 Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 357; Trei tel GH An 
outline of the law of contract 6ed (2004), 346. 
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Repudiation has several meanings. It can be used to describe the refusal of 
one contractant to perform in terms of a legally binding contract, or the 
announcement by such party that he or she is unable to perform, or the 
refutation of the actual existence of the contract itself.331 
4.3.5.1.1 Requirements of repudiation 
There is repudiation where the words or conduct, when interpreted from the 
position of a reasonable person in the position of the innocent party, 
demonstrate that the guilty party, without lawful grounds, has no intention to 
comply with his or her contractual obligations. Regarding the element of 
wrongfulness, repudiation is only wrongful if the infringing conduct comes to 
the attention of the innocent party and leaves him or her under the impression 
that the guilty party is not going to perform.332 
In the instance of surrogacy agreements, both the surrogate and the 
commissioning parent(s) could be guilty of repudiation. The surrogate may, 
through her words or her conduct, create the impression that she has no 
intention to relinquish the child upon birth.333 
331 Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 363; Kerr AJ The 
principles of the law of contract 6ed (2002), 575. 
332 The d i f ference be tween repudiat ion and prevent ion of per fo rmance: repudiat ion ant ic ipates 
eventua l ma lper fo rmance wi th relative certainty, whe reas prevent ion of per fo rmance 
ant ic ipates ma lper fo rmance wi th absolu te certainty. South African Forestry Co Ltd v York 
Timbers Ltd 2005 (3) SA 323 (SCA) .Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 
3ed (2007), 363, 365. 
333 S. Otto & another v D. Lessnar [298/2011 (D) unreported] . In a recent High Court 
appl icat ion a coup le approached the Court for an urgent order forc ing the surrogate to hand 
over the child. The chi ld w a s to be born wi th in the next week . The coup le had entered the 
agreement wi thout the required High Court conf i rmat ion. The coup le w e r e anx ious regarding 
the enforceabi l i ty of the agreement . W h e n they in formed the surrogate that they w e r e 
required to at tend Cour t for conf i rmat ion, relat ions be tween the part ies became ' somewhat 
strained' and the surrogate created a 'wish list' wh ich inc luded a new motor vehic le. The 
sur rogates conduct led the commiss ion ing parents to bel ieve that she w a s not go ing to 
adhere to her contractual obl igat ions. In her aff idavit before the court, the commiss ion ing 
mother stated that because the surrogate had no genet ic tie to child, she had 'absolute ly no 
right to the chi ld' . The chi ld w a s born and Judge Trevor Gorven granted an order conf i rming 
the agreement be tween the commiss ion ing parent(s) and the surrogate. The court held that in 
addi t ion to the coup le being the legal parents of the child, their full parenta l rights and 
responsibi l i t ies c o m m e n c e d at birth (the surrogate had w i thd rawn her intention to oppose and 
her 'wish list' w a s never produced) . The impor tance of this case lies firstly in the fact that the 
Court gave effect to the contractual intent ion of the part ies, and secondly, that a l though de 
facto conf i rmat ion w a s not env isaged by the Act, in th is case, it w a s permit ted. 
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On the other hand, the commissioning parents may create the impression that 
they have no intention to accept the child as their own upon birth. Importantly, 
in both situations, the words or conduct of the respective party must, on the 
basis of a reasonable person, be construed to mean that the guilty party does 
not intend to comply with his/her contractual obligations. 
4.3.5.2 Prevention of performance 
The second form of anticipatory breach is prevention of performance. 
Performance will be prevented if the performance is in fact impossible or 
alternatively, despite performance being physically possible, for reasonable 
and practicable purposes it is deemed impossible.334 
4.3.5.2.1 Requirements of prevention of performance 
Prevention of performance only amounts to breach if the conduct of the 
contractant infringes a contractual obligation. In effect, after the conclusion of 
the contract the debtor makes it impossible for him/her to perform or the 
creditor makes it impossible for him/herself to render cooperation to the 
debtor.335 Performance will be prevented if the performance is in fact 
impossible or alternatively, despite performance being physically possible, for 
reasonable and practicable purposes it is deemed impossible.336 
The surrogate may be guilty of prevention of performance if she continues to 
use contraception during the process of artificial fertilisation. In this respect, 
as a result of her own conduct, she has made her performance in terms of the 
contract impossible. 
334 Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 366. 
335 Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 366, 377. 
336 Per fo rmance wil l be prevented if the per fo rmance is in fact impossib le or al ternat ively, 
despi te per fo rmance being physical ly possible, for reasonab le and pract icable purposes it is 
d e e m e d impossib le. 'For purposes of th is b ranch of law it is unnecessary to d is t inguish 
be tween vis maior or casus fortuitus, wh ich be tween them include any happening, whe ther 
due to natural causes or human agency, that is unforeseeable wi th reasonable foresight and 
unavoidable wi th reasonab le care' . Van der Me rwe S and Others Contract general principles 
3ed (2007), 366, 367; Kerr AJ The principles of the law of contract 6ed (2002), 527. 
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After having examined the three types of breach and their respective 
requirements, the author will now individually examine the three principal 
remedies for breach as provided for by the general mechanisms of the law of 
contract. Subsequent to each examination, the author will discuss each 
remedy in light of a surrogacy agreement and establish if in fact the remedies 
provided for in the general law of contract are adequate to remedy breach in 
the case of a surrogacy agreement. 
4.4 The primary remedies for breach 
In South Africa, the law of contract provides three primary remedies in the 
instance of breach: specific performance, cancellation and damages. Specific 
performance is the most natural remedy available in respect of breach. It 
amounts to a claim for the fulfilment of the actual performance to which the 
contracting parties agreed i.e. the guilty party is ordered to perform in terms of 
his or her original contractual obligations.337 Specific performance is not 
available when performance is impossible and a court will not easily grant it 
when it may cause great hardship to the guilty party or to society as a 
whole.338 Cancellation is as the word itself states. The innocent party is 
afforded the opportunity to elect whether to abide by the contract or 
alternatively cancel. 
Through abiding, the contract continues to exist as if no breach has occurred. 
With cancellation, restitution must occur. Lastly, damages are a form of 
patrimonial compensation awarded to the innocent party for harm or loss 
suffered as a result of the breach. All three remedies have their own specific 
requirements. 
4.4.1 Specific Performance 
337 Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 381; Christ ie RH The 
law of contract in South Africa 3ed (1996), 571 -4, 578-9. 
338 Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A). Du Bois F and Others 
Wille's principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 872. 
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The first remedy available in the case of breach is that of specific 
performance. Often termed the most natural remedy because it gives effect to 
the original consequences of the agreement, an order of specific performance 
requires of the parties to perform as in terms of the original contract. The 
parties must perform specifically as they agreed to perform. In order for an 
innocent party to claim specific performance, such innocent party must 
establish that performance is possible. A reciprocal contract requires 
reciprocal performance: if the innocent party is unable to or refuses to perform 
himself/herself, the guilty party need not perform and a claim for specific 
performance will not be upheld.339 
In the matter of Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance the court provided 
guidelines regarding the granting of a claim for specific performance.340 First, 
specific performance will not be ordered if it is impossible to perform and/or 
performance would result in a great hardship for a party or the public at large, 
secondly, a claim for specific performance may be refused if performance will 
be difficult to enforce, and thirdly, and this is submitted to be the most 
pertinent to this research, specific performance will not be granted if it 
concerns the freedom of the individual.341 
If the court does grant an order for specific performance, it may be in the form 
of an order for absolute specific performance, or on the other hand, the court 
may order specific performance with the alternative of damages. The innocent 
party may also claim damages in addition to specific performance as a result 
of harm or loss suffered as a result of the guilty parties conduct. In some 
circumstances, the innocent party may also elect to claim damages as a 
substitute for specific performance: however loss, must be established.342 
339 Exceptio non adimpleti contractus - the pr inciple of reciprocity. The gui l ty party may rely 
on this except io as a de fence w h e n he has been ordered to per form and the innocent party 
has yet himself to do so. The gui l ty party can w i thho ld per formance. BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v 
Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 1 SA 391 (A); Benson v SA Mutual Life 
Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A). 
340 1986 (1) SA 776 (A). 
^ 1986 (1) SA 776 (A). 
342 Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 876; Van der 
Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 381. 
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4.4.1.1 A claim for specific performance in the event of breach of a 
surrogacy agreement 
In a surrogate motherhood agreement, specific performance would entail the 
following: the commissioning parents are obliged to compensate the surrogate 
for all the necessary and reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the 
medical procedures, treatments and tests and are held liable for the costs 
involved in the confirmation of the agreement. The commissioning parents 
must also accept the parental rights and responsibilities of the child upon 
birth. The surrogate is contractually obligated to gestate the child and to 
relinquish her rights and responsibilities towards such child upon birth or as 
soon as reasonably possible thereafter. 
In addition to these clear obligations, the commissioning parents may also be 
obliged to obtain life and disability insurance for the surrogate in the event of 
her death or disability as a result of the pregnancy and birth of the child. The 
surrogate may also be required to adhere to a lifestyle which is conducive to a 
successful pregnancy i.e. the surrogate may agree to not smoke or to drink. 
In the case of a surrogacy agreement, specific performance would necessitate 
that the surrogate and the commissioning parent(s) adhere to their original 
contractual duties. If the parties claim specific performance, the breach will 
not affect the continuity of the contract: the parties will continue as if the 
breach did not occur. 
The author submits that despite the fact that a claim for specific performance 
is seen to be the most natural remedy available in the case of breach, it will 
be difficult to stipulate if the position will be the same having regard to 
surrogacy agreements. Although the topic will receive greater consideration in 
the discussion of enforceability, I submit that, in the case of surrogacy 
agreements, specific performance will not be wholly achievable. Specific 
performance will be almost unproblematic if the breach arises as a result of 
the commissioning parent's unwillingness to compensate the surrogate after 
the child is born and after the child has been handed to the parents. In this 
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situation, all that is required of the commissioning parents would be to 
monetarily reimburse the surrogate. 
However, taking into consideration the guidelines provided by the Appellate 
Division in Benson v SA Mutual, the situation will not be the same if after the 
artificial fertilisation and before the birth of the child, the commissioning 
parents repudiate the agreement and no longer intend to raise the child as 
their own.343 Despite the fact that section 297 provides that a full surrogacy 
agreement may not be terminated post artificial fertilisation, the question 
arises if a court would be in the position to compel the commissioning parents 
to accept the parentage of the child that they no longer desire? Will this not 
amount to granting specific performance at the risk of sacrificing the freedom 
of the individual? In this respect, I submit that a claim for specific performance 
will not be entirely possible in the case of a surrogacy agreement. As it will be 
shown below in the discussion regarding cancellation, I suggest that the 
likelihood of a claim of specific performance being upheld will be ultimately 
determinate on the degree, nature and materiality of the breach: i.e. what 
effect has the breach had on the 'substance' of the agreement. 
4.4.2 Cancellation 
Taking into consideration that the author has just examined the most 'natural' 
remedy available to parties in the event of breach, and reached the decision, 
that in the case of surrogacy agreements, it is not truly 'natural' in the 
contractual sense of the word, the author now turns to cancellation: the most 
'unnatural' form of contractual remedy. 
In the event of breach, the innocent party may elect not to continue with the 
contract and choose to cancel. However, because cancellation is not seen as 
a 'natural' consequence of entering into a contract, cancellation will only be 
permissible in limited circumstances. In the general law of contract, the right 
to cancel will usually depend on whether a cancellation clause has been 
343 Benson v SA Mutual Life Assurance Society 1986 (1) SA 776 (A). 
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included in the contract, or in the absence of such a clause, the material effect 
the relevant breach has had on the substance of the contract.344 Regarding 
the materiality of the breach, the innocent party must prove that the nature 
and extent of the breach is so serious that the substance or core of the 
contract cannot be repaired by any other available remedy. Unlike specific 
performance, cancellation does not require a court order and thus the 
innocent party need not acquire a court order permitting him/her to cancel.345 
Cancellation has the effect that the primary obligations which were created in 
the contract are terminated, however the secondary obligations to pay 
damages and make complete restitution (restore the status ante-quo) 
continue to exist until they are fulfilled.346 
4.4.2.1 Electing to cancel in the event of breach of a surrogacy agreement 
As is the case in all other forms of contract, if a party were to elect to cancel a 
surrogacy agreement, he/she would have to show that the breach was so 
serious that no other remedy would cure such breach. The effect of such 
cancellation, in ordinary contractual terms, will be that each party would be 
required to restore to the other that which the other party has performed. 
I submit that although cancellation is not 'natural' in the ordinary contractual 
sense, in most cases of breach arising out of a surrogacy agreement, I submit 
that it would be quite unproblematic to show that the breach was so serious 
344 In the case of a cancel la t ion c lause or a lex commissor ia , the innocent party may have to 
g ive not ice to the gui l ty party that he or she is in b reach and a certa in per iod may be 
st ipulated for recti f ication. A contract may also state that no notice is required and any form of 
default wil l be accepted as repudiat ion and the innocent party may elect to cance l 
automat ical ly . Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 877; 
Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 399 - 402; Christ ie RH 
The law of contract in South Africa 3ed (1996), 571- 4, 597. 
345 Goldstein and Wolff v Maison Blanc (Pty) Ltd 1948 (4) SA 446 (C); Sweet v Ragerguhara 
NO and others 1978 (1) SA 131 (D); Mahabeer v Sharma NO and another 1985 (3) SA 729 
(A). Du Bois F and Others Willes principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 878; Van der 
Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 377-8. 
346 The right to resile may be exc luded th rough waiver , estoppel , prescr ipt ion or the inabil i ty to 
make restitution. Coetzee v Impala Motors (Edms) Bpk 1962 (3) SA 539 (T). Du Bois F and 
Others Wille's principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 879, 880; Van der Merwe S and 
Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 402 - 5; Treitel G H An outline of the law of 
contract 6ed (2004), 378. 
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that it affected the substance of the contract. For example, when the parties 
enter into a surrogacy agreement and the surrogate refuses to relinquish the 
child to the commissioning parents upon birth, this would certainly amount to 
a material breach which would give the commissioning party the necessary 
'proof' to establish that he or she is entitled to cancel the agreement. 
Nonetheless, it would in truth be difficult to imagine how parties to a surrogacy 
agreement could effect restitution. The pregnant surrogate could not be 
expected to hand over the foetus which she is carrying. In this situation, unlike 
the situation in other day-to-day contracts, we are not faced with an object 
which can simply be restored to the other party. In ordinary cases of breach, 
parties can monetarily compensate one another for the costs incurred as a 
result of the agreement. I submit that, in the case of restitution arising out of a 
surrogacy agreement, this will not be the case. 
It is also difficult to ascertain what the commissioning parent(s) would have to 
give back to the surrogate. The surrogate cannot be given back the months of 
her life which she has spent undergoing artificial fertilisation and being 
pregnant. It could be said that she could be monetarily compensated for her 
loss as a result of the breach, but it would require a complex formula to 
determine the quantum of such loss. 
For legal scholars, surrogacy agreements give essence to the saying that 
'cancellation is an extraordinary remedy which is available only in exceptional 
circumstances'.347 The effect of cancellation of a surrogacy agreement as a 
result of breach is unimaginable, in that restitution in the true sense of the 
word is not possible. 
4.4.3 Damages 
The last remedy which will be discussed is that of damages. In the law of 
contract, innocent parties may only claim monetary compensation for actual 
347 Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 398. 
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loss arising out of breach of contract, no damages can be awarded for 
intangible or non-patrimonial loss.348 Damages are calculated according to 
positive interest i.e. the innocent party will claim damages sufficient to put 
him/her into the position he/she would have been had the contract been 
fulfilled.349 Damages may not be too remote from the loss or harm: a causal 
connection must exist between the breach and the damage. The damage 
must flow directly from the loss or harm or it must have been reasonably 
supposed to have occurred in consideration of possible breach.350 The 
innocent party is also obligated to minimise his loss. 
4.4.3.1 A claim for damages arising out of the breach of a surrogacy 
agreement 
In the case of breach, a party who claims damages for the loss or harm 
suffered as a result of the breach will be awarded damages calculated in a in 
accordance with positive interest i.e. the monetary compensation which the 
party will receive will attempt to rectify the breach by placing the party in the 
position they would have been had the contractual obligations been properly 
fulfilled. In the case of a surrogacy agreement, it cannot be submitted that an 
award for damages on the basis of positive interest could be legally plausible. 
Damages are in any event only awarded for patrimonial loss, so the parties 
would not be able to claim for emotional shock or pain and suffering. 
348 Act ions for pain and suffer ing, physical inconvenience, injured feel ings and d isappo in tment 
are only c la imable in te rms of the law of delict under the actio iniuriarum. Nonethe less, the 
author submi ts that no amoun t of monetary compensa t ion wi l l remedy the harm or loss 
suf fered as a result of b reach in the case of sur rogacy agreements and thus, so as not to 
exceed the ambit of th is research, no further d iscuss ion wil l be carr ied out regarding non-
patr imonia l loss. See for example Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of South African 
Law 9ed (2007), 1166 - 1121 and Neeth l ing J, Potgieter J M and Visser PJ Law of Delict 5ed 
32005), 11 - 17. 
49 Actual and prospect ive d a m a g e s are avai lable to the innocent party. Actual d a m a g e s refer 
to the d a m a g e concrete ly incurred, whi ls t in the case of prospect ive damages , the innocent 
party can c la im for that wh ich wou ld have been. A n example of prospect ive d a m a g e s is loss 
of profit of earn ing capaci ty. In the case of sur rogacy agreements , many part ies include a 
c lause in the agreement relating to loss of earn ings as a result of the pregnancy . The 
surrogate is then enti t led to compensa t ion for this. Lavery & Co Ltd v Jungheinrich 1931 A D 
156; Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Co Ltd v Consolidated Langlaagte Mines, Ltd 1915 
A D 1. Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles of South African Law 9ed (2007), 425, 462, 
882; Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 420. 
350 Van der Merwe S and Others Contract general principles 3ed (2007), 415 - 419; Treitel 
GH An outline of the law of contract 6ed (2004) 345; Du Bois F and Others Wille's principles 
of South African Law 9ed (2007), 883. 
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In respect of the surrogate, no amount of monetary compensation would any 
way cure the emotional loss or harm she may suffer as a result of the breach 
of the agreement. If a woman chose to be surrogate and the commissioning 
parents breach the agreement and subsequently an election is made to 
cancel, the surrogate may be burdened with a child who she would more than 
likely have had no intention to keep or to have. No amount of money will put 
her in the position she would have been if the contract had been successful. 
The commissioning parents, on the other hand, find themselves in a much 
more propitious position than the surrogate in the case of breach. They can 
mitigate their emotional loss or harm through finding themselves another 
woman who is willing to be their surrogate. However, if this is not possible, 
once again, no monetary value will be able to place them in the position they 
should have been if the contract had been correctly performed. I submit that 
the award for damages as a result of breach of a surrogacy agreement will 
never be able to cure the emotional loss or harm suffered as no monetary 
value can be attached to such loss or harm. 
Having considered the three types of breach and the three primary remedies 
available, I submit that, in the case of breach arising out of a surrogacy 
agreement, no remedy will suffice. A claim for specific performance will not 
amount to providing a natural remedy to parties, when specific performance 
will amount to creating hardship or in effect, specific performance will sacrifice 
the freedom of one party for the satisfaction of the other. Hence, specific 
performance in respect of surrogacy agreements will only be possible if the 
breach has yet to have a serious effect on the substance of the agreement. 
In the case of cancellation, once again, it will depend on the nature and extent 
of the breach. Although I will discuss termination of the agreement in greater 
detail below, cancellation is different because unlike termination, cancellation 
arises out of breach, whereas termination is permitted in terms of the Act. In 
the case of termination, the respective positions of the parties are delineated 
in the Act. In the case of cancellation, the seriousness of the breach will 
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determine whether it is possible to simply 'restore the status ante quo', and 
hence it is unknown what effect cancellation will have on the legal positions of 
the respective parties. 
Lastly, having regard to a claim for damages, the law of contract does permit 
a claim for damages arising out of emotional loss or harm and in this respect, 
I cannot submit that a claim for damages will remedy the breach. And even if 
the law of contract did permit claims for non-patrimonial loss, I cannot submit 
that any amount of monetary compensation will remedy the loss or harm 
suffered by the innocent party. 
Surrogacy agreements do not deal with an every day ordinary object, 
surrogacy agreements deal with the future of a child and the future of his/her 
respective parents. Surrogacy agreements do not amount to ordinary 
contracts, and in that I conclude, that the ordinary remedies for breach of 
contract will not cure harm or loss suffered as a result of the breach by the 
guilty party to the surrogacy agreement. 
4.5 The enforceability of surrogacy agreements 
After having reached the conclusion above that the ordinary remedies of the 
general law of contract will not adequately cure harm or loss suffered as a 
result of the breach of a surrogacy agreement, the author will now commence 
with a determination into whether valid surrogacy agreements are in fact 
enforceable in the ordinary contractual sense of the word. Whilst making such 
a determination, the author will also will examine the effect that termination of 
surrogacy agreements have on the positions of the parties and the 
implications, if any, that termination has on the principle of pacta sunt 
servanda. In the end, the author intends to show that surrogacy agreements 
are not wholly enforceable, they do not entirely protect the interests of the 
parties to the agreement, and ultimately, South African surrogacy agreements 
do not take into consideration the principle of pacta sunt servanda. 
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4.5.1 The impact of section 298 and section 299 on the principle of pacta 
sunt servanda 
In South Africa, a distinction is made between partial and full surrogacy. To 
recapitulate, partial surrogacy is when the surrogate mother is both the 
genetic and gestational mother and consequently there exists a genetic bond 
between the surrogate and the child to be born of the agreement. In the 
instance of full surrogacy there is no biological connection between the 
surrogate and the child to be born of the agreement: the surrogate is merely 
the gestational mother. 
In both situations, the child born of the agreement is considered a child born 
of the commissioning parents and the surrogate is obliged to relinquish the 
child at birth or as soon thereafter as possible.351 Consequently genetic 
relations do not have an effect on the legal status of the agreement.352 
351 Sect ion 297(1)(a) of the Act. In te rms of the current Ass is ted Reproduct ive Techno log ies 
Regulat ion Bill, 2010 of India (current ly before par l iament for promulgat ion) , the legal s tatus of 
a chi ld born as a result of a sur rogacy agreement is the same as that in South Afr ica. He or 
she is d e e m e d to be ' the legit imate chi ld of the intended parents, whe the r marr ied or 
separated ' . Note that unl ike in South Afr ica, once the Bill is passed, homosexua l coup les wi l l 
not be able to make use of Indian surrogates. Homosexua l i ty is not a legally recognised 
sexual relat ionship in India. R imm J 'Booming baby business: Regulat ing commerc ia l 
sur rogacy in India' (2008-2009) 30 Pa Journal of International Law 1429. Jha DN 'City gifts 
gay couple parenthood ' (2011) avai lable at 
http://www. timesofindia. inditimes. com/articleshow/7511373. cms ?prtpage= 1 (accessed on 21 
February 2011). 
352 Sur rogacy in the UK is current ly governed by the 2008 Human Fert i l isat ion and Embryo 
Act (hereinaf ter referred to as 'HFEA') . In te rms of the Act, despi te sur rogacy being legal ly 
recognised, the contract itself is not d e e m e d legally enforceable. The chi ld born of the 
agreement is the chi ld of the surrogate mother and the commiss ion ing parents must wai t six 
w e e k s after the birth of the chi ld before they may apply to court for a parenta l order having the 
effect of grant ing t h e m full parental r ights and responsibi l i t ies. A l though commerc ia l sur rogacy 
is prohib i ted in the UK, on the g rounds of it being cont ra boni mores, in the recent High Court 
matter of Re: L (a minor) 2010 E W H C 3136 (Fam), the court made it c lear that the chi ld 's 
we l fa re is paramount and wou ld t rump publ ic pol icy on payments . In th is matter, the 
commiss ion ing parents had entered into a sur rogacy agreement in Il l inois wi th an Illinois 
w o m a n . In Illinois, commerc ia l sur rogacy is permit ted. Upon returning to UK, the 
commiss ion ing parents made an appl icat ion for a Parental Order (Sect ion 54 HFEA) wh ich 
could grant them full parenta l r ights and responsibi l i t ies of the chi ld born of the agreement . 
The Court w a s aware that payments had been received by the surrogate wh i ch had exceeded 
the reasonable expenses incurred as a result of the pregnancy . However, the court held that 
on the basis of the chi ld 's best interest and genera l wel fare, in this regard, these factors 
over rode the publ ic pol icy ban on payments in respect of sur rogacy agreements . Gamb le N 
and Ghaevear t L 'In pract ise - the HFEA 2008: Revolut ion or evolut ion' (2009) avai lable at 
http://www.aambleandahaevert.com/assets/familv%20law%20aug09.pdf (accessed on 29 
May 2010); Ghevaer t L ' Internat ional surrogacy: Progress or media hype' (2011) avai lable at 
http://www.bionews.org.uk/page 85514.asp?print= 1 (accessed on 31 January 2011); 
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Genetic relations may however develop into a dilemma when it is necessary 
to determine the enforceability and performance obligations of the contract. 
Section 298 expressly provides that when the surrogate mother is also the 
genetic mother of the child to be born of the agreement, she has up until 60 
days after the birth of the child to decide whether or not to terminate the 
agreement. A surrogate mother with no genetic relation to the child may not 
terminate the agreement after she has been artificially fertilised.353 Hence, as 
noted by Professor Louw, a partial surrogate mother 'may terminate and 
withdraw from a fully enforceable surrogate motherhood agreement - an 
option which is by implication not available to a (full) surrogate mother who is 
not genetically related to the child'.354 Hence, not only does Chapter 19 give 
rise to constitutional implications (as evidenced by chapter two and three), but 
the application of Chapter 19 also has contractual implications. Parties who 
choose full surrogacy agreements are afforded equal contractual protection in 
terms of the Act, whereas in the instant of partial surrogacy, the surrogate will 
always have the 'upper contractual hand'. 
In addition to this, despite the fact that the Act expressly provides for the right 
of termination by the surrogate, it does not afford the commissioning parents a 
similar right, either in respect of full or partial surrogacy. Thus it is at this point 
the submission of the author that Chapter 19 of the Act, although it aims to 
provide protection for all parties to the agreement, fails to do so in that a 
potential partial surrogate mother will from the commencement of the 
agreement possess the ascendant position. 
Beckford M and Ross T 'Chi ld less coup les w in right to pay surrogate mothers ' (2010) 
avai lable at http://www.telegraph.co.uk/health/children shealth/8190131/childless-couples-
win-the-right-to-pay-surrpgate-mothers (accessed on 31 January 2011); B lackburn-Starza A 
'Chi ld 's we l fa re is ruled 'paramount ' in sur rogacy case' (2010) avai lable at 
http://www.bionews.org.uk/page 83861.asp?print= 1 (accessed on 31 January 2011). 
This is of course made subject to sect ion 300 and CTOP. Louw A Chapter 19: Surrogate 
Motherhood in Davel CJ and Skel ton A Commentary on the Children's Act 38 of 2005 (2007), 
19-22. 
354 '[Full] sur rogacy is legal ly a safer opt ion w h e n compared to [partial] sur rogacy because 
under a [full] sur rogacy ar rangement , the chi ld is not biological ly related to the surrogate 
mother, and tradi t ional wes te rn legal norms are more incl ined to recognise the genet ic parent 
as the legal parent ' . Louw A Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood in Davel CJ and Skel ton A 
Commentary on the Children's Act 38 of 2005 (2007), 19-21; Burpee AL ' M o m m a drama: A 
s tudy of how Canada 's regulat ion of sur rogacy compares to Austra l ia 's independent 
regulat ion of surrogacy' (2008 -2009) 37 International and Comparative law Journal, 229. 
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4.5.1.1 Full surrogacy 
In order for the author to further substantiate the submission that was made 
above, the differences in the legal consequences which arise out of partial 
and full surrogacy agreements will be examined below. The author will 
discuss the enforceability of the respective agreements as well as the impact 
that termination will have on the rights of respective parties.355 
'In the case of full surrogacy, the agreement [is irrevocable] once the 
surrogate mother has been impregnated'.356 In terms of the Act, the only 
possibility of termination post fertilisation is in terms of CTOP (section 300). 
The SALC defended the irrevocability of a full surrogacy agreement on the 
grounds that it would be in the best interests of the child to grow up with at 
least one commissioning parent.357 The SALC submitted that if the surrogate 
were allowed to escape the agreement, the child would have no genetic tie to 
its mother.358 With regard to commissioning parents, the Act is silent 
regarding the termination capacity of commissioning parents in the case of a 
full surrogacy agreement. In light of this, it is presupposed that they too 
cannot terminate the agreement post artificial fertilisation. Consequently, any 
form of contravention by either party after artificial fertilisation in a full 
surrogacy agreement will amount to a breach of the contract. 
4.5.1.1.1 The contractual implications of the termination of a full surrogacy 
agreement 
Having regard to full surrogacy agreements and section 297 of the Act, post 
fertilisation of the surrogate mother, the principle of pacta sunt servanda 
appears to be the overriding consideration regarding the enforceability of the 
355 The right to make dec is ions regarding reproduct ion (sect ion 12(2) of the Const i tut ion), and 
the impact that the appl icat ion of Chapter 19 has on this right w a s examined in detai l in the 
chapter 3 of th is research. 
356 Louw A Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood in Davel CJ and Skel ton A Commentary on the 
Children's Act 38 of 2005 (2007), 19-23. 
357 This submiss ion w a s examined in chapter th ree under the heading 'The const i tut ional 
impl icat ions of the appl icat ion of Chapter 19 of the Act on the best interests of the child. ' 
358 For further d iscuss ion see paragraph 4.5.1.2 below. 
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agreement. In terms of the Act, neither party may terminate the agreement 
after the surrogate mother has been artificially fertilised. Hence, it is submitted 
that any act or omission in contravention of the agreement by either of the 
parties to the contract would amount to breach. 
In the instance of breach of a full surrogacy agreement, I submit as I did in 
previous paragraphs, that the ordinary remedies of the general law of contract 
will not can cure the emotional loss or harm suffered as a result of the breach. 
However, if the innocent party were to claim specific performance, the 
materiality of the breach will be pertinent in the determination of whether the 
innocent party could rely on such a claim. As it has been stated before, a 
court will not grant an order for specific performance where the result thereof 
will cause hardship to the guilty party or the public at large, or, and this is 
particularly relevant to the case of breach in surrogacy agreements, the court 
will not make an order for specific performance which will result in unfairly 
burdening the freedom of the guilty party. 
Taking the above into consideration, the question may be raised what impact 
might such specific performance have on, amongst others, the right to make 
decisions concerning reproduction? With regards to the commissioning 
parents, it is argued that their position remains the same as it was at the time 
of fertilisation. They entered the agreement in order to obtain a child, and at 
this point we can assume that their inability to conceive and give birth is still 
permanent and irreversible and that in this respect, their right to make 
decisions regarding reproduction has not in any way been infringed. If breach 
occurs post fertilisation, and specific performance is granted, the 
commissioning parents will still become the legal parents of the child upon 
birth. And if it is they who breached the agreement, say for example they 
indicated that they no longer want to raise the child of their own, the 
commissioning parents can always put the child up for adoption upon birth. 
On the other hand, the surrogate still finds herself in a position where 
(despite the fact that she knowingly and voluntarily agreed to be in such 
position) she cannot, during the period in which she is acting as a surrogate, 
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make any further decisions regarding reproduction. She has exercised her 
freedom of contract and her right to make decisions regarding reproduction, 
but at the same time, any further decisions which she may want to make are 
limited post fertilisation. Although I intended to submit that on a whole, 
Chapter 19 may have the inadvertent effect that its application favours the 
contracting position of the surrogate, in the case of full surrogacy, I reluctantly 
submit that the commissioning parents may find themselves in a more 
auspicious position than the surrogate. If specific performance is ordered it 
will be the surrogate and not the commissioning parent's freedom which will 
be seriously jeopardised. 
In conclusion, although the possibility of breach is always present, the Act 
expressly provides that the full surrogate (and hypothetically the 
commissioning parents) cannot terminate the surrogacy agreement post 
fertilisation. The agreement is fully enforceable against all the parties. If the 
surrogate wanted to terminate the agreement her constitutional rights are 
trumped by the same rights which the commissioning parent(s) hold. In this 
respect, the surrogate is not carrying her own child. To compel her to 
relinquish the child to the commissioning parent(s) upon birth would not 
amount to an infringement of her rights. It would be an infringement of the 
commissioning parent(s) rights if the surrogate were permitted to keep the 
child.359 Parallel to this, if the commissioning parent(s) were to breach the 
contract and wanted to terminate the agreement, they to would be 
contractually bound to continue with their contractual obligations. However, in 
this situation, we may be creating the possibility of a child being brought up by 
parents who no longer desire such a child. It is thus my submission that in the 
instance of full surrogacy agreements, the principle of pacta sunt servanda is 
the determining factor. 
4.5.1.2 Partial Surrogacy 
359 S. Otto v D. Lessnar (298/2011 (D) unreported) . 
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'It is a rgued that to compe l a surrogate mother to surrender [her] chi ld is to "sacri f ice a 
w o m a n ' s reproduct ive au tonomy to the pr inciple of 'pacta servanda sunt. '"360 
The author will now discuss the enforceability and likelihood of breach in the 
case of partial surrogacy agreements. 
Partial surrogates are genetically related to the child to be born of the 
surrogacy agreement which they concluded.361 Partial surrogate mothers may 
terminate the agreement in terms of section 298 of the Act. 
At present, the South African courts have not yet had the opportunity to 
determine whether partial surrogacy agreements are in fact enforceable. The 
Act, whilst clear on the fact that the partial surrogate has the right to 'opt out' 
of a valid surrogacy agreement, however neglects to provide whether the 
commissioning parents are afforded the same entitlement.362 In this respect it 
is argued that because the surrogate has been afforded the right to terminate 
the agreement, although the ordinary rules of contract would provide that any 
act in contravention of the agreement would amount to breach, refusal by the 
surrogate to relinquish the child born of the agreement upon birth will not 
amount to breach of the agreement. 
4.5.1.2.1 The contractual implications of the termination of a partial surrogacy 
agreement 
South African law requires that when concluding a surrogacy agreement, the 
surrogate has the intention to gestate a child for a person(s) who are on their 
own unable to do so. Upon entering the agreement it can be assumed that the 
360 Louw A Chapter 19: Surrogate Motherhood in Davel CJ and Skel ton A Commentary on the 
Children's Act 38 of 2005 (2007), 19-23. 
361 Partial sur rogacy does not require any form of medica l b io technology and records of its 
appl icat ion can be found as long ago as in the Old Tes tament (Genes is 16:1-2). Partial 
sur rogacy is not permi t ted in India or Israel on the g rounds that it amoun ts to an act similar to 
incest. 
362 The 60 day cool off per iod is a result of the S A L C adopt ing a 'more chi ld-centred approach 
[which] acknowledges that the chi ld 's best interests are c losely l inked to those of his or her 
parents and the interests of the fami ly as a whole ' . Louw A Chapter 19: Surrogate 
Motherhood in Davel CJ and Skel ton A Commentary on the Children's Act 38 of 2005 (2007), 
19-23, 19-25. 
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surrogate has a virtuous aim and does not willingly choose to form a bond 
with the child. 
The state of affairs is however altered when the child is in fact genetically 
related to the surrogate. It can be presupposed that when the child that you 
are carrying is in fact yours it will be additionally challenging to prevent 
yourself from forming a bond with such child.363 The surrogate's thoughts and 
actions at birth cannot be predicted. 'Surrogacy agreements involve a 
precommittment to transfer parental rights to the intending parents.'364 
Frankly, a possibility exists that the surrogate may form an emotional bond 
with the child and changes her mind regarding the relinquishment of parental 
rights and responsibilities. 
In the instance of partial surrogacy and having regard to her reproductive 
freedom, to force a partial surrogate to give up her genetic child could be said 
to forego her reproductive freedom to the enforceability of the contract. In this 
respect her reproductive rights will trump the principle of pacta sunt servanda. 
The surrogate will for all purposes be the legal mother of the child born of the 
agreement.365 On the other hand, the conception of the child must take place 
with the gamete of at least one commissioning parent and in this respect it 
cannot be said that it is fair and reasonable to permit the surrogate to keep 
the child whilst the commissioning parent may not. Taking the child from one 
and giving it to another will have the effect that the dignity of the genetically 
related commissioning parent is impaired. It cannot be argued that either the 
rights and interests of the surrogate or the rights and interests of the 
363 'A growing body of research about b i r thmothers suppor ts neither the conc lus ion that 
w o m e n ' s feel ings are unmaterna l w h e n they agree to act as surrogates, nor the idea that t hey 
invar iably direct their f low of maternal feel ings to con fo rm to contractual intent'. Kandel RF 
'Which c a m e first: The mother or the egg? A kinship solut ion to gestat ional sur rogacy ' (1995) 
47 Rutgers Law Review, 191. 
364 'Such precommi t tment r isks that a) the surrogates wil l initially fail to predict their level of 
a t tachment to the unborn chi ld and wil l d iscount the risk that they wil l not want to surrender 
the chi ld after birth and b) that nobody ( including the surrogate) wil l be able to foresee how 
much the surrogate wil l va lue the chi ld once she has gesta ted the chi ld for nine months ' . 'The 
entire process of reproduct ion is an inherent part of a w o m a n ' s ex is tence and that t ransferr ing 
a chi ld to someone else upon birth is unnatura l and psychologica l ly damaging ' . Burpee AL 
' M o m m a drama: A study of how Canada 's regulat ion of sur rogacy compares to Austra l ia 's 
independent regulat ion of surrogacy ' (2008 -2009) 37 International and Comparative law 
Journal, 320. 
365 Sect ion 299 (a) and (b) of the Act. 
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genetically related commissioning parent are greater than the other. Most 
importantly: this outcome cannot be said to take into account the best 
interests of the child. Hence, when a partial surrogacy agreement is 
terminated, the legal positions of all the parties are unknown. Even though the 
section 299 of the Act provides that the genetic surrogate will be the mother of 
the child, the Act does not stipulate what rights and responsibilities the genetic 
commissioning father may have in respect of the child. Hence, the application 
of section 299 of the Act, although it has been included to regulate the 
positions of the parties in respect of termination of the agreement, does not 
fulfil this objection. The rights of the commissioning father are indefinite and 
this and this cannot be said to fulfil one of the purposes of Chapter 19: to 
provide legal certainty in respect of the legal positions of all the parties to a 
surrogacy agreement. 
Despite the fact that it could be submitted that the genetic commissioning 
father may be able to obtain parental responsibilities and rights towards the 
child born of the agreement via section 21 of the Act, the 'Parental 
responsibilities and rights of unmarried fathers' clause, the author would have 
hoped that the legislation would have incorporated a provision into Chapter 19 
which expressly stipulates the rights and the position of the genetic 
commissioning father in the case of the termination of partial surrogacy 
agreements. This would have avoided the lengthy practical process which is 
associated with a section 21 application. 
Nonetheless, although the partial surrogate has the right to terminate the 
agreement, the effect of termination is contrary to the whole purpose of 
Chapter 19: it does not protect the interests of the parties to the agreement, 
and the child born of the agreement will not be the child of the commissioning 
parents. The fact is that section 298 creates an imbalance between the 
parties to the surrogacy agreement. The surrogate is expressly permitted to 
terminate and the commissioning parents are not; if the surrogate does 
terminate then she is regarded as the legal mother of the child. However, 
there still exists the issue regarding the fact that one of the commissioning 
parents' gametes would have been used in the process of artificial fertilisation 
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and it cannot be said to be just and reasonable to proclaim that such 
commissioning parent has no right to the child to which he is genetically 
related to. 
Taking the above into consideration, I therefore conclude that for purposes of 
legal certainty and for the sake of the protection of aj] parties to the 
agreement, partial surrogacy should on a whole not be permitted. Even if we 
were to rely on the remedies of breach, none of them would be appropriate. 
We cannot compel either party to specifically perform in terms of a partial 
surrogacy agreement, neither party can restore to each other that which the 
other has performed and even if the parties were permitted to claim monetary 
compensation, no amount will repair the emotional hardship suffered. Lastly, if 
the legislature does not perceive the interests of the parents of the child to be 
adequate reasoning to prohibit partial surrogacy, it is my submission that it 
should so be done on the basis of the best interests of the child. 
In support of this recommendation, the following needs consideration: 
'Arguably, the ban on part ial sur rogacy faci l i tates the process of establ ishing parental 
r ights over the chi ld born th rough sur rogacy because it guaran tees that at least one 
member among the commiss ion ing part ic ipants wil l bear a genet ic chi ld and that the 
surrogate wil l not have a rivall ing c la im to paren tage-on genet ic g rounds at least. '366 
4.5.2 Conclusion: The contractual implications of the application of 
Chapter 19 of the Act 
The law of contract revolves around two principles: the freedom to contract 
and pacta sunt servanda. The idea is that parties have the right to choose 
with whom, about what and on which terms to contract and such contract is 
enforceable. When parties choose to enter into a surrogacy agreement they 
are required to meet a number of requirements before the Court will validate 
366 R imm J 'Booming baby bus iness: Regulat ing commerc ia l sur rogacy in India' (2008-2009) 
30 Pa Journal of International Law, 1439. 
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such agreement. Once the contract has been freely and voluntarily concluded 
the agreement is deemed to be legally enforceable. 
Nevertheless, surrogacy contracts do not deal with an object of performance 
as is the case normally in contract law. Children are not commodities. And 
when one contracts to be a surrogate mother or a commissioning parent, it 
cannot be presupposed that simply because the contract is supposedly 
enforceable that the parties are going to fulfil their respective obligations. 
To the legislature, it seems as though it was practically unproblematic to 
distinguish between full and partial surrogacy agreements. It was simply 
decided that where a genetic relation exists between surrogate and child, the 
surrogate will be afforded a 'cooling off period' and in the case where no 
genetic relationship exists, termination of the agreement can not occur after 
fertilisation. There are three potential problems with the Act in this respect. 
Firstly, the Act does not make provision for the possibility of breach of the 
agreement. It is my submission that the general laws of contract are alone 
inadequate to legislate surrogacy disputes correctly and that it why it is of vital 
importance that Chapter 19 expressly provides for all possible issues that may 
arise out of a surrogacy agreement. The purpose of Chapter 19 was to give 
legal recognition to surrogacy agreements in South Africa and to provide 
protection for all parties concerned. Despite the Act acknowledging the right of 
the partial surrogate to terminate the agreement, it does not provide for 
breach and suitable remedies. 
Secondly, section 298 does not make provision for termination by the 
commissioning parents. In this, it must be said that the legislature has 
presented us with an illusion that only the surrogate may want to terminate the 
agreement. This is surely not the case. Despite the precedent deficiency in 
respect of partial surrogacy, I submit that there may be occasions when the 
commissioning parents may also want to terminate. In this respect, it is thus 
my submission that failure to include provisions regarding termination by 
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commissioning parents leaves a vast lacuna in the law which may lead to 
future contractual disputes. 
Lastly, I have to conclude that for purposes of contractual clarity and in the 
best interests of all parties concerned, that partial surrogacy should not be 
permitted in South African law.367 Partial surrogacy presents a quandary from 
day one: there is no genuine protection afforded to the commissioning parent 
because the Act provides that the surrogate will always have the opportunity 
to escape performance, and on the event that the surrogate does choose to 
terminate and is subsequently 'awarded' parentage of the child, no provision 
is made for the rights of parentage of the genetic commissioning parent.368 
It is therefore my submission that full surrogacy is the only way in which to 
prevent the formation of legal disputes at a later stage. The recent case of S. 
Otto v D. Lessnar (298/2011 (D) unreported) has shown a willingness by the 
Court to give effect to the contractual obligations of a surrogacy agreement 
and to compel full surrogate mothers to relinquish the child at birth. In this 
respect, formal surrogacy protects the interests of the commissioning parents 
insofar as they, as the genetic parents, are guaranteed that they will receive 
the child which is genetically linked to them. Full surrogacy also has the effect 
that the child born of the agreement will be raised by a parent who is 
genetically linked with them. This is, in the SALC and the AHPC's opinion, as 
in the best interest of the child. 
Having regard to the above, the question may arise as to the surrogate's 
interests and if they are protected in the case of full surrogacy. The answer is 
367 The SALC proposed a compe te ban on part ial sur rogacy on the basis that internat ional 
ju r isprudence showed that the most p rob lems arising out of the en forcement of sur rogacy 
agreements w a s w h e n the surrogate w a s also the genet ic mother and 'it wou ld be 
unconsc iousab le to force a mother to part w i th her natural chi ld and that a surrogate w h o is 
not genet ica l ly related to the chi ld wou ld be able to rel inquish him or her more easi ly ' . On the 
other hand the A H P C recommended both full and part ial surrogacy. Louw A S Acquisition of 
parental responsibilities and rights (unpubl ished LLD thesis, Universi ty of Pretoria, 2009), 
341, 342. 
368 In the in famous case of In re Baby M 537 A.2d 127, 1234 (NJ 1988), the court upheld the 
part ial sur rogate mothers right to exerc ise her parental rights over the chi ld born of the 
agreement based solely on the irrefutable fact that she, the surrogate, w a s the genet ic mother 
of the chi ld. Lee RL ' New t rends in g lobal outsourc ing of commerc ia l sur rogacy: a call for 
regulat ion' (2009) 20 Hastings Women's Law Journal, 175. 
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yes, but only to a certain extent. Despite the fact that the surrogate receives 
reasonable compensation for the necessary expenses incurred as a result of 
the surrogacy, the surrogate may not be reimbursed for the time lost to 
artificial fertilisation procedures or medical examinations or other burdens that 
result from the pregnancy.369 'Pregnancy is not an intellectual experience 
which women (as surrogates) can control and therefore stand back and 
become an incubator for couples', pregnancy and artificial fertilisation could 
amount to 18 months of going to and from doctors, 18 months in a change of 
lifestyle, 18 months of not being truly free to live your own life. It is the 
surrogate and not the commissioning parents who undergo a transformation 
in the anticipation of the commissioning parent's child. It is the surrogates 
body which experiences growth and maybe even pain. All the commissioning 
parents have to do is wait. 
The author is not suggesting that the surrogate is forced into the agreement 
and that she is less 'enriched' by the process than the other parties. There are 
many women who are willing to sacrifice up to 18 months of their life to 
reproduce a child for another. Nonetheless, it is my submission that in order to 
enhance the protection of the interests of the surrogate and all other parties 
concerned, in addition to permitting only full surrogacy, commercial surrogacy 
should be permitted in South Africa. 
4.6 Commercial surrogacy and the right to occupational freedom 
In the paragraph above, the author submitted that partial surrogacy should not 
be permitted and that, in order to provide sufficient protection for all the 
parties concerned, commercial surrogacy should be legally recognised and 
regulated in South Africa. Not only should the practice of commercial 
surrogacy be permitted on the basis of it being in the best interests of all the 
parties concerned, but in addition to this, commercial surrogacy should be 
permitted because it gives expression to the right to make decisions regarding 
reproduction and the right to freedom of trade, occupation and residence. 
369 S o m e part ies do agree to include a c lause regard ing loss of income. 
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4.6.1 The right to occupational freedom 
The right to make decisions regarding reproduction, as contained in section 
12(2) of the Constitution, has been dealt with throughout this research, and 
thus the author does not intend to examine it anew. Chapter 19 has been 
submitted to have given effect, even if not in full, to our rights in terms of 
section 12 through affording legal recognition to surrogacy as a form of 
assisted reproduction. 
Section 22 of the Constitution, or what is generally termed the 'economic 
rights clause', provides that everybody has the right to choose their trade, 
occupation or profession freely, however such trade, occupation or profession 
may be regulated by law. Section 22, although it is a 'substantially more 
limited right than its predecessor in terms of the Interim Constitution', aims to 
provide everyone with occupational freedom.370 Having regard to the fact that 
article 12(1) of the German Constitution closely resembles that of section 22 
of our Constitution, as well as the interpretation which the German 
Constitutional Court afforded to the meaning of the right to occupational 
freedom in the case of 7 BVerfGE 377 (1958), the authors of 'The Bill of 
Rights Handbook' submit that an occupation may be defined 'as an activity 
through which people seek to provide for their needs, not only in the material 
sense, but also in the more idealistic sense of pursuing their self-
development.'371 
In the 1997 case of S v Lawrence (decided in terms of the Interim 
Constitution), the CC held that the provisions of the Liquor Act 27 of 1989 did 
not infringe the appellants' right to freely engage in economic activity.372 The 
applicants had been charged and convicted in a court a quo for contravening 
the Liquor Act. In making its judgment, the CC held that although the 
370 The right to trade, occupat ion and profess ion in te rms of sect ion 26 of the Interim 
Const i tut ion (IC) w a s w ider than its successor , sect ion 22. Sect ion 26 of the Interim 
Const i tut ion prov ided that every person had the right to f reely engage in economic activity. 
Devenish G E A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999), 302; De Waa l J and 
Curr ie I Bill of Rights Handbook 5ed (2010), 484, 491. 
371 De W a a l J & Curr ie I Bill of rights Handbook 5ed (2010), 491,492. 
372 S v Lawrence 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC). 
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Constitution provided that everybody had the right to engage freely in the 
economy, such freedom of economic activity could be regulated through 
constraints and limitations. These constraints and limitations will be 
permissible if the purpose thereof is to protect or improve the quality of life, 
human development, economic growth or any other purpose expressly 
provided for in the Constitution. In this case the CC recognised that although 
the effect of the operation of the Liquor Act limited the right to economic 
activity, the purpose of such limitation was reasonable in that it was enacted 
to protect and improve the quality of life.373 
Having regard to the above it can therefore be submitted that illegal economic 
activity would not fall in the ambit of section 22. In the matter of JR 
Investments CC v Minister of Safety and Security, 'the court referred to certain 
unspoken restrictions [in respect of section 22], such as the "absolute 
prohibition on unlawful income producing activities" like drug trafficking, 
blackmail and child prostitution.'374 
Taking the above into consideration, it can thus be concluded that the right to 
occupational freedom as found in section 22 of the Constitution, 
encompasses the right of all citizens to seek not only an occupation which will 
satisfy their material needs but, in addition to this, everyone is entitled to seek 
an occupation which assists in their further self-development. However, as it 
was stated in Lawrence, and as is the case with all other rights, the right to 
occupational freedom is not absolute and can be limited if there is a 
reasonable constitutionally acceptable purpose for such limitation. 
4.6.2 The right to compensation for reproductive services 
373 In the case of S v Jordan 2002 (6) SA 642 (CC), the CC once again held that the 
inf r ingement on the right to economic act ivi ty w a s just i f ied because the purpose of the 
l imitat ion w a s reasonable. The appel lants in this case were a brothel -keeper , the brothel 's 
emp loyee and a sex worker w h o had all been conv ic ted in the court a quo for cont ravent ion of 
the Sexual Of fences Act. Th is case w a s dec ided on the basis of the IC because the cause of 
act ion arose in 1996. The case dealt wi th a cha l lenge against the prohibi t ion of prost i tut ion 
and brothe l -keeping on the basis of the right to economic activity. 
3 7 41997 (7) BCLR 548 (N). De Waa l J and Curr ie I Bill of rights Handbook 5ed (2010), 491. 
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With reference to the above discussion, the author submits that payment to a 
surrogate in exchange for her services as a surrogate can be said to amount 
to giving effect to the right to economic activity. The occupation in this sense 
would be to gestate a child for the commissioning parents who are unable to 
conceive and give birth to a child on their own. By means of acting as a 
surrogate, the surrogate will both satisfy her material and her personal needs. 
Despite the fact that every constitutionally afforded right may be limited, at this 
juncture, the author submits that prohibiting the practice of commercial 
surrogacy cannot be said to amount to a constitutionally acceptable limitation. 
Before a conclusion can be made regarding whether the prohibition of 
commercial surrogacy fulfils a constitutionally acceptable purpose, one must 
first take into account the arguments for and against the practice of 
commercial surrogacy. 
4.6.3 Arguments in favour of and against commercial surrogacy 
Keeping in mind that for many people surrogacy presents a myriad of difficult 
philosophical, social, legal, moral and ethical issues, the practice of 
commercial surrogacy is even more controversial. Despite the fact that it is 
practiced in a number of countries world wide, critics draw comparisons 
between commercial surrogacy and other stigmatised market transactions 
that involve the exchange of money for use of another person's body.375 '[Acts 
375 Countr ies such as India, Israel, Russia, S lovenia and the states of Cal i fornia and Nevada, 
USA have recognised commerc ia l sur rogacy as a legal fo rm of ass is ted reproduct ion. India is 
the number one internat ional dest inat ion for t ransnat ional commerc ia l sur rogacy agreements . 
People t ravel f rom near and far to take advantage of 'high qual i ty health care, wes te rn t ra ined 
doctors, inexpensive medica l t reatment and legislat ion which, [at the point of wr i t ing this,] 
neither prohibi ts nor permi ts commerc ia l sur rogacy agreements . In India, reproduct ive 
tour ism, in the form of surrogacy, is amongs t the top 10 highest contr ibutors to the country 's 
economy and despi te the fact that legislat ion is current ly before par l iament wh ich seeks to 
regulate the pract ice of commerc ia l surrogacy, such legislat ion wi l l not have the effect of 
prohibi t ing commerc ia l sur rogacy outr ight. In India, unl ike in South Afr ica, the lack of legal 
regulat ion permi ts that perfect ly heal thy ferti le w o m e n are able to commiss ion surrogates. At 
present, the 2005 Indian Counci l of Medical Research Guide l ines regulates ferti l i ty services. 
These guide l ines are not legal ly binding. Present ly the 2010 Artif icial Reproduct ive 
Techno log ies Regulat ion Bill is before Par l iament. R imm J 'Booming baby bus iness: 
Regulat ing commerc ia l sur rogacy in India' (2008-2009) 30 Pa Journal of International Law, 
1430; Hand J 'Sur rogacy in Israel: A model of comprehens ive regulat ion of new technolog ies ' 
(2005) 5 UTS Law Review, 111. 
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such as] prostitution, baby-selling, organ sales [and human trafficking] are 
believed to be by some akin to that of commercial surrogacy.'376 
Commercial surrogacy is often outlawed on the grounds that it 'reflects an 
improper motivation to gestate a child, introduces commerce into matters of 
sexual behaviour, and commodifies mothers and children'.377 Opponents of 
commercial surrogacy often express concerns that it 'reinforces a perception 
of women as mere "baby-making machines", promotes a view of children as 
marketable "goods" or products and fears that women who enter these 
agreements do so of economic necessity, without fully understanding the 
psychological and physical burdens that they stand to endure in the 
process.'378 Some commentators suggest that commercial surrogacy 
agreements may have the ultimate result that lower income women may turn 
into 'human breeders' for fertile women who do have the desire to be mothers 
but do not wish to sacrifice their careers, their physique or undergo the 
discomfort and inconvenience of pregnancy.379 
In favour of commercial surrogacy, it has been said that women should not be 
denied their freedom to contract merely because they are tempted by financial 
incentives. 380 'The key enabling condition for a women's sexual rights to be 
lived, is to control and make decisions about [their] own bodies and 
376 Firstly, the under ly ing object ive of prost i tut ion is p leasurable sexual intercourse, wh ich is 
vi tal ly di f ferent to that of a sur rogacy agreement whe re the object ive is to procreate but 
th rough artif icial means. Secondly , sur rogacy is not saving a current life but creat ing a new 
one. R i m m J 'Booming baby bus iness: Regulat ing commerc ia l sur rogacy in India' (2008-
2009) 30 Pa Journal of International Law, 1436, 1450; Burpee AL ' M o m m a drama: A s tudy of 
how Canada 's nat ional regulat ion of sur rogacy compares to Austra l ia 's independent state 
regulat ion of surrogacy ' (2008 - 2009) 37 International and Comparative Law Journal, 326. 
377 R i m m J 'Booming baby bus iness: Regulat ing commerc ia l sur rogacy in India' (2008-2009) 
30 Pa Journal of International Law, 1436, 1443; Hand J Sur rogacy in Israel: A model of 
comprehens ive regulat ion of new techno log ies (2005) 5 UTS Law Review Journal, 111. 
378 R i m m J 'Booming baby bus iness: Regulat ing commerc ia l sur rogacy in India' (2008-2009) 
30 Pa Journal of International Law, 1444. 
379 Some interpret commerc ia l sur rogacy agreements as commerc ia l contracts under wh ich 
the gestat ional mother forfei ts her parental r ights wh ich creates the risk of commerc ia l i s ing 
reproduct ive capaci ty and commod i f y ing chi ldren' in that the ' female reproduct ive capaci ty 
and the chi ld b e c o m e al ienable and negot iable products and services' . Kandel RF 'Which 
c a m e first: the mother or the egg? A kinship solut ion to gestat ional surrogacy ' (1995) 47 
Rutgers Law Review, 202. 
380 Kandel RF 'Which c a m e first: the mother or the egg? A kinship solut ion to gestat ional 
surrogacy ' (1995) 47 Rutgers Law Review, 212. 
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sexuality'.381 Many surrogates say that being paid for their services is not 
degrading but rather rewarding knowing that they have assisted a couple 
escape a childless fate. Surrogates are able to improve their lives and the 
lives of the commissioning parents through 'their work'.382 
In addition to this, it has been submitted that 'rich South Africans and 
reproductive tourists have access to a market of reproductive technologies as 
buyers, but poor people who want to donate eggs or to become surrogates 
are prevented from legislation from profiting' from their services.383 'The 
expressed morality is that "it is against public policy to place a price on human 
life," but this applies unequally to the women donating eggs and bearing 
babies, and not to the medical facilities and businesses that make huge profits 
from reproductive technologies.'384 
Thus it can be submitted that on the one hand, those that are opposed to the 
practice of surrogacy see it as a commodification of reproductive organs and 
ultimately children, hence the comparison to human trafficking. Whereas on 
the other hand, supporters of commercial surrogacy are of the opinion that 
women should be able to choose what they want to do with their bodies, and if 
they choose to be surrogates, they should be entitled to be sufficiently 
compensated for their services. 
Keeping in mind that the right to occupational freedom can be limited if the 
limitation serves a reasonable and justifiable purpose, the author will now 
381 van Zyl M 'Beyond the Const i tut ion: From sexual r ights to belonging ' (2007) avai lable at 
http://www.hsrcpress.co.za (accessed on 13 Apri l 2011) . 
R imm J 'Booming baby bus iness: regulat ing commerc ia l sur rogacy in India' (2008-2009) 
30 Pa Journal of International Law, 1451, 1452; Hand J 'Sur rogacy in Israel: A model of 
comprehens ive regulat ion of new technolog ies ' (2005) 5 UTS Law Review, 111. 
383 'The Nat ional Health Act 61 of 2003 express ly regulates the use of oocytes [ ( female 
gametes) ] as part of human t issue regulat ion, but there is no ment ion of sperm regulat ion. 
Sperm donors are paid wel l for their sperm, but oocyte donors have to comp ly w i th r igorous 
evaluat ions and tests and may only be compensa ted "for expenses incurred dur ing the 
procedure but may not receive any other fo rm of compensa t ion for their actual egg donat ion". ' 
van Zyl M 'Beyond the Const i tut ion: From sexual r ights to belonging ' (2007) avai lable at 
http://www.hsrcpress.co.za (accessed on 13 Apri l 2011) . 
van Zyl M 'Beyond the Const i tut ion: From sexual r ights to belonging ' (2007) avai lable at 
http://www.hsrcpress.co.za (accessed on 13 Apri l 2011) . 
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determine if the prohibition on commercial surrogacy, as an occupation, is a 
warranted limitation on the right to occupational freedom. 
In Lawrence, the CC held that the right to occupational freedom can be limited 
if the purpose of the limitation is to protect or improve the quality of life, 
human development, economic growth or any other purpose expressly 
provided for in the Constitution.385 In this respect, I submit that the limitation 
on the practice of commercial surrogacy as an occupation is unwarranted. I 
cannot agree that in permitting commercial surrogacy, any of these above 
mentioned factors are placed at risk. In fact, I submit that in prohibiting 
commercial surrogacy, the quality of life of many people and human 
development as a whole is not protected and improved, the economy is not 
given the opportunity to grow and the right to make decisions regarding 
reproduction is unjustifiably limited. In conclusion, it is the author's submission 
that to afford protection to these listed qualities (and the right to occupational 
freedom as a whole), commercial surrogacy should be recognised as a legal 
form of assisted reproduction. The legislature, through the enactment of the 
Constitution and specifically the CTOP, has acknowledged that South African 
women are vulnerable members of society who are subject to exploitation. 
Hence it is the authors submission that commercial surrogacy should be 
permitted and regulated through legislation. 
If prohibition of commercial surrogacy makes exploitation of vulnerable 
persons more likely, non-regulation increases the likelihood of abuse and no 
recourse for the parties.386 At times, financial compensation is necessary in 
assuring the positions of the parties to any contract are secured. It has 
already been argued in paragraph 4.5.1.2.1 that partial surrogacy, for reasons 
of certainty and protection of all parties should not be permitted. Full 
commercial surrogacy agreements on the other hand are viable. In a third 
world country like South Africa, women should be afforded the opportunity to 
385 S v Lawrence 1997 (4) SA 1176 (CC). 
386 'It is imperat ive that gove rnmen ts . . . unders tand that refraining f rom regulat ing commerc ia l 
sur rogacy due to the moral debate sur rounding the issue wil l serve only to exacerbate the 
prob lems of [commerc ia l surrogacy] as a growing industry ' . Lee RL 'New t rends in g lobal 
outsourc ing of commerc ia l surrogacy: A call for regulat ion' (2009) 20 Hastings Women's Law 
Journal, 275; We isberg K The birth of surrogacy in Israel (2005), 14. 
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earn money which will assist them in placing themselves and their families in 
better financial positions. 
4.6.4 Commercial surrogacy in Israel 
It has been submitted above that commercial surrogacy is a permissible 
occupation which, if legally permitted, will bring about expression both to the 
right to make decisions regarding reproduction and to the right to occupational 
freedom. However, because commercial surrogacy does involve payment for 
reproductive services, there does indeed exist the possibility of exploitation of 
women. Thus, if the legislature is going to afford legal recognition to the 
practice of commercial surrogacy, adequate legislation will have to be enacted 
to truly protect the rights of all the parties concerned. It is with this in mind that 
the author will briefly examine Israel and its commercial surrogacy legislation. 
As far back as 1992, the Israeli government realised that surrogate 
motherhood, and in that commercial surrogacy, could not be ignored and that 
the need for adequate regulation was imperative.387 It has been said that 
'Jewish tradition takes a natural understanding of human needs. Is rae l is not 
burdened by the belief that children are only legitimately conceived naturally, 
between husband and w i fe . Jew ish tradition recognises the importance of 
building a family.'388 Effectively, Israel recognises the importance of finding a 
balance between the government's interest in regulating human reproduction 
while at the same time respecting personal autonomy and privacy. In this 
respect, although commercial surrogacy is permitted, the practice is subjected 
to the strict overview of the Approvals Committee. 
387 ' Israel unequivocal ly fo rmed a pol icy posi t ion to legalise and regulate commerc ia l 
sur rogacy in order to protect birth mothers, commiss ion ing parents, chi ldren and the genera l 
public f rom the ef fects of surrogacy ' . Lee RL 'New t rends in g lobal outsourc ing of commerc ia l 
surrogacy: A call for regulat ion' (2009) 20 Hastings Women's Law Journal, 293. 
388 Lee RL 'New t rends in g lobal outsourc ing of commerc ia l sur rogacy: A call for regulat ion' 
(2009) 20 Hastings Women's Law Journal, 294. 
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In a country such as Israel, commercial surrogacy agreements are permitted 
and only full surrogacy is legitimate.389 The laws of Israel and the regulatory 
procedures which are practised have created a system of clarity, certainty and 
effectiveness. Similar to the South African position on High Court sanctioning, 
surrogacy agreements in Israel must be approved by the Approvals 
Committee who ensure that the agreements are favourable for all parties. 
Unlike South Africa, Israel's surrogacy legislation expressly provides that 
through Israel's public healthcare system, all parties must be screened and 
counselled before they may commence artificial fertilisation procedures.390 
After screening, the Approvals Committee performs a judicial review 
procedure of the surrogacy agreement. The agreement is examined to ensure 
that all the parties' interests have been considered and the parties understand 
the minutiae of the agreement. 
In respect of the surrogate's compensation, although no express guidelines 
exist and all parties are left to their own devices to determine the figures, the 
Approvals Committee are tasked with reviewing the compensatory amount to 
ensure fairness. The result of this is that it is extremely difficult to exploit either 
the surrogate or the commissioning parents. Compensation is paid in monthly 
instalments and apart for compensation for the costs involved in the 
fertilisation and pregnancy, the surrogate is also compensated for, amongst 
others, insurance, time spent, pain, change in lifestyle, loss of earnings and 
earning capacity. Israeli law also makes express provision regarding the 
protection of the commissioning parents: Israel seeks to protect 'their 
389 Surrogate Motherhood Agreemen ts (Approva l of Ag reemen t and Status of Newborn) Law 
5756 - 1996. On ly the sperm of the in tended father may be used in the process of artif icial 
fert i l isation, reflecting the Rabbinates concern regarding i l legi t imacy and incest. Hand J 
'Sur rogacy in Israel: A mode l of comprehens ive regulat ion of new technologies ' (2005) 5 UTS 
Law Review, 111; We isbe rg K The birth of surrogacy in Israel (2005), 17. 
390 Screen ing and counsel l ing w a s sugges ted by both the S A L C and the A H P C , however th is 
w a s not incorporated into the Act. For further d iscuss ion see Louw A S Acquisition of parental 
responsibilities and rights (unpubl ished LLD thesis, Universi ty of Pretoria, 2009), 347-348. 
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emotional vulnerability as well', in that, surrogates may only terminate the 
agreement in extreme circumstances of risk to their or the child's health.391 
Taking this into consideration, the surrogacy laws of Israel have provided a 
workable, efficient basis for the regulation of commercial surrogacy 
agreements. Israel has recognised the right of the parties to make decisions 
regarding reproduction as well having recognising the right of the surrogate to 
economic activity. The surrogacy laws of Israel do not permit partial 
surrogacy, only recognise termination of the agreement on the basis of health 
(thus giving effect to the principle of pacta sunt servanda), compel parties to 
undergo screening and counselling programmes before, during and after the 
duration of the agreement and has established the Approvals Committee 
which is officially tasked in ensuring that the parties are adequately protected 
and that the surrogate is sufficiently compensated for her services. 
With regard to the above, it is apparent that commercial surrogacy can be 
adequately regulated. Thus it is the authors final submission that commercial 
surrogacy should be permitted in South Africa. Parties should be able to make 
decisions regarding reproduction and women should be able to choose 
surrogacy as an occupation. Commercial surrogacy is an occupation which 
will not only provide material satisfaction, but will provide the surrogate mother 
with a sense of self-satisfaction in that she knows that she has given the gift 
of life. 
Commercial surrogacy is not prostitution, trafficking or womb-renting. It is 
neither about sexual pleasure nor about selling children. Commercial 
surrogacy is providing a child to those who are either unable to have one 
themselves or choose not to for other reasons. Recognising a women's right 
to contract, including the right to receive economic compensation for the 
supply of reproductive services does not enslave but rather empowers. The 
fact that the surrogate is financially rewarded for her services is really a non 
391 Lee RL 'New t rends in g lobal outsourc ing of commerc ia l sur rogacy: A call for regulat ion' 
(2009) 20 Hastings Women's Law Review Journal, 297, 298; Hand J 'Surrogacy in Israel: A 
model of comprehens ive regulat ion of new technolog ies ' (2005) 5 UTS Law Review, 111. 
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issue when you consider that without her, these people will not be able to 
have their own genetically related child. 
4.7 Conclusion 
At the beginning of this chapter the author set out to determine whether or not 
surrogacy agreements are wholly enforceable between parties and in the 
event of breach, what remedies the parties would be able to make use of. The 
chapter began with a brief discussion regarding the principles of freedom to 
contract and pacta sunt servanda and from there a succinct explanation of the 
requirements of a general contract and a surrogacy contract took place. 
The author came to the conclusion that surrogacy agreements fulfil the 
requirements of a valid contract in accordance with the general rules of South 
African contract law. Keeping this in mind, the author then examined the three 
types of breach, negative malperformance, positive malperformance and 
lastly, anticipatory breach. At the end of each examination, the author 
provided probable examples of breach in the case of a surrogacy agreement. 
This evidenced the fact that breach is possible in the case of a surrogacy 
agreement. 
Thereafter, the author discussed the three primary remedies for breach, 
namely, specific performance, cancellation and damages. Similarly, the author 
once again gave examples of probable breach in the case of a surrogacy 
agreement and examined the consequences of the application of the 
respective remedies on the rights of the parties. Overall, it was concluded that 
the remedies which are available to contractants in the case of breach of an 
ordinary contract are not suitable remedies in the case of surrogacy 
agreements. None of the remedies take cognisance of the emotional harm 
which can be suffered as a result of the breach, and even if they did provide 
for non-patrimonial damage, no amount of monetary compensation would be 
able to place the parties in the position they would have been had the 
surrogacy agreement been fulfilled. 
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With this in mind, the author then turned to section 297, 298 and 299 of the 
Act. Section 297 provides that all surrogacy agreements are enforceable after 
artificial fertilisation has taken place. Section 298 stipulates that a partial 
surrogate has 60 days after the birth of the child to determine whether or not 
to terminate the surrogacy agreement and thus raise the child as her own. 
Lastly, section 299 deals with the effect of termination on the legal positions of 
the party. 
The above discussion formed the crux of the chapter. This was where it was 
concluded by the author that full surrogacy agreements provide better 
protection for all the parties concerned because post fertilisation, the 
agreement cannot be terminated. Thus in respect of the enforceability of a 
surrogacy agreement, full surrogacy agreements ensure that the 
commissioning parents will receive a child which is genetically related to at 
least one of them, the surrogate will be reasonably compensated for her 
services, and finally, the child born of the agreement will be genetically related 
to at least one of his/her parents. Finally, it was concluded that full surrogacy 
agreements give meaning to the principle of pacta sunt servanda. 
Having regard to partial surrogacy, and specifically section 298, the author 
concluded that the regulation of partial surrogacy has the contrary effect to 
that which is the purpose of Chapter 19: partial surrogacy does not protect all 
the parties to the agreement and creates an automatic unequal contractual 
standing from the moment that the agreement commences. The author 
submitted that partial surrogacy should not be permitted by legislation 
because of the unfavourable nature that a partial surrogacy agreement 
consists of from day one. First, the surrogate will always have the opportunity 
to terminate the agreement, and secondly, if the surrogate exercises her right 
to termination, the genetically related commissioning parent is not afforded 
the same automatic rights as the surrogate mother in respect of legal 
parentage. Partial surrogacy agreements do not give expression to the 
principle of pacta sunt servanda. 
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In conclusion, the author submitted that commercial surrogacy is a favourable 
practice which should be afforded legal recognition. The author substantiated 
this submission on the basis of the right to make decisions regarding 
reproduction, and more importantly, the right to occupational freedom. The 
author concluded that commercial surrogacy is not a practice which can bring 
harm to others; in fact commercial surrogacy can improve and develop the 
way of life and the economic circumstances of many women, and if women 
choose to use their reproductive organs as a mechanism for making money, 
they should not be barred from doing do. Women have the freedom to make 
decisions regarding reproduction, regarding their occupation, trade and 
profession and women have the freedom to contract. To give meaning to their 
right to dignity and equality, the legislature should regulate commercial 
surrogacy. 
In support of the submission that commercial surrogacy be permitted, the 
author made brief reference to the surrogacy law which is currently in 
operation in Israel and proved that through proper regulation, commercial 
surrogacy can be used to further the interests of women, and to protect the 
parties to a surrogacy agreement even better. 
Having regard to the all the submissions made in this chapter and the 
submissions made in chapter two and three, the final chapter of this thesis will 
attempt to provide recommendations for the appropriate manner in which to 
legislate surrogacy agreements in South Africa. 
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CHAPTER FIVE: 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
5.1 Introduction 
This research sought to investigate the constitutional and contractual 
implications of the application of Chapter 19 of the Children's Act 38 of 2005. 
Its objectives, as provided for in chapter one was to examine, assess and 
consider the constitutional and contractual implications of the application of 
Chapter 19 as legislation which affords surrogacy agreements in South Africa 
with legal recognition. 
5.2 Legislative history of surrogate motherhood in South Africa 
The objective behind chapter two of this research was to provide a foundation 
upon which the constitutional and contractual issues of surrogacy in South 
Africa could be examined. Chapter two commenced with a brief description of 
the terminology found in surrogate motherhood agreements and thereafter the 
author examined previous surrogate motherhood regulatory policies. It was 
shown, and subsequently submitted, that prior to the promulgation of the 
Children's Act, no legislation expressly provided for surrogacy agreements in 
South Africa. Although it was said that the definitions of artificial fertilisation as 
provided for in the Human Tissues Act 65 of 1983 and Children's Status Act 
82 of 1987 were wide enough to incorporate surrogate motherhood, the legal 
positions of the parties to surrogacy agreements was still unlegislated and 
thus unclear. 
5.2.1 The AHPC's recommendations 
With this in mind, the author then investigated the recommendations of the 
1999 AHPC Report on Surrogate Motherhood. Attention was directed to the 
recommendations which dealt with the types of surrogacy agreements 
practiced in South Africa, the qualifications required of the parties to enter into 
the agreement, the rights and obligations which the parties would accrue as a 
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result of the agreement and the prohibition of payments in respect of 
surrogacy. A brief discussion was carried out in respect of the best interests of 
the child and the possibility of State funded fertility clinics. 
Having examined the above mentioned recommendations, the author came to 
the following initial conclusions: 
Firstly, cultural surrogacy had neither been expressly permitted nor prohibited 
in the recommendations, and the author submitted that such exclusion may 
give rise to future constitutional disputes. Secondly, it was submitted that the 
recommendation by the AHPC that partial surrogacy be permitted only in the 
case where full surrogacy was possible was favourable. This was motivated 
by the fact that in partial surrogacy, it would be difficult to compel a genetic 
mother to hand over the child born of the agreement to the commissioning 
parents upon birth, and on the basis of the inability to compel a partial 
surrogate to give up her own child at birth, such agreements cannot be said to 
be legally certain. 
Having regard to the qualifications of potential surrogate mothers, the author 
agreed with the following recommendations. First, potential parties should be 
screened for suitability before they are permitted to enter in to surrogacy 
agreements, and secondly, that potential surrogate mothers should be subject 
to an age limitation. Thirdly, it was agreed that neither marriage nor sexual 
orientation should be considered in respect of the suitability of potential 
surrogates, and fourthly, because of the possible implications on the rights of 
the partner of the surrogate, the author concluded that she was in agreement 
with the recommendation that the consent of the surrogate's partner was 
necessary for confirmation of the agreement. However the author did not 
agree with the recommendation that potential surrogates must have a living 
child of her own and was concerned by the exclusion of the AHPC regarding a 
possible age limitation in respect of potential surrogate mothers. 
Having regard to the commissioning parents, the author agreed with the 
following recommendations. First, the author agreed that surrogacy should be 
196 
 
 
 
 
a last resort for persons wanting to have a child by other than natural means, 
and secondly, that commissioning parents are to be screened for suitability. 
Thirdly, the author agreed that marriage and sexual orientation were not to be 
seen as qualifications of commissioning parenthood and fourthly, that the 
commissioning parent's partner must consent to the surrogacy agreement. 
However, the legislature should have provided what 'a partner' means in 
terms of the Act 
The author was however uncertain regarding the exclusion of the 
recommendation regarding an age limitation of commissioning parents and 
submitted that the application of the recommendation that at least one 
commissioning parent must be genetically related to the child born of the 
agreement may amount to differentiation on an unjustified ground. 
The next aspect of the recommendations which were discussed was the rights 
and obligations which the parties incur as a result of the application of the 
agreement. The author submitted that full surrogacy is the better option for 
prospective commissioning parents because the recommendations provided 
that a child born of the agreement would be considered the child of the 
commissioning parents from birth, whereas in the case of partial surrogacy, 
the position was the opposite. In partial surrogacy it is uncertain as to who 
would be responsible for the child during the sixty-day period which the 
surrogate mother is afforded to determine whether she will keep the child or 
hand the child over to the commissioning parents. Hence as a result of the 
application of the AHPC recommendations, the rights and the legal position of 
the parties to full surrogacy agreements and partial surrogacy agreements 
were completely distinct. 
Thereafter, the author examined the AHPC recommendation that payments in 
respect of commercial surrogacy be prohibited, the impact that the 
recommendations had on the best interests of the child and an initial 
submission was made as to whether State funded fertility (surrogacy) clinics 
were not feasible. 
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Lastly, the author submitted that she did not agree that the SALC and the 
legislature have chosen to incorporate the regulation of surrogate motherhood 
agreements in the Children's Act. The author submitted that the legislature 
should have followed through with the AHPC's proposed Surrogacy Act for 
the reason that surrogate motherhood agreements do not only involve the 
rights of children, but also the other constitutional and contractual rights of the 
other parties to the agreement. 
5.3 The constitutionality of Chapter 19 
Using the foundation established in chapter two, chapter three of this research 
set out to determine the true extent of the constitutional implications of the 
application of Chapter 19. The intention of the author was to illustrate the 
impeding results on the right to make decisions regarding reproduction, the 
right to equality, the right to dignity, the right to culture and the best interests 
of the child which arises out of the application of Chapter 19 of the Act. 
Ultimately, the author anticipated that Chapter 19 of the Act would give rise to 
future constitutional challenges. 
5.3.1 The Bill of Rights 
After a brief introduction to the basic principles of the Constitution, as well as 
an examination of the rights to equality, dignity and freedom of security and 
person, the author commenced with an examination regarding reproductive 
rights in South Africa. The purpose of the discussion regarding reproductive 
rights was that the author submitted that surrogacy is a reproductive issue 
and that Chapter 19 gives effect to the right to make decisions regarding 
reproduction. The right to make decisions regarding reproduction formed the 
primary right of the research. 
5.3.2 The rights of the potential parties to a surrogacy agreement 
Thereafter, the provisions of Chapter 19 which were identified in chapter two 
as being possible candidates for constitutional scrutiny were once again 
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examined. However, in this chapter they were examined in much greater 
detail having regard to, amongst others, the rights of equality (the Harksen 
test) and dignity and the right to make decisions regarding reproduction, as 
well as the limitations clause. The author separated the examination into three 
sections. First the application of Chapter 19 in respect of the rights of potential 
commissioning parents was addressed, thereafter; the rights of the surrogate, 
and lastly, the possible implications of the application on the best interests of 
the child was examined. 
5.3.3 The rights of potential commissioning parents 
5.3.3.1 Section 294 
In respect of potential commissioning parents, two provisions were identified 
as being constitutionally suspect, namely, section 294 and section 295 of the 
Act. The examination commenced with a brief discussion regarding the 
possibility of the right of persons to a child. Utilising the CC decision of 
Dawood and the right to make decisions regarding reproduction, the author 
concluded that, despite the CC having held that the right to dignity 'extends at 
the very least to the protection of the core elements of marriage-like 
institutions', the word protection could not be interpreted to mean that there is 
a right to a child. 
With this in mind, the author then turned to section 294 of the Act and the 
possible limitation its application placed on potential commissioning parents. It 
was concluded that the application of section 294 of the Act, and the limitation 
which it imposes on infertile persons (single fertile persons and couple where 
both partners are infertile) was unwarranted on the basis that it amounted to 
discrimination as well as it did not such persons the opportunity to exercise 
their right to make decisions regarding reproduction. Thus it was held that the 
limitation on these persons did not serve a constitutionally acceptable 
purpose. 
5.3.3.2 Section 295(a) 
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Thereafter section 295(a) was examined (the corollary of section 294). 
Section 295(a) provides that only persons who are irreversibly and 
permanently unable give birth to a child are permitted to enter into valid 
surrogacy agreements. The author submitted that the effect of section 295(a) 
was that single fertile persons and couples where both partners are fertile are 
excluded from entering into valid surrogacy agreements. The author 
concluded that her initial conclusion that the limitation which arose as a result 
was justifiable was incorrect. Although it was submitted that one of the initial 
purposes of Chapter 19 was to provide persons who were unable to conceive 
and give birth by natural means a method in which to have genetically related 
children who were legally recognised as their own, the application of section 
295(a) means that persons who are fertile cannot exercise their right to make 
decisions regarding reproduction merely because of their ability to produce on 
their own. Therefore, section 295(a) was found to be constitutionally 
unacceptable. 
5.3.4 The rights of potential surrogate mothers 
5.3.4.1 Section 295(c)(viii) 
Thereafter the author directed the readers' attention to provisions of the Act 
which may have the potential to limit the rights of the surrogate. In this 
respect, the author first examined section 295(c)(viii) and the requirement that 
a surrogate must have a living child of her own. It was concluded, that without 
any irrefutable proof illustrating that a surrogate who has a child of her own 
will be more likely to relinquish the child born of the agreement at birth than a 
surrogate without a child, the limitation which the application of section 
295(c)(viii) has on the rights of potential surrogates without a child of their own 
is unwarranted. 
5.3.4.2 Exclusion of age as suitability factor for surrogate 
Secondly, the author considered the exclusion of the legislature of an age limit 
for potential surrogates. The author concluded that not only is the health of 
the surrogate at risk when she is over the age of 35 years, but the health of 
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the child to be born of the agreement as well. With this in mind, it was 
submitted that considering the risk to the surrogate and the child, it would be 
in the best interests of all the parties concerned if a maximum age restriction 
was implemented in respect of would-be surrogates. In addition to this, the 
author concluded that despite age being a listed ground of discrimination, 
such discrimination would be a reasonable limitation on the rights of potential 
surrogate mothers considering that the purpose of the limitation was to protect 
the lives of potential surrogates and the lives of future children born of 
surrogacy agreements. The author concluded that an additional benefit of the 
inclusion of such limitation would be that the enforceability of the agreement 
would be strengthened because with the imposition of a maximum age 
limitation, the probability of the surrogate miscarrying or the child being still 
born are greatly reduced, thus enforceability is enhanced. Hence, the 
exclusion of age as a restricting factor amounted to a failure on behalf of the 
legislature. 
5.3.5 The rights of potential commissioning parents and potential surrogate 
mothers 
5.3.5.1 Non-recognition of cultural surrogacy 
The final exclusion of the legislature which was examined was that of the non-
recognition of cultural surrogacy in the Act. Referring to the right to make 
decisions regarding reproduction and the right to culture (as provided for in 
section 30 and 31 of the Constitution) the author concluded that the non-
recognition of cultural surrogacy as a form of assisted reproduction was an 
unwarranted limitation on the rights of both potential commissioning parents 
and potential surrogate mothers to practice their culture. The author submitted 
that without evidence to show that the practice cultural surrogacy was 
contrary to values of the Bill of Rights, it could not be said that the practice of 
cultural surrogacy was inconsistent with the Constitution. 
With this in mind, the author then examined the implications that the non-
recognition of cultural surrogacy may have on the cultures that practice it. The 
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author concluded that through failing to legally recognise cultural surrogacy, 
the children who are born as a result of cultural surrogacy agreements are not 
afforded the same legal status as those children born of valid surrogacy 
agreements. Not only was this found not to be in the best interests of such 
children, but it was found to be an unwarranted limitation on the rights of 
parties to cultural surrogacy agreements. Effectively, the non-recognition of 
cultural surrogacy creates more uncertainty now regarding the positions of the 
parties to these agreements than it did before the Act came into operation. 
Thus for purposes of legal clarification and more importantly, in the best 
interests of the child, if the legislature truly intended cultural surrogacy be 
excluded, it should have been expressly provided as such. Lastly, it was 
stated that it was unknown if persons who practiced cultural surrogacy would 
be subject to criminal sanctions because they contravened the Act. 
5.3.6 The best interests of the child 
After having considered the possible constitutional implications of the 
application of Chapter 19 of the Act, as well as the possible implications of the 
exclusions of the legislature on the rights of potential commissioning parents 
and potential surrogate mothers, attention was directed to the implications 
such provisions and exclusions may have on the best interests of the child. 
The issue commenced with an examination of the best interests of the child 
principle. The author noted that the principle, as provided for in the 
Constitution as well as the Act, was not novel to South African or international 
law, and numerous precedents existed regarding the interpretation of the 
right. 
Having regard to the above, the author then commenced with a re-
examination of all the provisions and exclusions which had been discussed 
previously. 
5.3.6.1 Section 294 
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With regard to section 294 of the Act, read with section 41 of the Act (the right 
to information in respect of genetic origin), the author concluded that the 
limitation which is imposed as a result of the application of section 294 on the 
rights of all the parties, specifically in respect of the best interests of the child 
born of the agreement, was not justifiable. The author concluded that although 
it will be in the best interest of the child if he/she has access to information 
regarding his/her genetic relation, such access was not dependant on sharing 
a genetic relation with his/her commissioning parent. Resultantly, the 
limitation which arises out of the application of section 294 on the rights of 
potential commissioning parents was not found to be justifiable on the basis 
that it was in the best interests of the child. 
5.3.6.2 Section 295(a) 
Pertaining to the inclusion of section 295 of the Act, the author discussed 
section 295(a), section 295(c)(viii) and section 295(e) simultaneously. The 
rationale of examining the impact of section 295 (a) and (c)(viii) on the best 
interests of the child together was that both of these provisions had received 
similar concerns regarding their application. Section 295(e) and section 10 of 
the Act were used in support of the best interests of the child principle. 
Section 295(a) was found to impose an unjustifiable limitation on the rights of 
would-be commissioning parents. When examining the provision anew and in 
light of the best interest of all the children party to the agreement (section 
295(e)), the author reached the same conclusion. The author submitted that 
even if the commissioning parents were not permanently and irreversibly 
unable to conceive and to give birth and thus a likelihood existed they may 
choose at a later stage to have a child through natural conception, this did not 
justify the exclusion of fertile would-be commissioning parents from the 
application of the Act. The submission that there existed a risk that the child 
born of the surrogacy agreement may feel substandard because he/she is not 
completely genetically related to his/her parents and left out if a 'genetically 
related' sibling is born was illogical. Parents cannot be expected to ask their 
children's permission to have another child. Thus it was concluded that the 
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inclusion of section 295(a) on the basis of the best interests of the child was 
unreasonable and section 295(a) placed an unwarranted limitation on the 
rights of potential commissioning parents to exercise their rights to make 
decisions regarding reproduction. 
In respect of section 295(c)(viii), the authors preliminary observations were 
that the limitation imposed on potential surrogate mothers who did not have a 
child of their own was unwarranted. The author submitted that without 
decisive proof showing that a surrogate who has a child of her own would be 
less likely to refuse to hand over the child upon birth than a surrogate without 
a child of her own, the limitation imposed by the application of section 
295(c)(viii) did not fulfil a constitutionally acceptable purpose. 
Having regard to section 10 of the Act (the right of a child to participate in all 
matters concerning themselves) and section 295(e) (the family members and 
circumstances of the parties must be taken into consideration), the author 
concluded that the provision requiring that a surrogate mother should have a 
child of her own was not in the best interests of the other children to the 
agreement. The author made use of case law and literature which showed 
that there exists the likelihood that the children of the surrogate may not 
comprehend what their mother (the surrogate) is doing. On the day upon 
which she hands over the child to the commissioning parents, they may fear 
being 'rejected' too. Hence the author concluded that it would not be in the 
best interests of the child if a surrogate had a child of her own, and ultimately, 
the limitation arising out of the application of section 295(c)(viii) resulted in an 
unwarranted limitation of the rights of all the parties to surrogacy agreements. 
5.3.6.3 The exclusion of age as a suitability requirement for the s surrogate 
mother 
Subsequent to the discussion on section 295 of the Act, the author discussed 
the implication of the exclusion of the maximum age limitation on the best 
interests of the child. As previously stated, the author found that the exclusion 
by the legislature to include such a clause amounted to a failure to recognise 
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the inherent risks to both the surrogate and the child in a 'geriatric pregnancy'. 
Having regard to the best interests of the child principle, such exclusion was 
found to be in conflict with the best interests of the child. 
5.3.6.4 The non-recognition of cultural surrogacy 
Lastly, the author examined the impact that the non-recognition of cultural 
surrogacy may have on the best interests of the child. It was concluded that 
despite the fact that cultural surrogacy may be difficult to regulate, it was not 
in the best interests of the child to exclude children born of a cultural 
surrogacy agreement from the legal protection which Chapter 19 affords all 
other children born of valid surrogacy agreements. Hence, the author 
concluded that the legislature had failed to take cognisance of the best 
interests of the child principle when it chose not to recognise cultural 
surrogacy as a form of assisted reproduction. 
5.3.7 The right of access to reproductive health services 
The last part of the chapter examined section 27(1)(a) of the Constitution as 
another right which affords recognition to the right to reproductive autonomy. 
Although the Act does not provide for the right to access to surrogacy-
enabling medical procedures, section 27(1)(a) was examined because of the 
initial AHPC recommendation that provision should be made for State-funded 
fertility clinics to assist those who cannot afford medical procedures 
associated with the fulfilment of surrogate motherhood. 
The section commenced with an investigation into socio-economic rights 
judicial precedent. Having regard to this, the author concluded that access to 
any socio-economic right was limited by the qualification of progressive 
realisation, restricted state funding and the qualification 'desperate need'. 
Hence, the author concluded that the right of access to surrogacy-enabling 
reproductive technologies did not qualify as a desperate need which required 
the implementation of immediate legislative frameworks which would require 
nationwide surrogacy assisting clinics. 
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5.4 The contractual issues of Chapter 19 of the Act 
After having examined the constitutional impact of the application of Chapter 
19 of the Act on the rights on parties to a surrogacy agreement, the purpose 
of chapter four of this research was to illustrate that in addition to 
constitutional implications, Chapter 19 of the Act also gives rise to contractual 
consequences for the parties to the surrogacy agreement. The author 
intended to show that Chapter 19 of the Act does not permit the parties to a 
valid surrogacy agreement to choose with whom they wish to contract and on 
what terms they wish to contract. Ultimately, the author proposed that Chapter 
19 of the Act does not give rise to wholly enforceable surrogacy agreements 
and therefore Chapter 19 does not protect the interests of all the parties 
concerned. As a final point, the author intended to illustrate that commercial 
surrogacy should be permitted and with reference to international legislation, 
commercial surrogacy can be adequately regulated. 
5.4.1 Cornerstones of a contract 
The chapter commenced with a brief discussion regarding the principles of 
freedom to contract and pacta sunt servanda. Thereafter, the author 
examined the seven requirements of a valid contract in terms of the general 
law of contract, whilst simultaneously applying these requirements to a 
surrogacy agreement. Whilst it was concluded that surrogacy agreements do 
amount to valid contracts in light of the seven requirements of the general law 
of contract, the author did raise concern concerning the omission by the 
legislature to stipulate what would become of the rights and obligations of the 
parties to an illegal surrogacy agreement. 
5.4.2 Breach of contract 
Having determined that a surrogacy agreement constitutes a valid contract in 
terms of the law of contract, the author then introduced the concept of breach 
of a contract. The author established that the law of contract provides for 
three remedies for breach, namely, negative malperformance, positive 
206 
 
 
 
 
malperformance and anticipatory breach, and in most cases, both the debtor 
and creditor can be guilty of these three forms of breach. Whilst examining the 
requirements of negative malperformance, positive malperformance and 
anticipatory breach (repudiation and prevention of performance), the author 
simultaneously applied possible scenarios which may arise in the case of 
breach of a surrogacy agreement. With this, it was clear, and it was concluded 
as such, that there may be situations which give rise to breach in the case of 
surrogacy agreements. 
5.4.3 Remedies for breach 
Once it had been concluded that breach was possible in the case of 
surrogacy agreements, the author then commenced with an examination into 
the three primary remedies of breach as provide for in the general law of 
contract, namely, specific performance, cancellation and remedies. Whilst 
discussing these remedies, the author simultaneously applied probable cases 
of breach arising out of surrogacy agreements. The purpose of this application 
was to determine if the three primary remedies could assist parties to a 
surrogacy agreement in the case of breach. The author concluded that the 
ordinary remedies available to contractants in the case breach will not amount 
to adequate redress for innocent parties in the case of breach of surrogacy 
agreements The author concluded that because surrogacy agreements do not 
deal with everyday objects, but with the rights and interests of a child and 
his/her parents, the remedies available to ordinary contractants will not be 
able to place them in the position they would have been had the surrogacy 
agreement been fulfilled. 
5.4.4 The enforceability of surrogacy agreements 
After having concluded that breach can occur in the case of surrogacy 
agreements and that the primary remedies which are available to ordinary 
contractants in the case of breach will be ineffectual, the author then directed 
the discussion to the crux of the chapter: enforceability of surrogacy 
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agreements and the implications that the application of section 298 and 299 of 
the Act has on such enforceability. 
5.4.4.1 The contractual implications of termination of full surrogacy 
agreements 
Having regard to the fact that in terms of the Act, surrogacy agreements are 
supposedly wholly enforceable and cannot be terminated post fertilisation, the 
author concluded that full surrogacy agreements cannot be terminated post 
fertilisation. This was based on the submission that because a genetic tie did 
not exist between the surrogate and the child to be born of the full surrogacy 
agreement, the surrogate could be compelled to relinquish the child to the 
commissioning parents on birth. Hence, it was concluded, that it would be in 
the best interests of all the parties concerned that full surrogacy, because it 
can be enforced, is the more favourable type of surrogacy agreement. 
5.4.4.2 The contractual implications of termination of partial surrogacy 
agreements 
Despite the fact that the Act provides that valid surrogacy agreements are 
fully enforceable post fertilisation of the surrogate mother, section 298 of the 
Act provides that a partial surrogate mother (i.e. a surrogate who is both the 
genetic and gestational mother of the child to be born of the agreement) can 
terminate the agreement up until 60 days after the birth of the child. In this 
respect, the author concluded that the partial surrogate cannot be compelled 
to give up a child which is genetically related to her if she decides that she 
does not want to. On the basis of this, the author concluded that it would be in 
the best interests of all the parties concerned that partial surrogacy 
agreements not be permitted in terms of the Act. This was because of the fact 
that first, the surrogate cannot be compelled to give up her own genetically 
related child and secondly, because partial surrogacy agreements will never 
be fully enforceable. Thirdly, if the surrogate decided to keep the child and 
raise it as her own, the parentage position of the commissioning parent who 
was genetically related to the child was not stipulated in the Act. Finally, the 
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uncertainty which arises out of the practice of partial surrogacy agreements 
could not be said to be in the best interests of the child. Hence, it could not be 
concluded that partial surrogacy was in the best interests of all the parties 
concerned. 
5.4.5 Compensation for reproductive services 
Throughout chapter two and three, the author submitted that partial surrogacy 
agreements do not provide protection for the interests of all the parties to the 
surrogacy agreement. The author concluded that full surrogacy agreements 
were more favourable to the contractual and legal positions of the parties. In 
addition to this, the author submitted that full surrogacy, incorporating 
commercial surrogacy, was the manner in which to sufficiently protect the 
interests of all the parties concerned. 
5.4.5.1 The right to occupational freedom 
The author referred to section 22 of the Constitution and the right of everyone 
to choose their occupation, trade and profession. With this, the author referred 
to case law pertaining to the right to economic activity (section 26 of the 
Interim Constitution) in which the courts found that the right to economic 
activity could be limited if the limitation fulfilled a suitable purpose. In addition 
to this, the author referred to German Constitutional case law which defined 
'occupation' as both the manner in which to gratify material and self-
satisfaction needs. 
Taking the above into consideration, the author concluded that the prohibition 
on commercial surrogacy (the right to be compensated for reproductive 
services) was unwarranted because not only could commercial surrogacy 
amount to an occupation which could satisfy both material and self-
development needs, but the principal of the freedom of contract necessitated 
that women be permitted to choose which contracts they want to enter into, 
with whom they want to contract and upon which terms they want to contract. 
In this light, both the right to make decisions regarding reproduction and the 
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right to occupational freedom gave rise to the right to be compensated for 
reproductive services. 
5.4.5.2 Commercial surrogacy in Israel 
To conclude the chapter, the author made reference to Israel and the 
Surrogate Motherhood Agreements (Approval of Agreement and Status of 
Newborn) Law 5756 of 1996 to illustrate that through appropriate legislation, 
commercial surrogacy could be used to protect the interests of all the parties 
concerned, and that exploitation of the parties was not always the case with 
commercial surrogacy. 
5.5 Recommendations 
This research has reflected that there are a number provisions of Chapter 19 
of the Act which, when applied, may amount to a limitation on the rights of the 
parties to a surrogacy agreement, as well as have an impact on the principles 
of freedom of contract and pacta sunt servanda. After having examined these 
provisions in detail, the author recommends that Chapter 19 of the Act be 
repealed and that the proposed Surrogacy Act, which was recommended by 
the AHPC, and which envisaged the regulation of surrogacy agreements in a 
specialised piece of legislation, is drafted. Alternatively, the following is 
recommended: 
(i) The Act should be amended to include a provision stipulating the 
cultural surrogacy is also recognised as a form of surrogacy in South Africa, 
and the provisions of the Act, where possible, apply equally to all forms of 
surrogacy practice. 
(ii) The Act should be amended to include a provision that partial 
surrogacy is not a recognised form of surrogacy in South African law, and that 
partial surrogacy agreements will not be deemed as legally valid and 
enforceable for the purposes of the Act. 
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(iii) The Act should be amended to include a provision that provides that 
the suitability and competency of all the parties to the agreement will be 
determined through a screening and counselling process. The screening and 
counselling will be performed by certified medical practitioners, such as 
psychologists, who will determined from time to time by the Minister in the 
Regulations to the Act. 
(iv) The Act should be amended to include a provision which provides that 
the surrogate must be of an age, determined from time to time by the Minister 
in the Government Gazette, which is deemed to be suitable in respect of the 
physical and psychological aspects of pregnancy. 
(v) The Act should be amended to exclude the requirement that a 
surrogate mother must have a documented history of pregnancy and a child 
of her own. 
(vi) The Act should be amended to exclude all provisions which 
differentiate between termination of a full surrogacy agreement and 
termination of a partial surrogacy agreement. 
(vii) The Act should be amended to read that the effect of all valid 
surrogacy agreements is that the child born of the agreement will be for all 
purposes the child of the commissioning parents. 
(viii) The Act should be amended to exclude any provision which directly or 
indirectly refers to the compensation of the agreement. The Act must be 
amended to read that the surrogate shall be entitled to both the reasonable 
compensation for her services as a surrogate as well as to the reasonable 
compensation for those expenses which the surrogate incurred as a result of 
the agreement. Lastly, a provision must be included that the parties are to 
determine the reasonable compensation for the surrogates services amongst 
themselves. However the High Court who confirms the agreement will 
determine if such compensation is just and reasonable considering the 
respective positions and resources of the parties. 
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This research has presented an argument and reached the conclusion that 
the application of Chapter 19 of the Act does provide grounds for possible 
future constitutional challenges and contractual implications, and 
consequently, several of the provisions incorporated into Chapter 19 of the 
Act do impose unreasonable and unjustifiable limitations on the rights of 
potential parties to a surrogacy agreement. In this, the research question 
which was posed in chapter one, has be answered in the affirmative. 
The recommendations which have been provided are aimed at establishing 
greater legal certainty in respect the rights of all the parties to the surrogacy 
agreement, providing improved contractual protection for all the parties 
concerned, and to ensure that the best interests of the child is given due 
consideration. 
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CHAPTER 19 
SURROGATE MOTHERHOOD (ss 292-303) 
292 Surrogate motherhood agreement must be in writing and confirmed 
by High Court 
(1) No surrogate motherhood agreement is valid unless-
(a) the agreement is in writing and is signed by all the parties 
thereto; 
(b) the agreement is entered into in the Republic; 
(c) at least one of the commissioning parents, or where the 
commissioning parent is a single person, that person, is at the 
time of entering into the agreement domiciled in the Republic; 
(d) the surrogate mother and her husband or partner, if any, are at 
the time of entering into the agreement domiciled in the 
Republic; and 
(e) the agreement is confirmed by the High Court within whose area 
of jurisdiction the commissioning parent or parents are domiciled 
or habitually resident. 
(2) A court may, on good cause shown, dispose with the requirement 
set out in subsection (1) (d). 
293 Consent of husband, wife or partner 
(1) Where a commissioning parent is married or involved in a 
permanent relationship, the court may not confirm the agreement unless the 
husband, wife or partner of the commissioning parent has given his or her 
written consent to the agreement and has become a party to the agreement. 
(2) Where the surrogate mother is married or involved in a permanent 
relationship, the court may not confirm the agreement unless her husband or 
partner has given his or her written consent to the agreement and has 
become a party to the agreement. 
(3) Where a husband or partner of a surrogate mother who is not the 
genetic parent of the child unreasonably withholds his or her consent, the 
court may confirm the agreement. 
294 Genetic origin of child 
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No surrogate motherhood agreement is valid unless the conception of 
the child contemplated in the agreement is to be effected by the use of the 
gametes of both commissioning parents or, if that is not possible due to 
biological, medical or other valid reasons, the gamete of at least one of the 
commissioning parents or, where the commissioning parent is a single 
person, the gamete of that person. 
295 Confirmation by court 
A court may not confirm a surrogate motherhood agreement unless-
(a) the commissioning parent or parents are not able to give birth to 
a child and that the condition is permanent and irreversible; 
(b) the commissioning parent or parents-
(i) are in terms of this Act competent to enter into the 
agreement; 
(ii) are in all respects suitable persons to accept the 
parenthood of the child that is to be conceived; and 
(iii) understand and accept the legal consequences of the 
agreement and this Act and their rights and obligations in 
terms thereof; 
(c) the surrogate mother-
(i) is in terms of this Act competent to enter into the 
agreement; 
(ii) is in all respects a suitable person to act as surrogate 
mother; 
(iii) understands and accepts the legal consequences of the 
agreement and this Act and her rights and obligations in 
terms thereof; 
(iv) is not using surrogacy as a source of income; 
(v) has entered into the agreement for altruistic reasons and 
not for commercial purposes; 
(vi) has a documented history of at least one pregnancy and 
viable delivery; and 
(vii) has a living child of her own; 
(d) the agreement includes adequate provisions for the contact, 
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care, upbringing and general welfare of the child that is to be 
born in a stable home environment, including the child's position 
in the event of the death of the commissioning parents or one of 
them, or their divorce or separation before the birth of the child; 
and 
(e) in general, having regard to the personal circumstances and 
family situations of all the parties concerned, but above all the 
interests of the child that is to be born, the agreement should be 
confirmed. 
296 Artificial fertilisation of surrogate mother 
(1) No artificial fertilisation of the surrogate mother may take place-
(a) before the surrogate motherhood agreement is confirmed by the 
court; 
(b) after the lapse of 18 months from the date of the confirmation of 
the agreement in question by the court. 
(2) Any artificial fertilisation of a surrogate mother in the execution of an 
agreement contemplated in this Act must be done in accordance with the 
provisions of the National Health Act, 2003 (Act 61 of 2003). 
297 Effect of surrogate motherhood agreement on status of child 
(1) The effect of a valid surrogate motherhood agreement is that-
(a) any child born of a surrogate mother in accordance with the 
agreement is for all purposes the child of the commissioning 
parent or parents from the moment of the birth of the child 
concerned; 
(b) the surrogate mother is obliged to hand the child over to the 
commissioning parent or parents as soon as is reasonably 
possible after the birth; 
(c) the surrogate mother or her husband, partner or relatives has no 
rights of parenthood or care of the child; 
(d) the surrogate mother or her husband, partner or relatives have 
no right of contact with the child unless provided for in the 
agreement between the parties; 
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(e) subject to sections 292 and 293, the surrogate motherhood 
agreement may not be terminated after the artificial fertilisation 
of the surrogate mother has taken place; and 
(f) the child will have no claim for maintenance or of succession 
against the surrogate mother, her husband or partner or any of 
their relatives. 
(2) Any surrogate motherhood agreement that does not comply with 
the provisions of this Act is invalid and any child born as a result of any action 
taken in execution of such an arrangement is for all purposes deemed to be 
the child of the woman that gave birth to that child. 
298 Termination of surrogate motherhood agreement 
(1) A surrogate mother who is also a genetic parent of the child 
concerned may, at any time prior to the lapse of a period of sixty days after 
the birth of the child, terminate the surrogate motherhood agreement by filing 
written notice with the court. 
(2) The court must terminate the confirmation of the agreement in 
terms of section 295 upon finding, after notice to the parties to the agreement 
and a hearing, that the surrogate mother has voluntarily terminated the 
agreement and that she understands the effects of the termination, and the 
court may issue any other appropriate order if it is in the best interest of the 
child. 
(3) The surrogate mother incurs no liability to the commissioning 
parents for exercising her rights of termination in terms of this section, except 
for compensation for any payments made by the commissioning parents in 
terms of section 301. 
299 Effect of termination of surrogate motherhood agreement 
The effect of the termination of a surrogate motherhood agreement in 
terms of section 298 is that-
(a) where the agreement is terminated after the child is born, any 
parental rights established in terms of section 297 are 
terminated and vest in the surrogate mother, her husband or 
partner, if any, or if none, the commissioning father; 
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(b) where the agreement is terminated before the child is born, the 
child is the child of the surrogate mother, her husband or 
partner, if any, or if none, the commissioning father, from the 
moment of the child's birth; 
(c) the surrogate mother and her husband or partner, if any, or if 
none, the commissioning father, is obliged to accept the 
obligation of parenthood; 
(d) subject to paragraphs (a) and (b), the commissioning parents 
have no rights of parenthood and can only obtain such rights 
through adoption; and 
(e) subject to paragraphs (a) and (b), the child has no claim for 
maintenance or of succession against the commissioning 
parents or any of their relatives. 
300 Termination of pregnancy 
(1) A surrogate motherhood agreement is terminated by a termination 
of pregnancy that may be carried out in terms of the Choice on Termination of 
Pregnancy Act, 1996 (Act 92 of 1996). 
(2) For the purposes of the Choice on Termination of Pregnancy Act, 
1996, the decision to terminate lies with the surrogate mother, but she must 
inform the commissioning parents of her decision prior to the termination and 
consult with the commissioning parents before the termination is carried out. 
(3) The surrogate mother incurs no liability to the commissioning 
parents for exercising her right to terminate a pregnancy pursuant to this 
section except for compensation for any payments made by the 
commissioning parents in terms of section 301 where the decision to 
terminate is taken for any reason other than on medical grounds. 
301 Payments in respect of surrogacy prohibited 
(1) Subject to subsections (2) and (3), no person may in connection 
with a surrogate motherhood agreement give or promise to give to any 
person, or receive from any person, a reward or compensation in cash or in 
kind. 
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(2) No promise or agreement for the payment of any compensation to a 
surrogate mother or any other person in connection with a surrogate 
motherhood agreement or the execution of such an agreement is enforceable, 
except a claim for-
(a) compensation for expenses that relate directly to the artificial 
fertilisation and pregnancy of the surrogate mother, the birth of 
the child and the confirmation of the surrogate motherhood 
agreement; 
(b) loss of earnings suffered by the surrogate mother as a result of 
the surrogate motherhood agreement; or 
(c) insurance to cover the surrogate mother for anything that may 
lead to death or disability brought about by the pregnancy. 
(3) Any person who renders a bona fide professional legal or medical 
service with a view to the confirmation of a surrogate motherhood agreement 
in terms of section 295 or in the execution of such an agreement, is entitled to 
reasonable compensation therefor. 
302 Identity of parties 
(1) The identity of the parties to court proceedings with regard to a 
surrogate motherhood agreement may not be published without the written 
consent of the parties concerned. 
(2) No person may publish any facts that reveal the identity of a person 
born as a result of a surrogate motherhood agreement. 
303 Prohibition of certain acts 
(1) No person may artificially fertilise a woman in the execution of a 
surrogate motherhood agreement or render assistance in such artificial 
fertilisation, unless that artificial fertilisation is authorised by a court in terms of 
the provisions of this Act. 
(2) No person may in any way for or with a view to compensation make 
known that any person is or might possibly be willing to enter into a surrogate 
motherhood agreement. 
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